It must be clear to differentiate war, struggle for faith, struggle for life, endemic violence, disputes over property, and the various ways humans fight each other, to arrive at useful knowledge of how mechanisms to fight, oppress, cajole, manipulate, and so on are deployed on a continuous basis. War is not reducible to a few trite sayings, but war is a particular type of violence committed by humanity. The usual formulation of war is that war is politics by other means, and thus the state and state society are the key distinction between war and other states of aggression. States can, and usually do, present war as a thing which can be controlled, planned, and implemented in measured or limited ways. So too do the partisans who favor war present war as a game or a situation which can be controlled, where one generalissimo waves his mighty hand to move armies and change the world. The language of war is omnipresent in modern society, and in particular the technocratic view of the world which became the default during the 20th century, against which all other views of politics, government, society, science, spiritual and temporal authority were compared. The existence of that technocratic view, and how it came about, is a lengthy discussion of the entire breadth of human history, and it would be quite impossible to describe in detail how warbands eventually turned to the city-state, then to empires, and then to institutions that we would recognize today. It is often forgotten that states are, in the end, little more than associations of men and women who formed the state for their own purposes, rather than some ulterior motive that is above human concerns. All activities we call war are conducted by humans, and usually the intended target of war is other humans rather than the world or forms of life considered lesser. While a war against termites may be a useful metaphor, no one is seriously convinced the termites rouse their comrades to arms or view their existence in the same way humans view their existence as driven by war and peace. A war against the weather or a war against a mountain would be sillier still, because non-living natural events are there, doing their thing, without any regard to our conceits. If you wish to hate a mountain for being in your way, you probably shouldn't burden yourself with the belief that the mountain has it out for you. As much as we often say "the game knows" when fortune disfavors us, the game or the computer simulation really doesn't know. Cold reality is a very poor explanation of war, its purpose, and the motives of those who engage in it. Very little of war, in actuality, concerns any real or material objective, even though our material concerns have been made subject to war and its doctrines for as long as humans followed organized spiritual authority. Wars are materially very expensive, never go as planned, and usually the dispute causing the war could have been resolved much earlier if not for human pigheadedness and a certain cult in human society that desires war for its own sake, as they knew from the outset they would bear none of the consequences and saw war itself as life's prime want. Wars are never fought for their stated intention, and every general follows interests that make sense to him. Another trite saying, appropriate to modernity, is that war is business, and war as a business shows to new recruits the horrible truth about what they signed up for, which had nothing to do with the idiotic tales of glory and prestige the talking head on television or radio bragged about.

References to the origins of the cult of war have been present throughout this writing, in describing endemic violence and the likely motives of human actors in that time. I have often defaulted to the perspective of someone like myself, who would not be inducted into any cult of war and had every reason to consider the entire enterprise to be the worst bullshit. Without any filter, human history would appear to an alien as an endless series of barbaric betrayals, lies uttered constantly and in every expression common to the race, ultraviolence towards humankind and a system of organized torture and slaughter of animals that was essential to the definition of human civilization, races towards goals that are childish and vapid if someone thought about them for five minutes, institutions that never do anything except hurt others even though the apparent desire of people is to not do that, and a generally dismal existence that would lead an alien to smite the entire monstrosity and made the destruction of Sodom look like the destruction of an anthill. For all the glorification of war and its continued practice, there is scarcely any justification that would make sense even to those who participate in it. It is doubly ridiculous because, if wars had any resemblance to a game with a victory condition, the ways in which wars are fought are hilariously counterproductive, burning through resources at a prodigious rate. No one in the business of war has any incentive to ever see it end, because if war were fought with a mind to winning it, it would become clear in technocratic society that wars could be neutralized forever and the entire expenditure into its practice could be directed towards something that actually produced a return, or simply stored or used for things we would rather do with our time and wealth. An end to war would be the worst of all worlds to those who made their name and reputation off the glory of service to it, and to the states which were born first and foremost because they were instruments of war. The holders of the state operate in their societies as if they were at war with the ruled, and this is the only way such a society could conceive of order and stability. If our societies were oriented towards non-domination or goals of a purely spiritual or productive nature, none of our theories of government or the types of government yet known would be at all acceptable, and so prevalent is the faith in war that the concept of this world without war imagines either an immaculately perfect world where everyone goosesteps by some natural instict which perpetuates eternally, or some world where people are too stupid to know how to fight. The concept of actually moving past war while retaining some dignity and the option of fighting is anathema to all theories of government currently known. Even when the cost of war is enormous and there is no good reason to undertake such a ruinous enterprise, certain people insist and insinuate that war must continue no matter what, and often these are among the most worthless members of the middle class and the predatory of all classes whose goals have always been selfish and pigheaded. It is concluded that if there is any possibility of violence, then nature's law is that the violence will be expressed and assert dominance. In short, the predatory element's faith in war is premised on a belief that defensive war is totally ineffective. This is why wars continue to be sold as quick, cheap, and easy to win, no matter how ridiculous those claims are to anyone with a functioning brain and connection to reality. Nowhere was this ethos towards war more dominant than in the second world war, as the entire cope of those who did the most to instigate that war is that defensive war was for simps and great generals always won their planned offensive campaigns because they're so much smarter. It's strange because the blitz strategy was only effective in certain political situations. The Nazis themselves praised Hitler for being a great conqueror without actually fighting battles, and that was the Nazi modus operandi for making their war expenditure pay off. The entire thing was engineered to favor a bullycoward strategy and insist that the selected losers had to lose, and so the Nazi victories were possible politically because of a large aristocratic fifth column in a conquered country that agreed with everything the Nazis believed and that they were members of the coming master race. They joined in a global movement to purge the world of the weak who believed in things like democracy, communism, and basic decency like not being a screaming maniacal killer. The actions of the Nazis are only sensical if the Nazis were understood as the vanguard of a global movement, rather than simply the ruling party of a particular national project, seen in isolation in history books as a peculiar example. The cult of war of that time included a strange pseudo-history where nation-states were driven by arbitrary identities, and that different races fought for no particular reason whatsoever, and this was just accepted as if it were totally normal and how it always had been. The entire experience of the first world war and what led to it was whitewashed as soon as it was over, in preparation for the second round.

It is at that time when war no longer became a situation of temporary duration, but the permanent and default state of human societies. Peace was to be sold as a commodity in limited supply, and this peace was always backed by some doomsday weapon pointed at civilian centers as a threat of what happens if too many people do not get with the program. It strains credulity to call this situation peace in the sense that anyone would appreciate it, and woe to those who seek peace and believe the institutions in such a society share that interest! In doing this, war ceased to be war in the sense that the concept was appreciated. For war to be war implied that there was a condition called peace, and that war was the exception rather than the rule. Everyone in the cult of war implicitly believes that peace is an objective, if their cult is to have any meaning. Whether they actually arrive at peace, or if peace would be good for their true motives, is a different question, but the only leverage a warrior has is that peace is a potential outcome of all war activity. The objective of permanent war is not to make the war absolute, but to place a premium on the price of peace, and yank it away from people after it is dangled in front of them as a promise. Those who do possess peace are in a limited class, who form islands of humanity where life went on. The enclosure of the world entailed that what we called "life" in free society could no longer be considered life, and all who were outside of this club where peace was possible would be on edge, and put on notice that any seeming peace was an illusion. In most of the world, if you have peace, you merely have not seen the thing that is trying to kill you. It is not a surprise to people that peaceful civilizations do not require threats of nuclear annihilation and extremely violent biological interventions, and the promise of peace through such means is not peace as we originally conceived it. History is revised to suggest that it has always been this way, and what we thought was peace in the past was an illusion. This "enlightenment" about the permanence of war and the ruling institutions ignores entirely the nature of past armies and campaigns, and how the war machine operated from Antiquity up to the turn of the 20th century. War was indeed typical of states and always available as a threat, but the theory of society and the state in practice - whether it was the feudal or liberal model, or some other model imagined - was that society could only be possible under regular order, and this meant that laws and enforcement had to at least appear as if they followed principles understood by all participants in society, or at least all participants that were considered mentally valid. Even if there were distinct classes and political and social inequality was the rule, anyone with a mind lived in the same world, even if they were a slave. For any theory of society to remain in force, and this is true today for it is a rule of nature rather than a rule we made, there must be an assumption that there is a real world where events happen, and that social distinctions were only meaningful because people of different classes would do different things, held different property, and possessed different characteristics in some way that was appreciated by all. War, to be war, entails that a society is under attack. There is no form of "socially acceptable" war that is purely a ritualistic practice, however much idiots like to tell us that such a thing is possible. A ritual war carried out without purpose is not war that would be appreciated as relevant, and the ritual war could be replaced with some chanting and then marching the intended sacrifices to a death furnace, and believing that this was just totally natural and not at all weird. There may be rituals pertaining to war and a way that is considered normal - that is to say, some code that warriors abide among each other, and that is more or less expected in warriors' behavior towards civilians.

At core war as a practice is waged by one society against another, and for the purposes of war, the two societies are alien until reconciliation happens. War to be war is a war not against a particular entity, or even initiated by a particular entity like a state, but against society as a concept. War as a practice has long been known to corrode the bonds of a society, forcing members of a society into behaviors they would not normally consider. War as a team-building exercise is a hilarious folly, and anyone suggesting that wars and armies build comraderie is either very naive about how armies operate, or is lying to someone who they want to fear the military. The default attitude of a soldier towards their own army is distrust, and this is expected and serves a very real function. Soldiers who are blind followers and do not know what they are shooting or why they do it are not desirable. A certain level of connection to reality and fidelity to truth is necessary for someone to actually practice war, even if it is a planned war or ritual war and the true motives are far removed from any stated motive. The soldier's level of knowledge does not need to perfect or "100% sane", and usually isn't. Militaries are premised on a control of information at every level, but with the information a soldier is given and with the senses a soldier possesses, he is expected to operate as if he knows his domain, and to know the chain of command, and why he is to follow orders no matter how ridiculous. By no means does this obligate the chain of command to give a shit about making their subordinates useful, or suggest that superior officers would do anything other than ratfuck the lower grunts. The same attitude exists among soldiers of the same rank. Everything necessary to be an effective soldier and fight works against comraderie, trust, and friendship. The breakdown of morale and unit cohesion is something any commander has to think about if they have to actually do something. If you need to go to war to find friends or discover yourself, you are in the worst place possible for that to happen. The war cult does not give you any more order to life than it deems fit to allow you for its purposes.

It should be made clear that war, as a practice, is not intrinsically political, nor is war the essence of politics. The state in any conception could not arise before war as a practice was already in force, and so speaking of war as purely the domain of states or politics is an inaccurate division. We do divide the wars waged by states from wars engaged by organizations of inferior standing, that cannot make the claims a proper state does. There are then organizations waging war which do not conform to states in a sense that states are commonly recognized, but that form governments and armies in their own right. The British East India Company was not a state unto itself in the sense that states were recognized, but the Company's army was larger in numbers than the monarch's official army, and the Company conducted its affairs in its own interest, rather than the Company being purely an extension of the Crown as would be presumed. Increasingly, the Company's influence in the empire grows, and the methods the company employs permeate in the rest of British society, and then societies around the world. This is the birth of the free trade system and the logic of modern capitalism, and brought about modern understanding of class war and what interests and which people were fighting whom. What became a political affair was not at first recognized as political or the affairs of proper war, but would become the default that someone today readily recognizes. There would be some point in human existence where there were no states as such, or even anything that could be passed off as a state except in embyronic form, but there was plenty of war and warbands could form if there were enough men who figured out they could beat up others in the neighborhood to get what they want. At the core, there is a choice of certain people to do this, and then it is on everyone else to defend against that. The state proper, and thus politics as we know it, came about because of people, rather than some impulse in humanity necessitating formal states or formal states being necessarily useful for organizing human effort. Politics involves a great deal else that does not require war, or fighting of any sort. Political entities of any sort have to reckon with a material world and the details of production, and the politician's intervention to ensure this is not something he can resolve by appeals to struggle, as if he can whip farmers to make food grow on a barren rock. Whether a politician deigns to go down to where the ordinary workers live and think about what workers actually do is a choice, but eventually a politician will have to meet his constituents where they are at, rather than what the politician believes others ought to be. At the very least, the politician cajoling or bullying a hated subordinate knows whomever he is attacking will act in defiance of the politician's wishes, and has some idea of how to engineer the situation so the subordinated can't escape, or at least can keep the subordinated at bay. You might think that the state and politicians would see that maybe they could help out, so people don't have to struggle so much over basic things and we'd all be far more efficient. That is not what the state does, though. War has much to do with why states exist as they do, and war at its core is something apart from states, and would exist even if we did not believe states had any legitimacy. Politicians cannot change war or make it into something other than what it is. If war changes, it is changed by those who wage war, rather than changed by those who supply to the people their ideas of what war is. War, and thus its effects on society and the state, changes all of the time, in contradiction of the old saying from Fallout that war never changes. Certain elements that drive the cult of war, and the core convictions of the war cult, are far less likely to change, but those elements do not need to confine themselves to the domain of war, and always seek to infest any practice, including those that never had anything to do with war or peace.

We may recognize war in principle as a game played between two societies. We will call these societies teams, even though "team" is for the reasons mentioned above not a reason to suggest that anyone on these teams likes each other. Societies are understood as human agents, and all that is their property is marked as possessions of those agents in some way or another. The property is distinguished from things in the environment that are not claimed by anything in a society. Both societies have their models to consider what is theirs, what belongs to the enemies, and what is neutral. The objective of both societies is to destroy the integrity of the other society, so that changes may be made that are suitable to the victor. In the ideal example, both societies consider themselves to begin this game as their ideal, or at least, they recognize the conditions of their society as a thing they are defending, and recognize that changes to that society, its values and methods, are a threat to defending that thing. The war is a game played by all members in both societies, regardless of whether they want to play or not. War, to be war, entails the mobilization of the whole society in this effort. Even if this mobilization does not make the fullest use of all agents and property, it is presumed that the society could marshal everything at its disposal in the effort. To do otherwise would limit the essential nature of war to something other than what it would need to be if it were indeed war. War is organized towards a singular goal of destroying the other society, so that it may be restructured as the victor wishes. In principle, total destruction is on the line for both sides, and the warring parties do not agree beforehand the scope of what may and may not be changed in the other society. There may be expectations that some things cannot be changed, but in principle, the plan of war suggests that the other society may be broken and reassembled as the victor wishes. If the victor cannot actually do this, it raises questions of why the victorious party went to war in the first place, unless the victor were aware of what war aims could be accomplished and that they were indeed possible. To suggest an absolute limit to the destruction and reorganization of the enemy would be to place the activity below the proper meaning of "war". The full realization of those limits is not necessary for war to be war, but the game is not war unless that possibility is a part of the game. All of the actors in this game are not, in principle, bound by any law other than natural laws that are outside of the control of any participant. Whatever is materially possible, including self-induced changes to your own team's core convictions, is possible. It is entirely possible for one team to forfeit entirely war at any time, but forfeit means the other team decides whatever terms it desires. Whether the team that is victorious after their opponent's forfeit can affect the other team in the way it desires is not a matter dictated by war as a practice; and so a team that is winning by all metrics may forfeit the war, conceding to the other team a "win", while the "loser", who may present themselves as winners regardless of their forfeit, does whatever they may want, accepting that the outcome of the war for the other team is locked in. Whatever relations exist between the two teams after the war is not strictly speaking the business of war. War, to be war, implies that there is a winner and loser judged by both teams, and by anyone who wants to referee this game. Winning and losing is essential to war, regardless of what someone might consider philosophically the point of it is. If "everyone is a winner", or "war has no winners", then the activity engaged in is not war in any way we would appreciate it as a concept, but some ritual that may appear to be war but is something else entirely. There are in war many sub-games which are called "battles", "skirmishes", or other such events which are of a similar manner, within the domain where they are believed to take place. These sub-games all relate to each other in the overall game of war.

War, then, is at heart a tool for social engineering. It is not a thing that serves a purpose, or accomplishes material motives. Wars are not fought for land, or prizes, or esteem, or for ideology, or for religion. They are not fought for any ulterior motive that must exist. The point of war as a practice is to engineer an enemy society, which is understood to be an enemy, and wars are undertaken by societies that consider their own members friends for the purpose of war. This is the basic Schmittian conception of the political, but it is in reality something particular to the practice of war. Not all conflicts are war, for there can be conflicts within a society or fights between people that aren't part of any war plan. Not all politics is defined by conflict, for the concerns of the state are not solely defined by war. It is through war that societies were engineered to create the state and the political as we know it. Political thinking was not something inherent to mankind in any fixed form, beyond the most basic observations of how human consciousness is constituted and how a man would have to comport himself. We did not reach some critical period where human beings were now and forever political animals, and could be nothing but that. The first political thought is not a thought of war in the sense we have described, nor is the first political thought purely about struggle. Political thought began in the first instance out of a desire in people to claim something, and to establish themselves as something apart from the world and apart from other conscious entities like themselves. How a politician sought to do that could vary. War, on the other hand, did not require political thought to be realized. Warlike behavior can be found in animals, and it is not carried out at a purely instinctive level or for some ulterior motive the animals conceived. We have observed certain members of the ape kingdom engage in battle and coordinate tactics with each other, yet there isn't a political structure beyond the typical sociality of animals. The political and social are two different concepts, and war at heart is a social behavior, rather than the behavior of political entities or particular institutions.

War is not the only tool for social engineering, but many times the social engineer invokes the language and methods of war, viewing the population that is ruled or experimented on to be an enemy. Mengele's atrocities do not serve any scientific purpose, nor are they necessary conditions for a scientist to conduct social experiments. Social scientists and psychologists have often been able to find lab rats in the wild so to speak, and damaged people are of lesser value for the social and psychological experiments. The methods of certain social engineers to force certain people into these experiments under threat of torture, and a culture which glorifies the immiseration of research subjects as good unto itself, is not necessary for science. It is not even necessary for the destructive aims that this 'social research" is a cover for, because it would be possible to simply exterminate or imprison people without any social experiment, and it has long been known that these social experiments have no actual value that promotes knowledge. The quality of knowledge that is gleaned from social experiments on prisoners and psychiatric slaves is usually determined by the researcher's willingness to view the human lab rats as people, at least in certain regards that would make the experiment proceed smoothly and allow the researcher to gather the information desired. The brutality shown in these Mengele-type atrocities, which would always be advanced by Fabian Society types, was an expression of their ethos which demanded such behavior of a "proper scientist", so that the technocrat and believer was blooded and did things in the way their ethos insisted it must be. This activity of torturing and humiliating human lab rats is not even an expression of the cult of war, or a use of war for particular social engineering goals. The true intent of these atrocities, and the Fabians' own propaganda showing this torture to the general public, is a declaration of war against the general public, to put normal and decent people on notice that if they don't get with the program, anyone can be tortured and sacrificed. The logic behind this is not difficult to see. Even if you see it for what it is though, it is necessary for the public relations ghoul to push this image in front of the American television watcher, and present this image to them every day, or frequently enough so that it is normalized. The purpose is never to convince someone by rational argument to submit, because most normal people have submitted and know not to transgress an unwritten law. The purpose is to conduct war-like behavior against a general public that is viewed as an enemy, and dare anyone to ignore it or refrain from taking part in it. The general public themselves are seen by such researchers as a mass of lab rats, and the whole country a laboratory, and the seething contempt at the core of their ethos is the point of this "research". None of this research into mass psychology tells the technocrat anything he didn't already know about human behavior, because it was known from the outset that torturing people and using these mechanisms would provoke certain reactions and affect the desired behavioral changes. When the result of the "experiment" comes out the way the torturer wanted, the findings are posted to the world as some grand discovery, and it as if there was no chain of torture to make this real. When the information gathered from observing the masses does not prove what the torturer wanted - when the people refuse to go along with this game - the torturer makes up results that say the experiment actually says what the torturer wanted, and the same celebration of a grand discovery is proclaimed to the public for the same purposes. Somewhere, a researcher compiles volumnious records of the actual state of the people, with every avenue available to them. Data harvesting in the neoliberal period is a gigantic enterprise, and internet users or anyone who must submit to institutions is monitored and probed to see what their tendencies are. This information is not so much used for genuine research purposes, but as part of a command and control mechanism, which relies on a form of social engineering that is entirely warlike.

It is of course entirely possible to engineer society without any war plan, or even with the cooperation of the ruled, many of whom operated on a principle that at some level they had to get along with others if they wanted a functioning society. The objective of this warlike approach to social engineering is not to accomplish some stated behavioral objective, but to perpetuate a cult of war in every sector of social behavior, and train people to orient everything they do, even mundane things, around a wargame that was designed by a thought leader, and with the values fed into that wargame determined to select certain people to win and others to lose. This, of course, is only a surface-level view of the social engineering project currently in force, and it is this project and my own contempt for it that was the true genesis for writing this entire book, and why I needed to answer this question. We will revisit this social engineering later, but I mention it now to demonstrate this example of war being at heart a social engineering tool, more than anything else that war ostensibly accomplishes. Nothing about the present social engineering project produces any quality we would find good or desirable, even if we agreed killing off the residuum now was good. The entire purpose of the "social experiment" is to break the resolve of normal people by subjecting them to psychological torture in their daily lives, until they give up the expectations of a free society and accept any slavery. The purpose, then, is not even the stated goal of eliminating the residuum, or encouraging people to support that project. It has been well known that if the residuum were openly killed off, so long as the killings were managed in a way that established interests were not upset too quickly, the rulers could do this without fear of reprisal. The more important objective of Fabian social engineering is to instill in the general populace behavioral changes which glorify torture for its own sake, and eliminate the possibility that humanity could be anything but this. Fabianism, naturally, was a doctrine of profoundly stupid men and women, who insisted that their stupidity was some sort of genius, and had smoke blown up their ass their whole lives. H.G. Wells is a remarkably stupid man even by the low standards I hold for science fiction writers, and this is standard for the entire Fabian lot. They're only smart enough to make life miserable for the rest of us, and that is all they need to be. Obviously the whole Fabian society is just a faction within a much larger ruling interest, comprised of people who aren't stupid and know why they would allow this, but the Fabians pursue this project not for any ulterior motive, but because this is really what they are and always have been, and they didn't need to be anything else. Why would they be anything else? Doing what they do has been rewarded, and doing otherwise has only exposed them as the fools that they are if they ever leave their tendency.

The practices of war did not arise fully formed, but like anything else, arose from prior conditions to arrive at the organization of societies in this way. The earliest practice of war would be, as mentioned before, nothing more than a few men figuring out that they can do it. They didn't need a cult, or some dark energy telling them to do this. Their actions did not start a grand cycle of spiritual importance, and the drive to violence existed long before them. Part of the mystique of the cult of war, which was always a spiritual authority rather than a true appeal to the unconscious lizard brain, is to essentialize war, and obscure its intent for long enough that others are cowed into submission, without any actual fighting. One lasting legacy of war is to allow for the war party to simply take what they want through tribute, habituating humans to pay up just as the herd of cattle or sheep were habituated by a drover. Every aristocracy that defined itself by its monopoly on the cult of war - that is, the warrior aristocracy - viewed humanity as livestock, and the warriors as the lone exception. The priests a warrior aristocracy aligned with, including the priestly functions warriors themselves filled if the priest and warrior was one and the same, were a thin excuse to cover up this goal, if the excuse would even be given. This or that god, or any particular tenet except those absolutely necessary to perpetuate this use of men as livestock, was not of particular importance. You get the sense with the religion of a warrior aristocracy that they just make up whatever shit works, then forget they did it the next day. Someone could dig through the Vedas and find some myth that suited whatever was in vogue at the time, and since the Vedas were spread by oral tradition and pedagogy was strictly enforced as the sole method to teach them, it's not hard to see that this is the spiritual and religious tradition of people who had a warlike view and did not want information getting out to the wrong people. Such is the way of most religions, which always hide their juicy insights to those who are inducted and can be pulled aside to hear the real plan. Inherent in this approach is not any self-defense, but a contempt for the unbeliever and those who failed the rites of manhood, who would be judged lesser. The practices of sorting the population out usually did not take the form of a war, but the approaches that would be used for war would be activated towards a long-run goal that could be spread by religion and daily practice. The language of war and a particular attitude towards struggle is present in virtually every religious practice mankind knows, and the few exceptions to this rule are never doctrines that can spread far. The only truly pacifistic doctrines that can spread are those which are designed to weaken and degrade men who were already jduged to be cattle.

To keep the religion of war active, it was necessary every now and then to engage in the genuine article. Whether there was anything to be gained was less relevant than a religion of war requiring sacrifices and ritual practice, and after enough games and intercine conflict had been exhausted, the religion of war could only find an external opponent to attack. There was almost never any material cause or benefit from the war, with the most obvious treasure being slaves. Slaves are problematic without an enforcement mechanism to ensure their submission. The typical practice, when it was not just wholesale slaughter, was to kill outright all males except the weakest and the youngest, and to kill any female who was defiant and wouldn't accept the right of conquest - and the "right of conquest" is pure sexual pathology made into a political tenet. The weakest males would become slaves, and the greater the submission, the greater the disdain. The youngest boys would be slaves, raised in the culture of the oppressor, and would be living symbols of victory and the corruption of the loser. It would become common practice for the females to go with conquerors, with the most venal of them lining up to welcome conquering armies, since that is how the great mating game goes. In an era before patriotism or any sense of pride took root, it was war against war, and bitter griping for those on the losing end of war, which was most of humanity. If the cult of war were absolute, this would have been the end of history: a roiling battlefield where the purest Social Darwinism enslaves most of the world in pointless fighting, never progressing beyond a level of war suitable to maintain the status of the losers as livestock, and any movement to suggest that humanity could be something else would be considered retarded, insane, and so anyone suggesting such an idea would be killed on sight. Since there were a great many people who did possess this view, it was and would remain a common sight to do exactly this, and so many visionaries who imagined a peaceful world would be tortured, publicly humiliated, and scorned for suggesting that the cult of war was retarded. You could say war was bad, or mean, or evil, or costly. You could say frankly that war is Hell, because that was undeniable to anyone who thought about war with any sort of clarity, or even put two and two together to figure out wht this is. You could never say that the religion of war or the cult of war was "retarded". That was beyond the pale. If war were considered merely stupid, it was always an inferior sort of stupidity that did not have any of the stigma that would be associated with fools. If someone were to say that the cult of war and religious veneration of it was the full, disgusting retardation that it actually is, that person was to be killed on sight and never allowed to suggest that idea. To suggest it and mean it would lead to a number of conclusions that would undo the conspiratorial project that a cult of war engages in to perpetuate itself. To say the cult of war is retarded is to say, without hesitation, that a warrior aristocracy can be and should be exterminated down to the last man, and any such structure should never be allowed to insinuate itself again for any reason. That development could never be allowed to happen, and this was sensed by the earliest ideologues of war, who knew what they possessed and that the great game could never actually end. This dictum that war must never end had to be followed enough of the time to ensure the practice of war never abated, but it could only be enforced for so long and with so much vigor. Few people were so committed to the war cult, and even if they were, they lacked a modern understanding of ideology and its perpetuation, relying mostly on low cunning and the superficial brilliance that is as common as dirt in the human race.

For all the talk today about the eternal struggle for life and the prevalence of war as the default state of mankind, if you look around, you find very few people who are true believers in any cult of war. They have always existed, and have always been able to insinuate themselves in various places. They can be found among the most intelligent of priests, who use all of their intellect devising new ways to torture and mutilate the damned and are the most dangerous of the lot, and they can be found among the ordinary fighting men who were at first not that different from any other man. They can be found among the lowest classes, and among men who are abject failures and would have been laughed out of any proper army. The cult of war does not necessarily entail being good at war in its actual manifestation. Very often, the fiercest believers in the cult of war are terrible at actually fighting, or even the drilling and ritual that conditions men to be useful for anything. War could prevail not because it was natural or inherent, but because war was materially useful for certain objectives. The most obvious is defense. If it takes only a few people to decide they're going to be assholes to the bitter end, there would need to be an awareness in society that this is a possibility, and the most obvious way to contend with this smallest of warbands is to meet them with another warband. War in any form is only countered with war, even if the defending party is a small contingent who see their function as one of security or peacekeeping. Even if the defender's methods are methodically pacifistic and refrain from anything that is seen as unwarranted, illegal, or immoral, those methods are constructed with the same aims as a violent war plan. The cult of war's lack of appeal to a broad base in humanity is not a matter of simple moral sentiment that could be adjusted with education. If that were the case, then the program of instilling this social value through state schooling would have been successful in no more than two generations, and there would not be a surviving man or woman who was not a purely fanatical zealot for the war creed. Any who disagreed would be immediately killed in broad daylight and this would be seen as meritorious and morally correct. This view is what ideologues always allude to and insinuate is the silent majority, and they assume everyone thinks like them at heart.

We should ask why war, either as a cult or the practice itself, is so unpopular. We can overcome our native disgust towards acts like killing or torture, although those are a common demotivator, as is the effort required to kill or torture someone who will avoid that fate, and the risk of retaliation against an opponent who does not regard a state's monopoly on legal violence. Those motives are all very practical reasons to despise war, but if the only argument against a cult of war is that war is hard and costly and risky, in the long run the cult of war would win by removing all of the risks and habituating people to accept terms of living which keep the cost of war down. This is what the cult of war and its advocates pursue as their strategy to continue the game, and so it has been accounted for. Still, the cult of war provokes a certain distaste beyond the obvious, and beyond the mere existence of counter-forces that suggest a moral, ethical, and philosophical stance that works against war. What is the source of that distaste for war, that makes it a bad enough idea that it isn't the first instinct of every human being? If the impulse to join the cult of war was as natural as its ideologues believe, the human race would be very different and it would not be possible to sucker most people into accepting states as we know them, or the moral philosophies that prevail. Obviously, the existence of moral codes that oppose war and its cult had to come from some seed, so at the very least, there would be a tendency in people that avoids the cult of war. There would be multiple tendencies, whereas the tendency for a cult of war is a singular proposition. There are not multiple variants of war, for the essential nature of war is a very particular proposition, and any type of war that is less than the genuine article would be dismissed as irrelevant and falls to the wayside. Any variant conception of war that would claim to be co-equal would be challenged on a number of grounds if someone were to suggest the true nature of war, if war as a practice were stripped of its political or human connotations and were understood as a mechanism in its own right. War as a means to an end has been proven to be counterproductive, when there are many ways to accomplish those ends that don't entail the particular mobilization that war entails. A war mentality is not necessary for social organization to exist in the first place, because most of our existence, even in a war-dominated society, must out of necessity acknowledge a basis other than war if members of that society wish to define themselves as anything other than a thing that fights other societies, in which there is no world outside of this limited social activity, and the warring societies are believed to constitute the entirety of the world. Such a world would not have any basis to exist except pure appropriation, and would exhaust its resources eventually. The ethos of eugenics, as warlike as it is, is not reducible to the war cult alone, and the extensive war cult in eugenic society is only a small part of what eugenism entails. A society dominated by a war cult and war mobilization alone, where all other mobilization is inferior to the war effort, would still be driven by concerns that would be inimical to eugenics, like actually being able to win battles or build something beyond more eugenics. A war cult has to at least appear like it can win battles, while eugenic society has been premised on a pervasive sickness where elaborate war plans are drawn every day but nobody regards anything battleworthy as useful. Eugenics is a level of depravity that even the most pathetic war cult ideologues could not match. I mention the hideousness of eugenics here because one consequence of the eugenic creed in its full horror is that it is one of the few things that would make a warmongering death cult appear positively enlightened by comparison. Eugenics, though, could only proliferate under highly specific conditions which were engineered. The eugenic creed is so unnatural that even its partisans have difficulty following through with its conclusions in full, unless they are in a hardcore cult echo chamber and have entirely given over their minds and souls to it. The war cult, even in its most fanatical forms, isn't particularly difficult to comprehend, and makes enough sense that almost everyone can figure out what it is after a sufficient introduction to such a society. We rule out naivete then as an argument as to why the war cult provokes distaste. Most of us are aware on some level that war is a thing and that it is not the narratives we are told about glory and victory, but something altogether different. Too many people have come back from war and told us it is bullshit, and there is no way to pretend for long that the narrative sops about war's glory are anything more than moonshine. Even the stupidest of us can figure out a few things about the nature of war and why it happens. After all the basic moral sentiments against killing and the typical consequences of war are taken care of - and war as a practice entails a great many things that do not involve killing or maiming - there is still something in war that is distasteful to every sense we possess, such that even the most devout war cultists have to consider how they will sell war in the future.

The true answer is not inherent to the cult of war itself, but a simple truth about the organizations that would wage it. There really is no society, in the sense we are told to believe it exists. When Margaret Thatcher announced that to the world in the 1980s, she hit a chord that resonated with the sense many of us had for a very long time, but that had not truly found its expression as a widely promulgated theory until then. There were philosophers suggesting this all along, when asking questions of what society was, but in all practical experience, nations, tribes, communities, clans, and societies of various sorts were a fact of life. There was no getting around the question of who was with whom, and no amount of individualist ethics could change what people lived through every day. Maggie Thatcher the milk snatcher herself can't change that by declaring it so, and it was not hard to see that there was certainly a society organizing the entire neoliberal project. Put another way, as a contemporary American comedian put it, "it's a big club, and you ain't in it." There would be in neoliberal society a very big and prominent club, which rendered all other social associations irrelevant in the long term. It is a global club, that did not regard nations or governments or the old type of state. Arrayed against it is everyone else, and whatever associations they believed they possessed, none of them would last for long, and it was easy to disrupt each and every bulwark of resistance to what was happening. If you were going to have social life in this very large group that was out of the club, it would only be on the terms those in the big club allowed. Getting to that point was a very, very long project, and the result of so much social engineering and manipulation, with many incentives pointing to it. By no means is the world of neoliberalism a foregone conclusion, or the only way it could have happened. The world of neoliberalism is a very particular phase in global history, and it is not a homogenous phase in which history was arrested. The neoliberal world was defined by spikes in activity, as humanity would be pushed from one crisis to the next, and each spike and collapse was planned with winners and losers in mind. In short, the neoliberal program would be a series of wars waged by one big club against everyone else, who were for the purposes of the big club a large mass opposed to them. From the outset, the attitude of those in the big club would be that democratic society was in reality a disorganized rabble that would run around like headless chickens if enough crises were instigated. This is the position stated outright by Walter Lippmann in his famous work Public Opinion (1922). Whatever the true nature of the disorganized rabble, it would be necessary for members of the big club to see it collectively as one big Other to be dismantled and reshaped. In short, the program not just of neoliberalism but of the technocratic society that came into being with the onset of the first world war, was nothing less than a war of that big club against the whole world. However much the big club members giggle at how easy it is to break up and atomize the little people, the same logic applies in their own camp. Nobody in the club has any reason to trust each other or any native solidarity. It is a club of elites, nobles, cocaine-fueled executives, prostitutes, drug lords, brown-nosers, schemers, and people who got there because they understood that politics at heart was primarily a game of stepping on the weak to get ahead. Even if that was not the full truth of politics, that was the strategy members of the big club adopted to get where they were. The honest who believed the world could be better were the simps and suckers, and the world was given over to a cocaine-fueled orgy that did not require any rationale or excuse any more. Those who made this big club were not always hardened warriors, and most of them knew war was for rubes. So many of them rose with the eugenic creed, and knew that alliance in the eugenics movement was the only thing holding this club together. Again, this will be revisited many times, especially when eugenics itself is examined in proper light. There was something to these people that allowed them to succeed, and it wasn't because they were necessarily good at winning or smarter than the average bear.

A simple truth to the neoliberal victory is that their assertion that there is no society was, at its heart, true and obvious enough that most people instinctively knew it and felt it. The 1970s were a decade of repeated betrayals to anyone who believed in a single socialist idea, who wanted to keep what socialism had created even. Even if they didn't like socialism or didn't see what was built as "socialist", the idea that society could be organized for mutual good and benefit had enough appeal to those who saw the obvious benefits of it. This organization was always premised on a social cooperation that was not premised on dire necessity or empty faith that it was possible, and wasn't premised on a theory or intellectual conceit that socialism was smarter and better. Any cooperative society is only built so long as its participants are motivated by something more than slogans or material need or identity with a team. A genuinely solidaristic politics had been attempted, but was under constant attack, with many within the socialist camp no longer seeing anything in a socialism that included most of the human population. The neoliberal reaction was not a bold move that changed the world, but a natural progression of what was inherent in the transformation of human society that began its active phase just before 1914, when the movement leading to the first world war made it an inevitability. The result seen with neoliberalism was not just the end of socialism, or the end of democracy, or the end of liberal ideals in any recognizable form. It was not merely the rollback of the Enlightenment, and it was indeed no rolling back at all. It was not even a full reversion to feudal behaviors, which were very much premised on sociality and transactional relationships. It was not a transformation to slave society like Rome. A few liked to draw superficial comparisons to the ideal republic of Plato and aspired to that, but if that was the goal, what we see is yet another horrible parody of that, of which so many have been made. What happened, and became clear enough to all, was that there really was no society. This was not a victory of ideology over truth, but a transformation of sociality that was now possible. There would of course still be society, in that there was an assemblage of humans interacting with each other, who formed organizations.[1] People would still live next to each other and fear each other, and know that someone is watching them and capable of reporting to some secret police that you weren't supposed to talk about. The conspiracism inherent in society didn't go away, and was more prominent than ever. Despite this, people still had friends and relied on mutual benefit to survive. The logic of capitalist determination did not dictate that people should be selfish. "Greed is good" is not a very smart strategy for any capitalist, and the success stories of Reaganite capitalism were not those who built something or led to any great thing, but the plunderers who held the best parties and had the best drugs. It is not something you would do unless you wanted to destroy as quickly as possible any virtue in a society, and that is exactly what would be promoted. But this, too, was not simply imposed by decree.

For a long time, members of any class would be burdened by the knowledge that society was vast, and organizations were everywhere. For the lower classes, this had been their experience all along, and their own social networks were local and never too reliable, but there were always parties and associations, and even the weak could congregate and chat. It was an expectation that could be believed sometimes that there was a place for anyone, even the lowest of the low, if someone were able to ingratiate themselves with the right people; and even if someone were a loner, it was possible to stay alone and be left alone, and there was a certain respect for loners who did not cause trouble for anyone. For the ruling classes and their functionaries, the sociality of the lower classes always presented a menace that could not be ignored. Mass politics always remained a possibility, if there were anyone to activate it and direct it to action. Even without mass politics, the lower classes would not sit idly while they starved. Memory of revolutions taught the ruling class that peasants and proletarians that are starving will rise in revolt at the first opportunity, and will do whatever is needed to not starve. The rulers further had difficulty trusting each other and conspiracies within their own ranks. Neoliberal society succeeded in atomizing people not because an ideology was accepted, or because some brand new technology or communication method had an effect merely by being known. Neoliberal society was possible because enough inroads had been built to short-circuit any individual who was a threat, and information pertaining to that person, like their location and a detailed record starting from childhood and recorded in school records, was available to anyone who sought to control society at all of its levels. Individually, no man could hope to survive against a society set up to destroy him. This had always been known to be possible and could be done simply by throwing stones at a sinner, but this had to follow the dictate that someone without sin was the first to throw the stones. Now, the stones could be thrown from the shadows, and the question of sin was no longer a concern. Reputations could be destroyed and entered into the official record that followed someone around since birth, and someone selected to die would be marked from an early age, recorded, and hounded anywhere he went. Anyone who was not wanted and was to be thrown away was done, and this could happen to screen out three-year-olds and track them to lives of eternal torment. A living Hell could be enforced, and due to volumnious record-keeping and control over the spaces a human in civilization could enter, it would be truly inescapable. At this stage, the lockouts could only secure a few islands, and so the ruling class still had to contend with society in the open field. A lockout can ensure that someone who is blacklisted will never find work again, and this is where the word "fired" is replaced with "terminated". The linguistic shift to "terminated" was not just a declaration that someone no longer worked at a particular place, but that the entire apparatus of human resources declared someone persona non grata. In institutions that were controlled, there was a wide network of information gathering to determine how far someone was allowed to rise. It was not until the conclusion of the second world war that the construction of this apparatus was undertaken in earnest. Attempts to do this have always been the dream of any manager, but there were too many ways to evade detection, and one great difficulty is that the recordkeeping required human clerks who had no reason to go along with any such program. The new system still allowed for nepotism and the promotion of friends through shady and secret methods. In fact, neoliberal America encouraged that practice, as rampant cronyism would accelerate the rot and lock out the honest, which was the purpose of constructing such an apparatus in the first place. The great sin of the past is that every now and then, honest and decent people would disrupt the well-laid plans of a managerial strata, and no manager could suppress the lower classes without facing revolt or mass refusal to work, and then that lower class seizing whatever they could to hold out until the managers and the upper classes had to bargain. Even in the waning years of the class struggle, there remained bitter resistance to this invasion of private life and encroachment on genuine freedoms still enjoyed and believed in by the common people. For the lower classes, society as something that existed independent of those who held the state was increasingly inconceivable.

The only proper definition of society would be that which is independent of any state, and which does not extend over the whole world in some nebulous sense. Even if society were vast and difficult to leave completely, the correct understanding of society is that if you were alone, you were alone, and it would take some doing for someone to go after you. It was believed that if you kept your head down, paid your taxes, and did all the things you were supposed to do, you could get by, or at least you should expect to if the society was at all tolerable to live in. This was how the better off of the lower classes, which had to be most of them, and the middle class alike understood the world. Whatever the ideology or laws or machines were, it was a safe bet until the late 20th century that you could avoid the worst of society simply by avoiding anything that attracted hostility. This didn't always work, and no one could run away forever, but when it became clear to someone that they really only get what they are allowed to have in this world, it was reassuring to know that there were nooks and crannies to escape to, and there were niches where people could find work or sustenance outside of this one model the ruling institutions presented. The ruling institutions, indeed, had to accept, against their inclinations, that there were ways to live outside of a narrow interpretation of Fordism. The industrial change that came with the neoliberal project would have suggested, by itself, that the variety of ways in which people could live and be accepted would increase rather than decrease. The Fordist model of conformity and massification was not in vogue, and there was no material or intellectual reason why an open, diverse society couldn't work. Indeed, it seemed very practical to just about everyone that cultural conformity was an artifact of a very particular period in human history, and conformism was never as religiously followed as its partisans insisted it was. The 1950s were not this utopia of whitebread suburban families living in luxury and negroes knowing their place and getting their separate and unequal treatment, and no other period where conservatism was a prominent idea actually conformed to this fantastical, Hitlerian lie that was advanced as the Right's manifesto. When conservatism was ascendant, it was always marked by furious culture wars, intrigues in every sector of society, the promotion of venal bourgeois interests as a counter to liberal reforms or the dreaded communists, and general incompetence in government. Reagan was no exception to the rule of conservative incompetence at governing anything, and gloried in a level of incompetence and criminality that prior conservatives could never attain and would envy forevermore.[2] Bland conformity was little more than a marketing jingle of conservatism, rather than the actual state of affairs. In industry, Ford had his reasons for standardizing production, because that was cheaper and the industrial technique of the time favored this standardization more than later industrial technique would. Standardization was never the ideal, even for Ford. Ford himself was partial to the vision of the fascists, who championed individualism in ways that were acceptable, but in industrial method there was no ideology involved. The same methods would be used in America, the Soviet Union, and Nazi Germany, because they were effective for building cars and tanks which everyone wanted at the time. The widespread availability of new machines, and then a campaign to make certain technologies a fixture in every home like the television and the home computer when they arrive, was not out of some conformist tendency, but a very particular social engineering project. The goal of this proliferation of consumer goods was not massification or conformity, but the beginning of an invasion of private life by the corporate sector. Far from it, everything about consumer culture favored individual expression, and the only thing that someone did conform to was whatever the thought leaders were really telling them to conform to, which would be uncritically accepted by everyone when the signal was given that conforming was mandatory. In personal expression and ideology, people could be whatever they wanted, and this was encouraged. The loudmouthed, opinionated American is himself a product of social engineering, trained to express his opinions only in a narrow, socially accepted manner and in the right arenas. Whether that loudmouth is a conservative, liberal, progressive, stealth-fascist, socialist, or an acceptable brand of communist, you could be whatever you wanted ideologically and in certain manners. The major thing to conform to was not a superficial identifier, but the expectations of a technocratic society that was set up to first manage people, then invade their lives, and then destroy those who were not suitable for the world desired in the 21st century. Neoliberalism, of course, is part of a larger plan, and only one arc that was planned decades in advance.

In this society, the conception of "society" changed. It was no longer an assemblage of people, or networks of friends. That was unseemly to speak of. Society instead would be interpreted as a vague entity, unmoored from any particular person but represented in media by appointed experts and talking heads. Society would be identified solely with authorities who were presented not just as spiritual authorities, but arbiters of truth who would tell you what your senses were supposed to say. This project was not built overnight and was never a fait accompli, and its description will be revisited throughout this book. The important takeaway is that "society" was now seen as an alien represented solely by these interests, and this was not merely a fascistic political claim, but taken to be a true understanding of what societies were. Societies were presented as mushy blobs, in which human agents were only recognized by experts with privileged access to say who was what. You, the pleb, were not allowed to say who was what, outside of a limited purview permissible for you. It was not your place to question the best and the brightest or any designated thought leader. If you tried, you faced ridicule and a struggle session until you gave up. Since you likely had a job and the thought leader was paid to tell you what to think, you were at a disadvantage in this battle, without any champion to represent you. Civil society, which itself originates more as a myth than a real thing, becomes the only link you have with society in the genuine sense; society is mediated by institutions of selected leaders and gurus, and members without privileged access are only there as cogs to fill their function. You knew on some level that society was just a bunch of people, even if they have bureaucracies and technological advantages over you, but many features in this society would tell you that the experts were virtually godlike in their command of "society", and anything that happened was the result of the experts making it so, engaging the engine of history to move it as they saw fit. On the surface, this makes a lot of sense. You would want smart people making decisions and stupid people to not interject, for all the reasons that would be a good idea. This development was not premised on any actual merit, but on a belief that ordinary people were not to judge society as it was, and could only speak of it as a vague blob. Any analysis of society that went beyond acceptable boundaries, like a thorough critique of the entire technocratic idea that went past "experts are bad because they are mean and I don't like them", could only travel so far before it was suppressed. One way technocratic society did sell itself was because its institutions would, until the Reagan period, operate at a sufficient level of competence that most would agree they were an improvement over what existed before, in the respects that were emphasized in the post-WW2 order. Living standards had generally improved even for the poor, work schedules were not onerous, and the company town was an anomaly rather than the norm. Reagan might appear to the vulgar historian like a retread of the era of robber barons. The robber barons, though, presided over the construction of technology and the rising arc of empire, and made a point of telling everyone that the robber barons built things and made the world go, and this was not backed by nothing. Robber barons built Standard Oil and made the world of the 20th century possible, and while it can be argued there was a much better way, there was an expectation that something had to be built for the robber barons to remain in power. Reagan's crooks did the robber part, but instead of the nobility expected of a baron, all of this robbery went to funding cocaine-fueled orgies and narco gangs and a managerial strata that was tasked with the open liquidation of everyone who was selected to die. That is the only thing they valued, and that is exactly what the world got. There was nothing else whatsoever to this entire project. The drugs and orgies were of course a feature of the robber baron era as well, and the robber barons loved narcostates more than anyone because many built their fortunes off the Opium Wars and its consequences. It is this managerial strata and a machinery that could reach into private life physically and over electronic communications and record-keeping, and the training of technicians and influencers who would be the enforcers of this new fascism, that made Reagan's society a different beast. It was no longer "society" in any sense we appreciated, when we had to speak of what was politically relevant in discussions about society. This went beyond merely annihilating the idea of a democratic society. That was still, at least nominally, an idea holding currency, even if democratic institutions could be ignored whenever needed. It was rather that speaking of society in the way it was formerly constituted became an unmentionable, as if you were speaking of unicorns to conceive of a society that changed without an expert moving history and telling you that history has in fact moved. Generations of technocrats insinuating themselves into every area of social life would have produced this even if there were no Reagan. The same attitudes came to prominence in the communist world, and with it, it was not uncommon to see Communist Party politicians say the same things a Reaganite would say. This change was not the inexorable result of creeping technology just making it happen, but a concerted orientation of social action towards the goal. In short, the ruling oligarchs and their alliance with intellectuals made clear that they were at war with those who were not in this formation, and the only way to get on the lifeboat in this grand lifeboat ethics exercise is to accept the ethos of that formation. The death of the old conception of society was the true beginning of the conditions of Francis Galton's Eugenics, and everything that came to pass was exactly what Galton prescribed as the course of action in the British Eugenics Society, conducted for the reasons Galton wanted and that they got.

This death of society as we knew it, of course, was not just a new development, nor an eternal truth. The myth of society as this technocratic alien we did not belong to was not universal in the past, but it has its antecedents. Its core thinking can be found in political treatises of Antiquity, and there would always be partisans favorable to such a view of society and institutions. Liberals acknowleding the individual as the basis for society were not announcing a new revelation. The concept of states and institutions relating to individuals rather than larger social formations was inherent to the philosophical conception of the state itself, and liberals saying this was basically a "well, duh" statement before they expounded on the meaning of that. There is no conception of society as such without individuals being the principal social agent. An early philosophical erosion of this comes from Marx himself, who discounted the liberal idea of individualism on historical materialist grounds. Marx is confusingly inheriting the political thought of the philosophical state, which always had to contend with its subjects as individuals before it could contend with them collectively. This is a very obvious error that Marx can recognize, but when Marx postulates about the nature of Man, he veers into philosophical beliefs that are sometimes rooted in an assessment of biology, and sometimes bold assertions of a human spirit that conform more to Marx's expectations of what it should be rather than what most humans have been. For Marx, the residuum is not at all relevant and has no place in his world, and visions of the lower classes that suggest the failure of their class would be fixed by simply not letting those lumpenproletariat ruin it with their smelliness. The attitude of later Marxist-Leninist states towards the residuum was to accuse them of political crimes of Being, with the implicit knowledge that what would be regarded as "bad genes" in eugenist society was in of itself a political offense against the state. In this way, political psychology promoted solutions that were more about upholding the Marxist-Leninist institutions and the grand theory than any condition of the residuum. If a member of the residuum could get with the program somehow, then that's great, but this almost never happened, and anyone who was politically insane or politically retarded was shunned from socialist society. The idea was to keep those people, even if they demonstrated some brilliance and an eagerness to work for socialism, in a position where they stayed exactly where they are. There would be in socialist society a quiet marking down of people who were "not supposed" to be in the political class imagined, even if they were faithful followers of the program. This came to many of these people as a shocking betrayal when the Soviet Union was to be dismantled, and within the technical classes, there was a rat race to see who would sink or swim in the world to come. Those who were "not supposed to be there" would be left to the mercy of the market system to sell whatever talents they had, and they could expect to sell those talents at cut-rate prices because this is neoliberalism, and it is a harsh world. So far as socialism existed anywhere in the world, this betrayal was bound to happen, and was seeded in advance. It was inherent in many of the socialist ideas that gained currency, because socialist ideas that would have prevented this would be squelched before a concept that technocracy could be criticized at all was allowed to gain steam. Any socialism that could be critical of technocracy in a serious way would have recognized the threat of a program like eugenics overrode any threat of capitalism as an economic situation, and that could not be tolerated. Those who stood to benefit from eugenics, or believed they would out of sense of their own intelligence, were not going to let some do-gooders interfere with the great working. The war on society required all intellectual trends to turn decisively against the masses, and turn out in favor of the new war - the true war, which did not regard the lines of class or states or any line except the line dividing those selected to live from the many selected to die. Clearly, those in the selected to live camp, who knew what the score really was and how they would stay there, had a lot of work to do in this war, mostly against the residuum but also in their own tent. The selected to live team was comprised of many rival factions and interests that had little to do with each other besides a commitment to this idea of an intelligentsia ruling all, and that they considered themselves members of that club. Dominant in that tent would be the ruling capitalist oligarchs, who had much to do with selecting the criteria for "smart" and who would be allowed to promote in the educational institutions and believe with certainty that they actually were in the club. Not every oligarch was in on the plan, and there was a large oligarchic faction that wanted the usual Nazi horseshit, but everyone in this formation understood that before they could take out each other, they had to contend with a large residuum that had no reason to go along with what was about to be done to them, except the threat of termination and torture compelling submission. The great carrot to offer to the residuum was to feed their worst vices and glorify the rot, and this was the first and most obvious part of the social engineering offensive. Those of the residuum who would do their part to enable eugenics chose their side of the war, often receiving nothing more than a pittance before being thrust back down into abject humiliation. They will always have chosen their side in the war, and should not even be dignified with the lofty title of being a Judas.

The strategy of the eugenists involved, but was not entirely defined by, this understanding of war's purpose as a social engineering project. Those who are familiar with war allude to this purpose of war throughout history. For most of history, war did not require a concept of sociology or social engineering for its purpose to be understood, and because wars were fairly common, it could be accepted that this was the way of the world and the way of Man. The hunters and hersdmen who would become warriors understood at heart why they fought, and that war as a practice was where they would have to prove if they were men or sissies, if they were allowed to be men upon reaching the age of manhood. War, on some level, was an expectation rather than a theory. It did not take much for a warband to form, and none of these warbands spent too long philosophizing about the nature of their game. Such an undertaking was not necessary to appreciate the effect of war. The objective of war did not need to be the killing of people or the destruction of something, nor did it have to be a fight to claim some territory or property. If wars were purely fought for mercantile purposes or what could be construed as that, they are usually a very inefficient way of attaining the goal. There may be an economic or political calculation involved to determine the payoff of a war, and usually there is this consideration, as politics and diplomacy is always a consideration whether there is war or not. Wars are usually fought with the expectation that neither side will be wholly exterminated or disintegrated, but that some victory condition entails domination of one group over another, or at least one group fends off an attempt by another to do that and considers not being dominated to be the value won. In the ancient world, until empires become the norm, tribes and nations would fight, lose, and come back in a matter of years ready to throw off the yoke of domination and fight again. The Romans would have to fight the rest of Italy multiple times before Roman hegemony became a reality, facing periodic revolts from their closest allies as far in as the late republic. Such examples would be the norm, and persistent domination over a large area or a large number of clients was an exceptional case rather than the rule. The usual way in which early and classical empires were sustained was through keeping defeated cities and nations as subjects of the imperial power, often with states remaining clients rather than being annexed. Even when annexed, cultural or racial replacement was rarely imposed in a violent way, and in practice assimilation was never a popular imperial strategy even in the modern era. Cultural homogenity, let alone racial homogenity, was a completely dismal strategy for rule, and the states implementing it did so not to resolve a war, but to maintain a permanent war that was more about social class and exploitation than any contest over identity. The open racial war in the United States towards the ex-slaves was entirely pressed by a certain faction in American society against people who bent over backwards to cooperate with an enemy, that by all of its laws and the stories it told itself should accept this cooperation, and almost everyone else in the world found it boggling that a vocal minority would maintain this war even when it held no material benefit or purpose and was not even fought in a way that would resolve the war. It is important to understand the racial war as a precursor to eugenics, and then as a vehicle to sell the purest eugenic creed to a sector of the American populace, and to recruit many of the white cuckolds who would be faithful, retarded death squads for the creed when the time came. That is all it was really for, and why racism was maintained more than any benefit from exploiting a race or even the exploitative benefits of eugenics for depressing overall wages. The crushing of wages did not require racism, nor benefitted from racism, because maintaining white identity would be a constant expense requiring payoffs and costs to overall security; and in any event, integration could just as easily be used as a tool to reduce the wage fund, and this prong of the war to reduce the wage fund was also used, since the capitalist-eugenist alliance loved the three-pronged assault from left, right, and center, with the center in this case being moderates who normalized a synthesis that was prepared as the solution to a culture war. The culture war was designed to perpetuate indefinitely, so that this desired synthesis and the desired three-prong attack would be created against the desired enemy. This reduction of the wage fund was not itself the motive, but a means to an end of the greater struggle of eugenic social engineering. The wage fund, however large or small, would never allow people to purchase any means that would permit rebellion. The purpose of crushing wages was not a defensive reaction, but an offensive plan to modify the behavior of workers and the lumpenproles. Deprivation would be used both in a general sense to force more people to chase after fewer dollars, and to deprive particular qualities that would have been valuable for the workers' security and development. The former was overt and obvious, while the latter would be conducted in a million subtle ways through social engineering wars and manipulations in every institution Americans interfaced with. Here, the use of war for social engineering is the clear purpose of structuing social problems and crises as war, and the war on drugs and war on poverty, like many social wars, were redresses of a progressive drive that desired eugenics and covered it with humanitarian-seeming goals. Much of the war on poverty consisted of the last bits of the ladder technocracy created to elevate just enough workers to the status necessary to build the machines of neoliberalism, payoffs to fatten and weaken elements of the proletarians while locking them out of social advancement, and propping up institutions that would be necessary like the medical sector. It also was, for its time, a jobs program for the liberal and social democratic intelligentsia who would be tasked with managing their most hated enemy, the welfare recipient. Holding that leverage gave the sadistic social worker glee to watch a desperate lumpen's life destroyed in front of them, which this author can assure you was a common story for welfare recipients. Since all of this money was extracted from the workers and the middle class, and the comfortable middle class received back the indirect social benefit of being in the winning group and granted social privileges that couldn't be valued in money, this was not a problem. Further, it had long been established that any welfare beneficiary was just cycling money back to the bourgeoisie in various ways, since that money would have nowhere to go but the capitalists who provided all services a proletarian would buy, like food or rent. Any money paid out to the lumpen was destined to return to the hands of the bourgeoisie eventually, which is what the smart people in the room were trying to tell the stupid men when the liberals set this thing up. Leave it to conservatives to lack the brainpower to see this very simplistic but highly effective model, and not be able to construct a worthwhile argument against it because their animal brain only comprehends "me wantee" and bullycowardice.

The practice of war would be, throughout human existence, the decisive factor in what social units were possible, and which were desirable. There would be some direction of choice in what a society would do, and in the main, the forms society took were not created by being imposed as a condition of defeat, but were forms that some tribe or nation or city adopted for themselves, and found useful for whatever purpose they had in mind. Social engineering in any time is not easy, and was not always consciously pursued, but in the main, there were men and women who took it upon themselves to be critics of whatever society they lived in, and believed they had a role in changing it into something that suited their wishes as best as they could. War would not be the motivator that prompted anyone to make social reforms as a concession to the practice of war itself, and no society would actually accept that blithely. War, whatever the partisans of its cult may claim, is always a choice for at least one side, and the most aggressive societies in history always made decisions that suited motives other than victory in war. War merely was the final determination of whether a society could survive, and war was not the only way in which societies could be changed by an outside agent. Nearly all of the social forms we have adopted were not adopted because they were truly necessary in war, or because they were imposed naturally. They were adopted out of expedience in the most obvious scenarios, by the whim of those who were in a position to make these reforms, and by social values which favored certain qualities in people, or qualities in the type of labor they did, or qualities of an intellectual or spiritual nature. Many of these social values were desired for spiritual authority rather than the needs of a temporal authority reacting to a situation or a material benefit to them. The value of productivity itself is often desired because a spiritual inclination to praise industriousness, either generally or towards productive aims that feed an ultimately non-productive goal. It should be known that free trade and capitalism are not spiritually inclined to favor any productivity, and capitalism as an arrangement has been allergic to the idea that capitalists exist to produce useful things. It first resisted this by simply rejecting that argument, and then by interpereting "utility" as "the thing which lets me, the capitalist, keep my money against that filthy mob, and nothing else". Finally this transformed into the alliance with the eugenic interest, where "social ends" were interpreted to be eugenic ends, and production for any non-eugenic value was not only viewed as unproductive, but the very thing eugenic society sought to abolish. This has meant eugenic society has been characterized by restricting production both in quantity and in any quality that is inimical to eugenics, and eugenic society has always been careful to measure the quantity of product and line up with existing demand, then with-holding that quantity of product to affect minute behavioral changes in the masses and lock out the residuum. Eugenic society could not survive if it did not in theory possess the means to meet a quantity of product to allow everyone a standard of living. If eugenic society actually could not meet the productive demands to allow that standard of living, it would become known that the threats of a eugenic society to invade private life could not be backed up, and this would motivate all subjects to rebel against such a society because victory would be attainable.

This is not a difficulty in practice, because it has long been known that industrial technique could, if desired, far exceed demand. Eugenic society is premised on throwing large swaths of the population out of work, and little regard is given for genuine efficiency. The incentives of eugenic capitalism discourage too much innovation in production techniques if they would lead to greater production yields, and always seek to produce the barest minimum necessary with the smallest compensation for labor and the smallest number of laborers possible. It is more important to work 6 workers for 120 hours a week, then it is to work 6 slaves for 60 hours a week, given equality of wages per hour. This is not because the doubled labor time produces twice as much product, because overworked workers are not as productive during the added 60 hours, and a 120 hour work week would exhaust workers in short order. Productivity increases that would shorten the work-week, without any effect on wages, would violate an incentive in eugenism to keep workers in as much misery as possible, and so the only efficiency increases allowed are those that would eliminate a need for a worker, rather than efficiencies that would make each worker more efficient. Nearly every production process is designed to eliminate as many workers as possible from the process, and to induce them to work as many hours and chew up as much of their free time and wealth as possible. Getting more out of workers per unit, even if the efficiency increase is put entirely towards paying workers half the wages for half the time invested, is missing the point of eugenic society. The eugenic society is not under actual competitive pressure to reduce wages, since it operates in monopoly conditions, and eugenic society is known to reward nepotism and has a stated goal of paying off favored workers and telling them they should be grateful for any scraps. The "bonus" of working an extra 60 hours of week in wages, which would exhaust the workers, is sold as something the worker should be grateful to accept, even if the work pace were to exhaust the worker utterly and kill him faster. The wider incentives of eugenism see the exhaustion and early death of workers as values of great importance. Extermination through labor is the eugenic plan for humanity, just like a concentration camp. The value of doing this outweighs the tiny benefit of a worker doing more with less time, and if that worker were to have more free time, eugenic society would prompt him to find another job if he wanted to prove his validity and worthiness to continue living, so that the 60 hours would be made up by another form of slavery. Since the basic work week in this eugenic society would be 120 hours, it would be seen as socially necessary and normal to impose this expectation, and if the worker has no standard for comparison or is put under enough pressure to comply with the demand, he won't be able to say no. It is the value of the worker's inability to say no that the eugenist values more than any product of a laborer. If it were possible, the eugenic capitalist would eliminate that worker as soon as his product is no longer necessary for the liquidation of the residuum, and that worker is sent to be reprocessed into glue after his remaining life is exhausted as a medical lab rat. This calculus looks odd if you think capitalism is about productivity and what is cost-effective, but the capitalist isn't a machine to optimize economic inflows and outflows. The capitalist merely has to work in that condition when he is in perfect competition, and as a monopolist, the capitalist is in the exact opposite of that. This is also the reason why a smart capitalist likes extracting rent and tribute and government largesse, so he can go be a "job creator" even though all the jobs are on paper and doled out like it is some sort of reward to be an exploited slave. Any study of the free trade system's origins would tell you that this behavior is expected of capitalists and incentivized, even if to our understanding it is a moral hazard. It was recognized as a moral hazard then, but the rules of the day were clear that workers were there to be exploited and had no rights as such, which is why incoming wage workers in the 19th century were treated as they were - as slaves both on and off the job, with police invading their life and an antagonistic city and state keeping them under control. The degree of freedom they were permitted was little more than an allowance rather than a right they could expect to protect, absent a lawyer and against courts that were stacked by an enemy class and interest that usually, but not always, ruled against workers on any matter, and always upheld the privilege of the bourgeois against the proletarian when the latter trampled on the former. Proletarians only won that fight on terms the bourgeois allowed, after considerable bourgeois assistance. If there are no proletarian lawyers, the proletarian is beholden to his class enemy for representation in any legal matter, which is a lot like slaves beseeching an advocate for whatever mercy they could find.

This transformation of incentives was made possible because the war of classes became not just a figure of speech or an inchoate struggle which was described with poetic narratives, or a grind that was waged against individual workers by a ruling body. Eugenics turned the class war from a figure of speech or an allegory into an actual war, fought by phalanxes of officers against an enemy in organized fashion, as if the whole society that was not in the know were an enemy formation. War expenditures and logistics were prepared to turn the class war into a siege. The ethos of Eugenics appropriated the word "jihad" to describe their struggle[3], and meant that in the true meaning of the word. No expenditure of the eugenic movement was accidental and the core actors of the creed knew to march in lockstep. They would be drilled in seminar after seminar to know exactly what to say, and to break ranks was not just a moral shame, but treason. Examples would be made of those who broke ranks or did not figure out what this was, and to those who were true believers, they behaved in every way as if they were warriors against the throngs of the residuum. In the manner of war propaganda, the residuum, most of whom were pacifistic to a fault, were portrayed as invariably hostile animals, dripping with disease. The image of a zombie, popularized in eugenic fiction, was the stand-in for the residuum, and depictions of the poor in liberal media reveled in describing the residum as zombies, not just in a philosophical sense but in their behavior. The behavior of zombies, dull indolence and a perpetual brain fog, were conditioned into the residuum as much as possible. Once this behavior was conditioned, it would be used as further proof of the necessity of war against the residuum, and the eugenic faithful responded to the image of rotting zombies demanding food. That the rotting zombies were drugged by force, beaten, humiliated, denied any standards of comparison, and conditioned to believe desperate moaning was the only way out, was of course part of the struggle, and on some level the eugenic faithful were aware that they did condition those behaviors, and actively encouraged the residuum's zombie-like traits. To do otherwise would have required breaking ranks and admitting the possibility that either the creed was wrong, or that a follower of the creed was not truly in the elect. Neither was thinkable if someone had committed to the creed and believed themselves to be a true member. Even the useful idiots of the residuum who knew they were doing dirty work for the creed, who had no shame and would gladly make themselves Judas goats, knew that if they were to repent, there would be no mercy, and that what they did could not be undone. Their only hope was to beseech the eugenic creed for what crumbs they would continue to offer, and sometimes those crumbs materialized in exchange for more of the dirty work, while often the crumbs would disappear and their Judas goat would be vivisected like anyone else in the residuum. Since the favorite Judas goats were those who were on the margins of being cast into what is today special education, they would often tell themselves that they would rather be Judases than retarded, and that in the end is a reasonable calculation. There is no Heaven awaiting the retarded, and they would know this if they knew what Christianity taught.

Past transformations of society were not as war-driven as the ongoing transformation. They were not always the result of revolutions or rebellions. Typically, the revolution did not create the social change attributed to it at all. Revolutions are the result of something that formed in many sectors over a long time, and often tied into a worldwide trend of revolutions. The modern revolutions were always inspired by the same conspiracies that brought about the American rebellion and the French calling of the Estates-General, and would look to those two examples of what to do when establishing a new republic, whether it was liberal or socialist. Both the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China made the most obvious comparison in their early history not with the French, as would be expected with an ideological reading of history,. but with the Americans. This makes sense given that the Soviets and Chinese faced many of the same initial conditions the Americans did, and effectively consolidated rule under a one-party state. The American way of doing this is complicated, but made clear with any long look at the American party system which is utterly alien to political formations in most elected republics, and it not even a thing Americans in the 19th century denied. There was a ruling party from a very early period in American history, and no political disagreement between parties ever really concerned ideology or core principles. The one period where the country split up was not a split in the party system, but a thing the whole political class save for a few attempted to avoid. The reckless actions of a few and the necessary response of the North at this provocation forced the hand of the slavery interest, which was one of those things considered part of the consensus that couldn't be changed through normal politics. The early history of the communist states was rife with infighting and a need for a ruler to suppress the political wingnuts, and the more overt one-party state of the communist regimes had more to do with their very different geopolitical situation and characteristics of Marxism-Leninism suggesting that it was desirable to rid the socialist republic of any sign of faction. Factional infighting was even more furious in the communist states than the shit-flinging of the Americans during the Articles of Confederation days and the battle between the Democratic-Republicans and Federalists over basically everything. Where all that led to the Federalists being chased out of public view until basically now, the communist infighting entailed an internal war against the kulaks, or capitalist roaders, and then for China things got super heated with the Cultural Revolution and the left's final resurgence as a global force. If revolutions were themselves the changing agent, then the results of revolution are dubious. The French Revolution was rolled back and its democratic reforms were undone beyond a token allowance by the restored monarchy for some representative body, entirely at the mercy of the king. What remained of the revolution was a transformation of France from an autocracy ruled by a glorified warlord backed by the Church to a modern nation-state of citizens, and while that was a very profound transformation and very relevant to our thinking of war as a social engineering project, the revolution itself only provided part of that change, and the same change did not happen everywhere in the same way. Americans never would develop a sense of nationalism in the French or European sense, and attempts to manufacture it have always been horribly misguided and un-American in profound ways. The communist projects relied not on nationalism but internationalism and the role of the Communist Party for their theory of how society would be ordered, and while the national idea from France informed everyone, the relevance of nationalism was not so much because it presented spiritual legitimacy, but because nationalism implied the basis for a mass army, which the French were using to kick astronomical levels of ass during the war with all of Europe that came out of the revolution. The transformations of society through war are not always what the initiators intended when starting the revolution politically, but those embroiled in any war are aware of the consequences and how a wars intent is transformative for both the enemy (they are to be subdued or disintegrated) and for the engaging society tasked with defending itself and adapting to its enemies.

One difficulty with using war as a plan for social engineering is that society, as mentioned, doesn't exist as a nebulous blob that can be taken for granted. It should not surprise anyone that wars, even among the ruling class, are never popular, and finding unanimity on a war of choice is nearly impossible. Wars of clear self-defense are almost obligatory for everyone, and wars to defend against an unforgivable slight to the society that would imply long-term humiliation are likely to find at least ruling class support. For most of the people, war is this horrific nightmare they are dragged into, that has always been nothing but bullshit fought for some aristocratic assholes who were taking their shit out on their own countrymen the previous day. For most of history, the rulers of a society openly laughed at their own people, and on multiple occasions used the war as a pretext to attack their own productive base, not because this was useful for fighting the war, but because the instigators of the war saw the declared war as a game and never gave up the war against their own country that was inherent to any aristocracy. An aristocracy that wasn't fighting that war against its own people would be overthrown the moment they were no longer needed, and that would be recognized very quickly if the war against the underclass truly abated. To maintain the war, aristocracies always resort to threats and ensure the life of the lower classes is never secure for long. Predation is inherent to aristocracy as a concept, and so aristocratic societies - and this definition defines most civilized societies with a developed and organized spiritual authority and a strong temporal authority that aligns with it, which means most societies extant including our own - make war and a cult of war central to their concepts of the political. The deliberate engineering of war and its purpose are obfuscated by the declaration that wars are merely political, and that politics necessitates war as some sort of good. Usually the public rationale is defensive, but no aristocracy conceives of itself defending a line in the sand or honoring any treaty.

Aristocracies do not face the most severe consequences of war and its cult, regardless of what class or combination of classes and which professions form the aristocracy. Normally warrior aristocracies are conceived since their connection to war is obvious. Spiritual aristocracies as a rule make an early alliance with warriors, and turn viciously against their own people. The warriors glorify violence and predation, and the spiritual leaders mollify the people while stealthily increasing the predatory instinct of the warriors and setting conspiracies against the commoners, pitting the commoners against each other in ways warriors cannot. Aristocracies drawn from the common ranks, which only became the norm in modernity, are typically aristocracies of capital or aristocracies premised on intelligence and supposed merit. The link of capital and banks to the old aristocratic order is hard to miss, and does not require too long an explanation. The aristocracy of capital was not an aristocracy of petty shopkeepers and factory owners who started from nothing. The commoners' rise was only possible because there were large capitalist entities already in existence, and the capitalist enterprise was tied most of all to trading companies that were de facto governments with armies. Without this presence, capitalism as a preferred arrangement is not able to fend off the older interest, and this is one reason capitalism happened in Europe rather than elsewhere. A few oligarchs can see that by pooling the wealth of the bourgeois petty and large, they share between them a majority of the wealth, and many commoners were educated men whose services were most useful to any regime, whether as scientists or lawyers or scholars. Every aristocracy of capital has usually implied that the capitalists possessed merit to acquire that wealth, and the leading capitalist aristocrats understood well that an alliance with science and technology was the surest way to secure that aristocracy, with the scientists and intellectuals being partners with their own interests in the arrangement. The leading aristocrats of capital were men in the new field of oil, railroad builders, industrialists with an eye towards arranging industry not just for a firm but the whole society, weapons manufacturers who now supplied not just guns and artillery, but battleships and tanks and outlandish battle platforms that were still yet dreams but the expectation of anyone who studied military hardware. Joining them would be the growing necessity of an intelligence service, policing functions and private armies that could control very large populations, and a military interest that was no longer aristocratic in its own right but always liked to hobknob with aristocrats and play-act like they were glorious generals of old. It was not the alliance with warriors that corrupted aristocracy to wage an intercine war. Every aristocracy, no matter its claims, rests on an essential difference between the ruler and ruled. This essence need not be hereditary or ordained by some spiritual authority, but it is an abiding characteristic of aristocracies that however they establish themselves, they did so because everyone else was kept down, and mobility into and out of the aristocracy was limited. Aristocracies take great pains not to release one of their own to the ranks of the ruled. When aristocracies eject one of their own, they will do as any smart mafia boss does and eliminate the dissenter. This is an old instinct that makes a lot of sense, because conspiracies don't want to let people with inner knowledge enter the ranks of the ruled and comingle with them. That is one of the worst things an aristocracy could face.

The formation of aristocracies was not a foregone conclusion. Clan societies typically lack a true aristocracy, but are instead ruled by certain families with a lot of wealth. It is possible to have rule without an aristocracy, and for those rulers to be very rich and everyone else to be poor. Tribal chieftains and their cronies are not aristocracies in any meaningful sense of the word, even if some who would be intellectuals would claim to a modern that their intellectualism is just as good as today's intellectual aristocracy. Aristocracy first required a considerable spiritual authority to be established, and then required a religion that dealt in some way with a theory of the state and society in terms that a mass audience could understand. This did not necessitate that the priests themselves rule, or that the priestly function had to be entirely associated with rule; it could be that spiritual thinkers would be present even in the lower classes, or the society allowed for spiritual consciousness of multiple types and permitted people to find their own guru. The important thing is that the spiritual authority of who and what ruled was made clear, and even if people didn't like it, they would be made to abide it. Aristocracy then required a stable, settled population of sufficient size, and a level of material stability such that a group of people were strongly secured from any effect of poverty. This usually meant that aristocrats did not engage in work or petty commerce, and extracted their wealth from various tributes and taxes. The return to the lower orders, if any, is that the aristocracy could share some of its privileges with the lower class, handing out a carrot that was jealously protected by the aristocracy. Aristocracies, in any form, claim they possess some merit, no matter how dubious, to justify their rule. This merit may be by demonstration of strength, or some law proclaiming it so and providing a spurious rational proof, or by claiming wealth was won by merit in a rigged economic order. Aristocracies encourage internal competition beyond the norm. A despotic king often rules with an aristocracy beneath him, but the aristocracy is antagonistic towards the king and vice versa, because every aristocrat wishes to be the king, or the first man in Rome as Caesar did. Aristocracies fear any figure like a Caesar or an Oriental despot like the Chinese emperors, and in the Chinese case, the emperor was explicitly placed above social class altogether to grant him a degree of freedom and authority and legitimacy to all classes. Very often, kings and emperors make a pretense that the sovereign is a check against the aristocracy, since the antagonism between kings and aristocracies is well known. The charge of an aristocracy against a would-be king or Caesar is that the king is a demagogue who wants to give the undeserving free stuff, and the counter-argument of a king is that the aristocrats are misers who only want to see you suffer. It's a great game that kings and aristocrats play, since anything the rest of the people get in such an arrangement are the crumbs of wealth, most of which was produced by labor and the land that was stolen from the common people. Aristocracies abhor work, and export that ethos to the rest of society. Aristocracies in the ideal world are remarkably unproductive, and view productivity in all cases as a thing which must be subordinated to reason and the dictates of military necessity. Given a choice, an aristocrat chooses to destroy prosperity beyond his own, and is miserly towards other aristocrats with whom he competes. All the things that can be said of a foul-hearted tyrant are really the soul of every aristocrat the whole way through. There is no decay of goodness to make the aristocrat a bad tyrant. Aristocracies start out rotten, and make a big spectacle about how they are good and noble. This goodness is defined entirely by comparison to the deprivation of the common folk. Commoners are only allowed dignity so long as they remain workers, and workers are never truly permitted liberty or security. Those are the last carrots an aristocrat ever wants to offer a worker, no matter how favored. Even the loyal workers are kept on edge, and an ever-present nervous terror is the default mental state of life in an aristocracy. With how hilariously maladaptive aristocracy has been, whether it is an artificial or elected aristocracy or a natural aristocracy premised on genuine merit, it is a wonder this form of government became the default, and its assumptions were taken for granted. Human history is indeed strange. So ubiquitous is the bias towards aristocracy that political theorists usually simplify the types of possible government to despotisms, monarchies, and republics, the latter two being effectively aristocratic governments in every case but with different pretenses told to the masses and among the rulers. When the only alternative to aristocratic terror is despotism, it's an engineered narrative to convince people that there is no alternative. Unfortunately, humanity is habituated to aristocracy to such an extent that anything else has become inconceivable, except as a reign of terror from below the likes of which would terrify all, including the others of common stock. Aristocracy has always been a work in progress, constantly revising its dogmas.

The further origins of aristocracy will be elaborated in subsequent chapters. It is helpful here to note that a state of war exists between aristocrat and commoner, and the haves and have-nots. All of our economic thinking in monetary society is informed by aristocratic tendencies that dominate the economic order, and usually insist on control of the currency. If the monetary economy were truly free, as an anarcho-capitalist fool believes it ought to be, it would collapse rapidly, because the assumptions of aristocracy are everywhere in our social values and affect economic decision-making of every consumer. The example of the thirsty bourgeois man in the desert discovering marginal utility by fetching the theoretical caravan is the ultimate example of aristocratic "me wantee" thinking at the heart of bourgeois economics. Nowhere in that contrived example is there a concept of work, land, or anything material. It is a very peculiar example if you think about anything in the real world, because in practice even an aristocrat must concede to material reality if he wishes to rule or do anything. Aristocracy does not so much act out of ignorance of material reality, but actively defies it and insists on declaring a falsehood of their essential difference from the rest of us as a necessary political distinction. This is only possible with the implication that work and land itself is subjected to a warlike approach to its management. The aristocratic approach to this is not the only way a state, which at first responded to a general fear, could take shape. Aristocracy is one of the steps a society can take to transfer from an older, gentile constitution more firmly rooted in the natural world, to the philosophical state of today where the question of what type of government we have is written down and the answers promulgated as much as they need to be. Aristocracy was not the only way the war within a society could have been waged. There were many causes for an elite to elevate itself above the norm and assert that because it was that way now, it should be that way in the future, and that it was actually always that way in the past. "He who controls the present controls the past" has a long history, and it is inherent to aristocracy. Ideas contrary to aristocracy may be entertained, like democracy, but they are never implemented in any way which disturbs aristocratic conceits in a significant way. At most, these reforms are permitted as a way to mitigate the ruinous traits of aristocracy, while maintaining the principle that an aristocracy should dominate the ruled. The rationalization becomes more philosophical than premised on the particular qualities an aristocracy might possess, since as mentioned, an aristocracy can be drawn from any class. In theory an aristocracy of skilled labor is possible, and this is what crude technocratic conceits are taught to be, but technocracies always favored those skilled at ruling and management over anything productive. A technocracy where the workers and useful intellectuals actually rule would be something very different from anything that happened, and at best a relatively benevolent aristocracy understood the value of having something that actually produces things over their usual tendencies.

A society at war is very concerned with authority in all ways. It is impossible to conceive of organized fighting without a chain of command or some way to know what is to be done. Since authority is best represented in a singular person, this often means that warlike societies must start as individuals who, aside from the state of war, have no particular reason to be united. Attempts to define the warring society must be able to make a clear delineation between who is in and who is out, and who has access to certain information. A military that does not verify this access risks a saboteur who has no interest in the project, and this is always present even if the warring society were presumed to be united by some material concern, or by an unspoken fear that no one is going to transgress without consideration. War as a practice would contribute further to the human sense of themselves as selves, which was already suggested by human necessity to retain themselves for economic decision making and conduct of their personal affairs. The general fear which formed the state will be acted on by everyone, whether they have the favor of the state or not. States have to account for people in their domain even if they are disloyal and do not submit to the state's authority or comply with record-keeping a bureaucracy would require. As warbands and those with a conceit of telling others what they will do and what they are were able to assert greater authority and do so on a permanent basis, resentment towards this would be the default state of anyone who had no reason to play along with this game. The existence of a great enemy, the nature of which is always nebulous, would be an easy way to draw people who had no reason to enter state society into the affairs of a few people. At first, and for a long time, these people ruled purely through fear, might, superstition, and whatever they could use to manipulate people into obeying instructions that were clearly against their interests. A true aristocracy was not formed immediately, because the concept of aristocracy and its legitimacy in the eyes of the common folk could not survive just because it was declared so. Clan and tribe societies looked to their closer social units for authority rather than any state or aristocracy, and the early states were ruled not by aristocratic conceits, but because one house or an alliance of houses could rule by might. Little effort in Babylon or Egypt was made to suggest that the rulers cared in the slightest about their subjects, or needed their consent for anything at all. Tax and tribute was obligated not by social custom, but because those who ruled had an army and could take your property and your life if you didn't pay up. This principle is still at the root of state authority and why they can collect taxes. You didn't really get a choice in being taxed, and no society could operate if it actually let the people decide their tax rate. "Taxation without representation" was intended to mitigate taxes an aristocracy of capital paid, with the expectation that in the long run, tax and rent would extract anything the common workers acquired. This process was held off until the 20th century, and neoliberalism was premised on maximal rent extraction and a deliberate effort to strip every last penny the workers ever acquired and any lands they managed to claw away from the system. In the days before states related to individuals or considered anything resembling rights or standing a thing, the state's authority was that it would do whatever it wanted, whenever it wanted. This, you may be surprised, often was better than the alternative, because no one was under any illusion that the arrangement was anything else. The ruled and the ruler were purely antagonistic and the ruler had no prestige or theory beyond their ability to do so. A justification may be found in the religion of early states, which proclaimed that the rulers were gods or very close to the gods, but this was just an affirmative statement of a cult of power. It did not need to be legitimized by any theory, and its legitimacy through war was only as strong as the state's ability to win wars. A ruler who couldn't win wars was exposed as a weakling, tossed out, and another ruler stepped into the power vacuum. Most people were never going to participate in the affairs of state, and there was no expectation that they would want to. They knew that the state was an antagonist, and their relation to it was that the state was the thing that came around to collect tax every year, and this tax was usually in requisition of goods. There wasn't a myth that some aristocracy deserved to rule, unelss it could point to some victory and ride that for as long as they could. The religious justifications of the past were not premised on a historical condition or any result, but on a cult and fetishism that glorified the leader and demanded submission. You bowed to the gods of the king, or you were in deep shit. There was no expectation that the gods were anything other than cruel to the weak, and your goal as a commoner was to align yourself with those gods because you feared them or believed it would give you something. It would take a form of education to instill the idea, over time, of an aristocracy with spiritual authority that could pass from state to state, and was a general rule of life. The spiritual authority of priests and wise men before was there for its purpose, but beyond the exhortation to bow and scrape to the king, the state was a temporal authority that simply asserted that it was godly because it was strong. New kings would bring in new cults, sometimes radically different and demanding new rules of worship and submission. It was the worship and self-abasement that kings and conquerors cared about, rather than the state religion pointing to truth or justice or things an aristocracy pretends to value. Aside from the loyalty of his soldiers, a king or warlord cared not about whether his common subjects loved him, feared him, or felt anything. All that was necessary was that the king could kill them if he needed to, and that the rabble kept paying into a protection racket and kept working the fields and industries of the society. A concept of civic duty escapes members of early states entirely, and if mentioned, it is seen as some sort of strange fantasy a rich person or a priest concocted to get them to pay into yet more horseshit.

You can see in this construction that the idea of a warring society all marching in order for the team is not at all how societies conduct war. This image of the entire society drilled and goosestepping for everything is a favorite of fascist ideology, but it never has worked like that, and the fascists themselves are the greatest example of how societies organized around war are never given more stability by being at war. People, who had no reason to go along with state society, are given a number of myths to suggest that the state or the ruling institutions of that society have a right to rule, and that their rule is just and good and all that. That is ostensibly what is defended. The lived experience of most people in the society is that all of those good things are in reality their greatest antagonist, or at best were neutral towards them, and that neutrality was only there out of a need to keep the peace. Neutrality is never the desired attitude of an aristocratic institution or a ruler, and neutrality in war is seen as toxic and seemly. The expectations of war are about whether someone is loyal or disloyal. The apathetics of the American Revolutonary War are heaped with scorn for wanting to stay out of a conflict that was, by all reasonable accounts, a bunch of bullshit so that two factions of rich men got a bunch of poor men and women killed and took more stuff. The patriots may disagree with the war being bullshit since it was their stuff they cared about, and the loyalists defaulted to the king despite King George and his court being pretty damn pathetic during the whole ordeal. No one likes a neutral, and the battle between good and neutral is one a state likes to wage before it enters war. If someone can stay out of a civil war entirely, they are blessed. The evil, or disloyal, are a thing that can be more easily spotted than neutrality, and thus they are often purged or dealt with, and the disloyal seeking to subvert society will understand the need for sneakiness. The disloyal have known for a long time that an appearance of neutrality will not save them. The neutral is despised by all sides, despite the neutral often seeing the stupidity of the entire war effort. The neutral is stuck there because, unless neutral can hold its line against the war cult, their typical behavior is to avoid fighting unless absolutely necessary, which means they are unwilling to take sides unless they can form their own side. Since this would mean the established neutral is fighting a two front war, it would be very difficult unless one side can be convinced that the war drive is bullshit.

Individually, members of society are loathe to involve themselves with any of this. War, for most of them, is not what they live for, and even those who specialize in war are not fond to fight it. The people who fetishize and glorify war are usually those for whom it is an abstract thing, or a thing they can spectate and gamble on like it's a cute game. The sociality that individuals wanted between each other implies that war is a thing to be avoided, and even mutual defense of a social unit is taxing for that unit. A war of aggression is only unifying if they can win, and then that unity comes at the cost of certain commitments. Fighting men have to be capable fighters, which means weeding out anyone who is too soft or can't follow orders or isn't with the program. It might be possible to throw the losers into some penal battalion or bitch work, but wars typically involve men fighting and being at risk of dying. An army of penal battalions is not going to win a war, and if the society at war is run so horribly that its people are unfit for proper service, that is all you will have to fight with. Ultimately, the breakdown of society comes back to how humans educated themselves from a very early point, and how social proof decided who was in and out of social units in the first place. A lame or unsightly child was typically exposed or ritually sacrificed in the old days, and this practice was not just tolerated but encouraged in primitive society as the thing to do. It was a radical change in civilized societies to not do this on occasion, like sparing the weak was some grand mark of virtue even though the mercy towards the weak was the most abject slavery and humiliation that no decent man, even a slave, would tolerate. Slaves of sound mind and standing who were treated this way would either break down mentally, seeing such treatment as one of the most severe punishments and an unbearable shame, or would free themselves by suicide or attack the master out of pure spite. No other response would be acceptable to a man with any shred of dignity. Slaves often talk about how much shit they put up with, but the humiliation of this degradation is something else altogether. To be retarded is worse than slavery, and this has always been known. Better to be a slave, even a slave who was buck broken, than to be a retard. The buck breaking technique was used to impose on the slave the belief that he was retarded, but on some level he knew he was not the retard. Even here, buck breaking was a terror technique against the disobedient slaves, rather than a normal, routing conditioning. The more effective and loyal slaves were shown this fate as a way to keep them from rebelling, but actually doing it en masse would lead to slaves refusing to work out of dire necessity or killing everything in sight. The favored slaves would be encouraged to facilitate the terror among each other and against the weak, thus perpetuating the system. As long as it wasn't them, the strategy of extreme punishments to set an example worked. Consider then that a society at war has been effectively put in slavery, and the ruler himself is obligated to prosecute the war to retain his legitimacy, and so he is in some sense beholden to the needs of war. Slave societies have never been bastions of solidarity, and any manager of slaves has known to punish the weak links to maintain discipline. Even an army that sought to salvage its manpower as much as possible, out of a sense that it had to, is hesitant to tolerate weakness. A deep impulse that led to war in the first place shows immense disgust towards the weak, and the thought of incorporating a retard in any society is more offensive than losing a war to their mind. To allow the retard as an equal would undo anything the war was intended to defend or maintain. That is the foundational rule of human sociality - once retarded, always retarded, and never allowed in the know. The degree of rtardation, or the nature of that retardation, did not have to matter so much. The judgement and need to punish transgressors of this most ancient eugenics was an absolute that would, time and time again, assert itself in all societies, whether they were at war or at peace. The condition of war simply intensified pressures to do this that would, in peacetime, be counterproductive. The war conditions are felt if a society is engaged with an enemy. If a population is enslaved, the master is at war with his slaves at all times, and the strategy of disciplining slaves is like any battle strategy, with engagements called interventions to modify slave behavior. The conquest and torture of slaves is itself a victory in the great war against the slaves, and a legitimation of the entire institution that is necessary for its continuation. There will never be a benign slavery, because if it is too benign, the slaves could suggest with good reason that they would gladly agree to conditions of free labor, and that such a carrot would be very welcome. The freeing of slaves has usually been present in slaveries, even in the scientific chattel slavery of America, so there was an admission that slavery wasn't absolute. That changed when Galton's Eugenics came to the world and proclaimed not just a total slavery, but a natural slavery that became the sole law and spiritual authority, displacing all others.

Human society was never what it was purported to be, and because war became a key organizing principle for societies, organic sociality could only exist in reduced forms and at a local level. Genuine connections between people in a nation were discouraged, and it remains the defining trait of a nation that it is an imagined grouping of people rather than something held together by meaningful bonds. It is not realistic for a million people to know each other personally, and mass behavior is conditioned primarily by thought leaders and mesmerists, to take advantage of certain principles in human psychology when humans are arranged in a mass crowd, and when humans are arranged in formations and drilled to behave in particular ways. Meaningful society would have entailed a level of communication that was not possible with any technology, and would not be possible even today. Theoretically, we are connected to an internet that brings us in contact with many millions of other people, but there is no realistic way we are going to know who we're talking to, and the internet brings many questions about whether what we read is authentic, and how much of the internet is comprised of bots or shills or powerusers with a disproportionate amount of time and energy to influence discussion. These problems are not unique to electronic communication, for trust and verification in a world of deception is always problematic. What is known is that organic sociality usually was necessary for survival, and early states could not intervene in private life the way classical states did. States did not relate so much to individual subjects except in isolated cases, and the clan and tribe was part of the constitution of early societies. Extended family networks and connections that were not mediated by any state were normal and expected features of society, and the state kept a lid on this purely for its claim to land and tax. This organic sociality did not exist for nothing, and was not present in the state of nature. Social bonds in an earlier society usually didn't recognize authority beyond that which was expedient, or the authority of parents over their children. That authority over children did not exist in the same way it does in any state society, where an expectation is placed on children to conform to antagonistic relations in close quarters. There is nothing "more natural" about tribal society over state society or a society of individuals managed by the state, because the tribal formation itself was formed by deliberate actors rather than by some instinct inherent in mankind. Tribes themselves were not political units or even direct associations of people, but social constructions we applied in hindsight to describe groups of people who shared characteristics, like a language or an economic system. There is a whole construction of economic systems, where in earlier society they are local and price-setting markets are not at all a thing. Nomadic society did not tend to understand "exchange value" except as an ad hoc arrangement, or certain expectations that were particular to people who lived off of herds. The typical exchange was not in money but in livestock, while industrial products such as they existed were not considered typical trade objects. Barter of such objects was less common than just manufacturing tools or pottery for yourself or your associates and giving them as needed, and practices of barter in nomadic society for industrial goods were often more about side deals between men, which had a shady character to most in society but were understood as a mark between manly men. There would not be a market of industrial goods in nomadic society that was large, and the products from butchering animals would be like so many other tools that were constructed. A whole science to use every part of the livestock had been developed and understood in those societies, and it would have been more convenient to trade the livestock than to trade the products from dismantling the corpse as-is. The hunt to acquire livestock involved herding live animals, and then breeding them whole and confining them. The construction of economic life was never solely about exchange in markets, and even today, market exchange does not account for all or even most of the exchange between humans. How markets actually function in the 21st century, and how logistics is managed today, is another broad topic that many an economist do not even acknowledge. There is a great effort to mystify operations and logistics with the use of money tokens, even though we know the money tokens are fiat currency that can be printed at will by the Federal Reserve, and monetary policy is used openly to manipulate mass behavior rather than any need to do so, or any incentive that would be considered productive. This fiat currency system exists because capitalism in the older sense would be laughable if it were expected to compete with planned industrial operations, and the firms which actually coordinate industry and distribution are monopolies which will never have to compete as if they were a struggling business. Amazon could lose money year after year, but the value of its operations is so great that this cost is borne. If there were not this money flooding into Amazon, the market incentives would not construct what Amazon does today, and there were existing incentives of the smaller capitalists to prevent this from happening as it would mean the end of retail business models. The retail apocalypse, always 10 years into the future, is really something else entirely, but it is known to any retail peon that retail outlets are the industry of not giving a fuck about anything and operating at the barest minimum possible to prevent shortages and riots.

This economic discursion does not relate directly to war, but it suggests that our thinking of natural, materially necessary sociality is unfounded. Society in its organic form did not regard the state as necessary, and states have been from the start an alien imposition on things most of us would have wanted. The beneficiaries of the state are conscious that they use this institution to rule, and that it is an alien. There is no way to bring people into the state without a fight, and this has meant that the intellectual theorists of the state are always given over to lies and scams to strip people of that native sociality, and the thing they wanted in the first place, which was to associate with other humans as they would prefer and to keep their liberty and security. None of those goals in society suggested any particular form society must take, other than that people generally would talk to each other. If everyone were loners, humanity would be a very hostile place and difficult to survive in, and it would be expedient for some of the loners to talk to each other eventually. There was never a null state where humans started out as loners. Even a savage would be raised by their mother long enough to suckle from her breast, if the mother did not kill the child or leave it to die before then. Savage man would still have understood other creatures like himself and figured out that they were much like him, and that some understanding was possible. This would not be much of a society, but there would be an awareness of a world and that social units were possible. Since sociality already existed from the forebears of humans, this time of solitude was not necessary, but communication itself suggested that humans would be more individualistic than their animal forebears, and would see more the situation they inherited as an unpleasant one. The composition of early society is likely informed by a desire in men to be free of domination, as would have existed in the world of apes and monkeys. That freedom was not about a love for liberty as an idea, but because it was the most basic condition of security, as domination in the savage world meant torture and death and a lot of suffering that served no purpose. It is sad that we live under a modern ethos that glorifies the worst of the ape kingdom and tells us this is what civilization is supposed to be, where freedom is reduced to an empty token and the only ideas are how to make others suffer for the pleasure of a few sadists, who tell us they are brilliant but who we know to be the worst retards of all.

The war game entails taking a society, however imagined, and organizing each of its human agents towards the task. Whatever our theories of government or the organizational chart that exists for economic or political purposes, it is well known that individual people are the agents that do things, in war or in any management of work activity. War as a practice requires the planner to view these agents as individuals, before it can rearrange them in formations, units, and allocations towards a shared task. This is different from the organic social cooperation that might be found, where people associate with each other because there is a coincidence of wants that is only possible through continuous interaction. The arrangement in war is dictated by whomever the war chief is, or at least it would have to be acknowledged if war is to be conducted by any plan that is appropriate to its task. War, to be war, is fought against another society doing the same thing. Therefore, there is a psychological game and analysis inherent to war in the meaningful sense. Wars are fought in the end with one man against another man, and whatever organization those men are in is built from the foundation that one man shall fight another. The organization of units in a warlike society is premised on individual competition and initiative, before the unit can form and an artificial cohesion can be taught. This cohesion of the unit is not a natural thing, but an artificial construct imposed by the commander, and conditioned on the premise that the commander is an alien to his subordinates. Even if the leader is selected from the group and is merely the most senior of equals, that leader is expected to impose his authority over the unit and guide it to do things which were not natural or in the interest of individuals. It is usually expedient that the collective aim of a unit be understandable to each individual, or at least that each individual has his place and role and executes it as needed. The more individuals in the unit can figure out the operation of the whole unit, and then the function of the whole army and society, the better that individual will understand why he is doing what he does. Any army that teaches and encourages ignorance of its soldiers, even the lowest of grunts, is sacrificing something that would make a man effective at fighting. Scared, cowardly, ignorant men will, like sissies, shoot everything in sight if they are given a gun and don't know what to do. If they manage to avoid the impulse to shoot things, they often revert to avoiding any battle as much as possible, and eventually avoid doing anything at all. Men who don't know what they're doing or why they're doing it tend to turn to self-abuse, indulge in their vices and self-soothe. This is the sign that someone's usefulness as a soldier is depleting. Normally, a commander with limited manpower would want to mitigate this if it can be done, especially in a society where replenishment of manpower is not easy. In eugenist society, militaries are organized to exhaust low-level grunts on purpose, while the useful fighting and purpose of war is conducted by elite specialists more and more. Since the army of a eugenist society exists primarily for a eugenic purpose, where the soldier is typically a lab rat for some Mengele-type experiments or social or psychological experiments, it is acceptable to indulge this ignorance and failure and encourage it. Scared and cowardly men make terrible soldiers, but they are useful enough as Einsatzgruppen to turn against their own ostensible "team", which is what the eugenic creed wants its military to be, fed with a diet of drugs and unaware of why they are following orders to shoot their former family and friends. This tendency was built into the methods of war and the philosophical theory of the state, which was premised on severing organic sociality, and eventually breaking down the individual subject and reconstructing him as a tool. The methods to break down and reassemble a human would remain, for most of history, an arcane science and only followed sometimes. Drill instructors preparing to fight did not have time to individualize instruction, preferring to teach by the numbers. The psychological breakdown would instead be a matter of state education, that terrible beast that doomed us to this. Actually reconstructing people beyond a bare minimum is too much work for them, but the state school, and most forms of education, are designed to degrade and humiliate anyone passing through it, and this curse afflicts humanity in some way or another. Its proliferation, and the invasion of education into the rest of our lives, has dumbed down and destroyed the psychological state of any society where the cult of education and cult of war were deployed for a purely eugenic purpose. This characteristic is common to state societies that embrace philosophies totally alien to a society that would work, which is to say every philosophy and theory that has currency in modernity save a few obscure ones. In eugenic society, the deleterious effects of education cults and war are deliberately maximized and encouraged, because that is the path of least resistance, so long as the eugenic creed is taken for granted and instilled in children as the most core value and the last spiritual authority.

We can see, and will see further on, that such a war machine will never do what it purports to do, even when doing so would make the war very simple and winnable. We will continue this work with the understanding that in some way or another, the mentality of war has been used for this effect of social engineering, in a way that should be clear to anyone looking at their life and history with this mind.


[1] I would like to make clear a certain myth that persists about liberalism, in which liberalism is portrayed as an "ideology of individualism" that stood in stark contrast to a natural social existence of mankind. In this telling, neoliberalism is an ideological triumph that stands in stark contrast to the "natural truth" of sociality, which has to be taken as a given without any explanation of why we believe society exists. Unironically, the only people who advance this ideology of individualism in earnest are the people who insist that "humans are naturally social", without any investigation into why this is so. The sad state of humanity is that many philosophies and theories of socialism did more to work against a genuine socialistic cooperation than anything liberals or capitalists could ever have done. Liberal thinking, including that of the neoliberals, did not actually believe in a literal sense that society didn't exist, or that society consisted of autistic agents who only mimicked sociality. A poor reading of information theory and the mechanization of thought reflected in the computer suggests this kind of thinking, and it is the sign of someone who does not understand sociology, history, computer science, or anything that would be relevant to understanding any question regarding the topic of what society is. Taking society for granted and dissuading any investigation into its meaning is one of the worst things you can possibly do if you wish to defend society. This made sense to a certain type of socialist who ingratiated themselves with the ruling institutions of the 20th century, who had a lot riding on the myths told about society, but did not want to deal with the genuine sociality of anyone who wasn't in their super adventure club. The liberals were not engaged in an ideological project at all, and it frustrates this author to hear Marxists or anyone else insisting that liberalism is an ideological construct at all. Ideological liberalism only exists near the end of the 19th century, and it is a vanguard filled not with people who actually believe in liberal thinking on institutions, but by people who do not want any concept of liberty except the narrow liberty of a few oligarchs - i.e., that ideological liberalism was the domain of a few intellectuals who hated other liberals and who other liberals hated. To this day, the typical liberal is not a screaming maniac, but either a fairly normal person or someone who has been put through the wringer and caught in the frenzy without knowing what, exactly, they were signing up for. Ideological liberalism is so hilariously unpopular that its open formulation is tantamount to a litany of barbaric outrages against basic decency. This, of course, is the entire point of people like the Austrian School economists, who made an entire career saying the stupidest shit humanly possible and insisting that saying stupid shit ad nauseum was a demonstration of strength. Ideological liberals share a common thread with the furthest Right-wing elements in political society, and have always made it their project to push liberals into an aristocratic camp where the subjects are ruled by a king, and the liberal subject is turned into a vassal or courtier who is taught to worship slavery as morally good. This, as you can expect, is so batshit crazy that most liberals, who never saw their understanding as ideology, simply shrug and go along with what has happened, blaming the wacky socialists for making ideology a bigger thing than it ever had to be. Ideology is for the slaves, and any liberal and any good Marxist would have been able to tell you that. The partisans of the Right, who have always been given over to some depravity or another, are more likely to be ideological liberals, but are too brain-rotted to know that the civic religion they espouse is pure liberalism. That is part of how the Right wing, who salivates like a rabid dog when the word "liberal" is uttered and wants to root out every liberal he or she can find, parrots everything a liberal would want to do, and how the Rightists accomplished what liberals wanted in the first place and made themselves cuckolded slaves. Even better is that the self-abasing Rightists take perverse pride in being slaves, which is one of the markers of America's extensive social engineering that is recognizable to anyone who retains their sense and studies the matter. I really would wish people on the Left understood that by repeating this line, they're just feeding the beast, and failing to understand why this happened. Of course, the "Left" influencers by this point are all shills with every incentive to do this, as selling out has been the Left's calling card for a very long time. Unfortunately, I've seen this picked up by people who are relatively honest, but have a distorted history where liberalism is rebranded as nothing but ideological lies, thus stripping from historical record historical reality of what the liberal revolutions did and did not do, and what really happened between 1775 and 1795. Since that period is very crucial to understand what we really live in today, it is understandable that it is most necessary to muddle historical record on what it was, and this is not so much about rolling back to a pre-revolutionary or illiberal time. The liberals themselves, knowing what they are there to do, have every interest in stripping the revolutionary period of any context, so that actions of liberals in the 21st century could be justified as natural and the world-historical mission of liberalism. Believing the narratives that sell this requires making assumptions about liberals, humanity, and society that are at odds with some basic facts, and things the liberal rebels themselves wrote and said they were doing. It requires superimposing a fictitious historical narrative that tells certain people what they would prefer to hear, to lend credence to something totally different from the stated intention. It does no one any service to rewrite historical records that were made at the time and ever since, in favor of a pseudo-history that insinuates like a nagging mother that their child actually likes or is something the child detests. Anyone who knows how mothers mindfuck their children can tell you how that works, and it is insulting beyond belief that anyone claiming to advocate for the masses would treat the masses like that. That, sadly, is par for the course when it comes to "revolutionary" propaganda, and it is only in spite of such thinking that any improvement in the human condition came about during the 20th century. Fortunately, there was plenty of spite, and plenty of intellectuals who were not engaged in that sort of habitual lying, and this author owes those who spoke and wrote the truth and stood for humanity more than he could ever hope to pay back... not that most of those people would want to acknowledge me or that I intend to pay back anything in my current situation. Finders keepers, I suppose...

[2] If this sounds like hyperbole, you do not know the heart and mind of the American conservative, who is without a doubt the lowest creature of mankind. A Nazi, at least, has some impulse of self-preservation and a degree of seriousness in their fanaticism when it came to their core doctrines of eugenics. A conservative has all of the incompetence and incredulousness of a Hitlerian, the moral depravity they like to project onto liberal decadence but that is truly a creature of their own, and a foolish obliviousness to everything they do that you would think has to be an act, until you actually pick their brain and realize these people actually are as stupid as you think. A Nazi can at least be understood as acting in some manner that would be appreciated as rational, if the motives and objectives of the Nazis are properly understood. The conservative is at best a Nazi in denial, and at worst a pile of corpulence who is nothing but a walking mound of parasitism. That characterizes the entire Reaganite movement and Reagan himself to a tee, and it was an open joke that Reagan was a senile incompetent ruled by the criminals around him and the Bush dynasty. Thatcher, at least, demonstrated a level of personal competence and awareness of what she was there to do, and could hold her own base in the contempt it deserved. Nothing about conservatism as a force in the world should be coddled or enabled, and it is the will of pathetic conservatives, who indulge in their delusions and infantile hobbies and let the world burn, that did the grand work of really running America into the ground and enabling what we live in today. The conservative, of course, denies his or her guilt and always jumps back to daddy when someone attacks them for their willful supplication and cowardice, and then they ask for actual Nazis to help them. If anything survives this nightmare, I hope above all that the American conservative is the model of choice for the word "political retard" in the encyclopedias of the future, as nothing exemplifies pure retardation and moral rot like a conservative. Fuck them all and may they rot in Hell.

[3] Per Francis Galton in "Essats on Eugenics", page 99, chapter "The Foundation of Eugenics": "Enough has been Written elsewhere by myself and others to show that whenever public opinion is strongly roused it will lead to action, however contradictory it may be to previous custom and sentiment. Considering that public opinion is guided by the sense of what best serves the interests of society as a whole, it is reasonable to expect that it will be strongly exerted in favour of Eugenicswhen a sufficiency of evidence shall have been collected to make the truths [author's note: by this Galton means the campaign of lying and promotion of Satanism he and his ilk are engaged it to terrorize the world to accept this] on which it rests plain to all. That moment has not yet arrived. Enough is already known to those who have studied the question to leave no doubt in their minds about the general results, but not enough is quantitatively known to justify legislation or other action except in extreme cases. Continued studies will be required for some time to come, and the pace must not be hurried. When the desired fullness of information shall have been acquired then, and not till then, will be the fit moment to proclaim a <b>‘ Jehad,’</b> or Holy War against customs and prejudices that impair the physical and moral qualities of our race."