The first observation is that there is a world that exists. There is no further knowledge that can be ascertained based on that alone, and the truth of that proposition is a given. Without this proposition, no further investigation is possible and nothing relevant can be said about anything, anywhere, for nothing would exist at all and this proposition would be an impossibility. This is the simplest possible basis for all further investigation.

This world may be interpreted as ideas, or as a material existence. The result, in the end, will be the same. By the fact of existence alone, nothing about that existence can be ascertained, without supposing something were true for the sake of a thought experiment. Regardless of whether someone is there to conduct this thought experiment, and regardless of any subjective experience, thought experiments may be proposed to suggest something about this existence beyond the mere fact of it.

Suppose there is a hypothetical observer that is aware of all facts, all potential information, all causes and effects, all the matter and ideas in the world that are at all possible. This hypothetical observer is not burdened by any barrier to understanding what a thing is at all, and is not only omniscient but has considered all thoughts concerning existence. Therefore, it can answer to anyone or anything that asks it, with an answer that is appropriate for its own knowledge base, and knows how to explain everything in existence. The one thing it cannot do is expand by its own volition to faculties available to whomever asks it so that answers beyond its understanding are comprehensible. That task is left the other mind, and while the hypothetical observer can give hints, it cannot compel knowledge into whomever or whatever is asking it questions. For now, no one is asking questions, but the hypothetical observer's omniscience can explain all the things us who read this book have already known and their true meanings.

We cannot be certain that "we" exist to conduct this thought experiment, or that "I" exist in any way that is absolute. We only know that there is a world, and that more knowledge is possible. To begin formally asking the question "what is the world" requires stepping outside of ourselves and accepting that there is a world that is knowable, and that everything that can exist is knowable. Whether it is knowable to subjective experience is irrelevant for the thought experiment. No subjective experience is possible without acknowledging a real world it relates to. The nature of that world may be argued by subjects, but there is a truth that is outside of any subject. Without accepting that reality exists outside of us, there is no further purpose to discussion and we can believe whatever we want about the world. This position is solipsism, and it is trivially debunked. A solipsistic view of the world implies that there is no truth at all, and thus does not permit the existence of any subject that can question truth, or that subject exists in a fantasy which is of no relevance to reality.

There is a thinking that claims the world of sense is an illusion, and that the true nature of the world is "unknowable", and only accessible through thought experiments. We cannot be certain of any sense information being "real" for its own sake, but we can also not be certain of senses existing in the first place. We cannot be certain of our own existence. The subjective experience, again, is irrelevant to the question posed. The omniscient observer can sense a world and reality, and so that observer is answering the same question we would ask of the material and physical world for any world. Moving the question behind a curtain that human knowledge may never know does not change that the question would exist for the hypothetical observer.

To speak of something "unknowable" affecting anything that we can regard as real, it is necessarily a thing that produces some interface with the reality we are apprehending. The unknowable that can never affect us in any conceivable way remains unknowable. There is a great mystery in the reality that we can ask questions about for us, but to speak of something we don't know affecting the reality we attempt to know, we suggest some relationship that is knowable. Whether the knowledge is obvious, or something a subjective observer can access directly, does not change that some knowledge can be inferred from this "unknowable" source. Our knowledge of the "unknowable" source would then include the knowledge inferred requires the proposition that there is something to know about the unknowable.

It is inferred from the observation of existence that observers are possible. If it is known something exists, it follows that it is knowable, but we lacked any further lead to give us this knowledge. Even if "observation" did not take the form of our sense and thought about the world, we can imagine the "observation" of some particle interacting with another particle or the world as a whole, and to speak of this particle's interaction is to speak of a world it interacts with and exists in. We can imagine the hypothetical omniscient observer asking this question for itself, with existence being completely void except for the hypothetical observer, or for the whole of existence itself to be the observer in some sense. In the case of existence being void, this "hypothetical observer" would become the whole of existence, for there is no observer. It is still possible for this hypothetical observer to not exist, or only exist as an abstraction for the thought experiment. If the hypothetical observer sees "there is nothing" and that there is no more to say on the matter - literally - then that is it and no further investigation is possible.

Thought experiments only tell us something if their results are confirmed, and no contradictory knowledge would oppose the result. We continue this thought experiment with that in mind, and that until confirmed by our knowledge, the thought experiment remains an idle speculation. Without such an experiment, it is impossible to gather more knowledge of what anything in the world is. It is possible to reject this thought experiment and propose a different one at any time, but the thought experiment proposed is not too controversial. The thought experiment is structured to make the smallest number of assumptions possible.

The hypothetical observer detects a universe with void and matter. Of the void, nothing at all can be said of it other than that it is nothing. Of the matter, nothing at first can be said of it except its existence. No different essential "types of matter" can be discerned as given, and if there were essences of matter that were different from one another, it implies some way to relate them so that it is possible to say "this is one type of matter, that is another", and all such essences are for the observer's purposes "matter" in a general sense. The number of material essences ultimately is explicable by a quality that is knowable, and if the quality exists, it may be compared against another quality to differentiate it. This knowledge of matter is inaccessible to us, but the omniscient observer can know the distinct qualities created by different essences, in order to detect which essence is really at work. All different essences of matter, then, are reducible to a singular essence of matter for the hypothetical observer, and so different essential matters are irrelevant. Different essential matters is unnecessary to describe the variety in the universe, and it is far more likely that there is only one essential matter that grants to all things their substance.

The void is necessary conceptually to speak of "space" in any meaningful sense. The space in which matter exists does not have any inherent definition to suggest it must exist as a three-dimensional space, or that it is continuous or discrete; but to speak of matter existing as anything other than a point suggests both that there is some way to relate positions of some subdivision of matter, and that void between them would be necessary if the world were to be anything other than a clump of matter mashed together in one incomprehensible structure, which cannot be differentiated in any way. If there is space, there is a definition of "nothing", or lack of substance, to differentiate it from "something", or substance. Without void, the density of matter would be unable to differentiate itself and matter would be "infinitely dense". Even if the true form of existence were that all that exists is reducible to a single occurrence, within that space there would be a void implied, if only to separate one locale from another however imagined with an imagined barrier to say "this is here, that is there". There is no way to speak of differentiation in existence if localized non-existence were not possible. The quantity of matter in the universe may be infinite, as infinity is not a problem for our hypothetical observer, but for it to be distributed over space suggests that something less-than-infinitely dense or non-existent may be observed in space.

Why space appears to us as it does may be answered simply; that for whatever reason, three-dimensional space, or what appears to be such to us, created stable systems of matter, and any dimensions of space beyond that did not manifest in a way that we would appreciate. There was nothing fixed about the nature of space, but space itself was arranged in this way as the simplest possible way it could be arranged. The argument for discrete space or an unorthodox space is one that requires an argument that we would be able to understand. Nothing about the spherical surface of the Earth was philosophically ordained to say that the space of a spherical surface is special. It is rather that there are reasons why the Earth formed as a sphere rather than some other shape, that follow principles of physics. The formation of spherical planets and stars is an emergent property, like so many others, and this spherical shape is not a perfect form of a sphere, but the most natural result of the accumulation of matter that constructed the Earth. We may debate the validity of this origin story and history. For now it illustrates how these concepts of space may not be what we naively assume, but came out of origins which are not too difficult to understand. There was never a time where anyone in the world thought the surface of Earth was flat with any seriousness. Mapmakers since ancient times had to navigate a world of considerable size, and observational evidence of a horizon indicated a spherical world. The Greek philosophers did not discover this spherical shape. By the time they write, this knowledge was common, and likely the same views were held by intellectuals in Babylon and Egypt. There wouldn't have been any reason other than naivete to suggest it was wrong, or at worst the surface of the Earth was an open question. In any event, the particular type of space does not matter, so much as the proposition that there is matter in space and that there must necessarily be void to speak of space.

The hypothetical observer senses cause and effect not as events in the moment, but has seen all that ever was and all that ever will be. Causality, then, is not a hard limit on the observer's knowledge, nor does causality tell us anything about the nature of the universe. What the hypothetical observer can do is tell us a few possible things about causality as we would see it. We might crudely conceive of causality as motion, in which one cause creates one effect over some time, and leave it at that. Causality, though, is more than a simple dyad of causes leading to effects, and no cause can be truly separated from its effect. The effect must flow from the cause. Cause and effect are separated in our understanding. We separate the two necessarily to speak of anything moving, and between cause and effect is something we never quite arrest. When we speak of cause and effect, we isolate the causal event and freeze it in time, and do the same for the effect event, regardless of the time-frame of the cause, time between cause and effect, and time-frame of the effect. Cause and effect in a description is a logical understanding of two propositions, between which the change occurs. In logical terms, there is nothing between A and B, because to describe the process would defeat the purpose of describing cause and effect.

It should be clear that causes and effects are only relevant to reality if they substantive. We are only, at first, concerned with material cause and effect. At this point, the entire view of the universe to the hypothetical observer is a material one. We do not have any "ideas" or forms that we can name, nor anything other than matter. We have yet to identify patterns in that matter, but some may be seen just from the shape of that undefined matter. Shape, though, does not grant to matter any meaning by itself. There is nothing to suggest any preferred shape of matter should be emergent over any other. The causes and effects we list are not "real things" in of themselves. Each cause and each effect is an isolated frame of time and space, and we can imagine a cause leading to an effect over a long period of time, or a cause leading to an effect close to instantaneously. "Instant motion" is not really possible, where cause and effect are fused. We can speak of a cause leading to an effect simply by being there, for example the cause of a support beam having the effect of keeping a building in place. If we do, though, we are implying a line of causality that, while not passing over time, implies there is some process by which we explain the support beam of a building, and why this works in architecture. Logical causes and effects imply a chain of reasoning to allow us to know what can do what. Mechanical motion in physics does not require a logical explanation to tell us why a force moves an object. In the natural world, objects move on their own not because of a hobgoblin, but because once in physical motion, we have no reason to believe that it would stop moving on its own accord, by some law of the world that arrests all things. Movement is something physical objects do.

We can then name multiple causes leading to multiple effects, all of which act on and spring from a locus of a single thing we are arresting. This thing may be material or it may be an idea, but for now, we only see the material world in our hypothetical observation. What may be a cause - a force moving the thing in space, or something inherent to its construction, or some property that acts over time, or some cause that is not immediately evident in its function towards the thing - does not act singly and is isolation. Instead, all causes act in concert at the locus of this "thing" we have defined, and out of the causes on this "thing" are the effects, which also are multiple. Effects themselves become causes, and can coalesce around another "thing" to continue the cycle, however we construe it. Logically, we describe causes and effects and that is the only thing we describe with language. If we were to somehow stop in the middle of the cause and effect cycle, we would be freezing in time and describing the cause-effect chain in progress, which itself can be attributed to causes and effects acting on some thing. We can do this ad infinitum to imagine cause and effect acting continuously. A cause is not a singular instant and time and has no defined duration; the cause is instead described as some mechanism leading to effects, and this mechanism can only work alongside the other causes. There is no hobgoblin processing the order of which cause will happen force. They always happen simultaneously and independently of each other, and each effect is simultaneous and independent as well; or we know when a cause will lead to an effect we have described, if we are isolating two distant time-frames and saying, for example, a caterpillar's life is the cause of a butterfly, and metamorphosis is an intermediate step which we may describe, but we don't need to in order to understand that butterflies come from caterpillars in some way. The metamorphosis, itself a complex process, is a thing we can investigate, but we don't need to observe metamorphosis in action to infer that it happens if a caterpillar turns into a butterfly while we aren't looking.

It is the transition between cause and effect acting on a locus that IS "the thing" we isolate in the material world. Our hypothetical observer sees this thing with perfect fluidity, because it does not suffer from any delay in knowledge that we would have. To the hypothetical observer, the locus being acted on is the thing it would describe to us, rather than the causes and effects as the object and its consequences. Causes and effects are different from the thing-in-motion and this is understood. The problem for us in language is that we have no useful language for describing things-in-motion, or rather, language to describe this locus of causes and effects which produce a system for us to observe. "Motion" itself is an imperfect metaphor, and this is a common trap of those who would reduce cause and effect or even physical motion to a crude force acting over time, as if it were inexorable. The fact of this locus's isolation is taken as an effect, or a cause, and we seek either its corresponding causes or effects in order to describe its effect on other things.

We have yet to describe then the "thing" itself. It is a simple rule that there are no forms in nature, or no preferred system that is hard-coded at some metaphysical level; nor are the forms of things reducible to simply what is available with crude sense and measurement. We only know matter as a thing which grants to things substance that makes them real; and it is only matter and substance which makes a thing real to our hypothetical observer. This need not correspond to mass or any physical indicator. It is rather that to the hypothetical observer, the material world is at first glance the only world, upon which any other thing we describe as real must derive. This is troubling for our hypothetical observer, because this finding suggests its existence is an impossibility. The hypothetical observer, though, is something so sublime and clever that this does not deter it from its helpful function we have given it. As mentioned, causes and effects are multiple, acting on a single locus, and all causes, "things", and effects are substantive in order to be spoken of as real. We may describe void in the systems we isolate, but this is only to separate the substantive portions of that system from that which is empty space, and while this can have an effect due to substantive things moving through empty space and informing the outcome of a system's existence, the void does not possess any quantity or quality.

It is in this "thing" that matter gains its defining characteristics that separate it from other matter. A system of matter, which as-is cannot be defined as anything meaningful, becomes meaningful through its actions. We define things by what they do, rather than what they are. Being, strictly speaking, is not something that stands apart. For something to be, it is merely doing the act of "being" - which is to say, existing as a locus of causes and effects which constitute the "thing"'s seemingly static behavior. Even ideas held in the mind are "doing" something to grant them their understandable meaning. For something to "just be" is for it to be reduced to a token, a symbol bereft of reality, which can be substituted for anything else through wordplay. The real doing of something cannot be substituted for with wordplay, because it does not correspond to any word we use. We instead derive meaning from words that comports with our genuine understanding of the world - that it is a world of events, rather than things, and we merely isolate certain events as "things" so that we can express this concept in symbolic language. Since symbolic language is the only elaborate tool we have for expressing ideas, and any other signal like gesticulation we send to another person will be interpreted as ideas before it is acted on. The idea may never pass through linguistic processing to be associated with a word as we know it, but there is a barrier in communication where messages must be interpreted.

There is not a barrier in the direct doing that material things do. There is not intrinsically a barrier between our thoughts and the world. There is a natural separation, because thoughts are not material things and cannot be treated directly as such, as if one electrical signal in the brain corresponds to exactly one thought. However, all of that thinking we do corresponds to some activity in the hardware of the human body, and it is the task of thought and consciousness to assemble that into something that is meaningful. That meaning is then acted on in some way, or ignored, so long as the mind did sense and interpret that signal. The mind does not interpret every signal sent to it, and could not, because human bodies have limited capacities no matter how developed we may make them. But, the mind manifests from that body to become something more than simply a brain pattern and storage in gray matter. The mind would have to be more than that to interface with a real world as it does, and make use of technology - which includes the symbolic language that separates humans from animals. We create and emphasize the barrier between our mind and the world, and to some extent this will exist in any creature that we consider to possess consciousness. The importance of this to our entire book will be apparent shortly. Our hypothetical observer does not have this difficulty. It understands the distinction between matter and the realm of ideas and minds, and the connection between the two. It is the doing of things, that locus between causes and effects, that allows a connection between the ideas we hold about the world and the actual world that we interface with. Consciousness itself is one such locus, and a very complex thing which is not quite material. There is no physical location where we can find "consciousness", as it is shunted into a virtual space. How this happens is very important, but it must happen. It is important to mention this now before moving on so that the crucial doing of a thing is understood to be the reality, rather than any of the words we use to approximate it. If words were the reality, then reality would be meaningless. If reality were mediated by words, it means reality is infinitely malleable to thought control and thus irrelevant for any question we pose about an existence that no thoughts can control. The error of such reality control is hopefully evident, but the purpose of this thought experiment is to explain why this reality control works and how it has been implemented in today's society.

Saying "doing is meaning" is not something you just say like a mystical slogan. It is rather to say that the characteristics of a thing are what define it in our understanding, and we use words necessary to encapsulate an understanding that is for us very intuitive. We only have symbolic language to develop formal knowledge and logic, and it would be impossible to conduct logical operations if we referred to the doing of things as the true meaning and made it mystical. This is instead important to note because there is an error in many logical systems, in that we do not really know what we think we know. We instead make best-guesses in language because that is the tool we have to communicate ideas to each other. We have very acute understandings in language when we actually communicate with each other, or read some media and contemplate its contents for ourselves. Certain subtleties and understandings can be conveyed in writing that are not immediately apparent, and a voracious reader learns to pick apart the subtext of written language. Someone adept at oral communication and knowledge of gestures and facial expressions can interpret in spoken words more meaning than someone who interprets them flatly. The error of dialectical thinking is to confuse the dialogue for the meaning itself, rather than the dialogue arriving at meanings because we lack suitable language to encapsulate an idea we do not know yet. The error of logical positivism and positivism generally is a sureness that models we construct are the true reality, or we are eager to ignore any information or any sense that the model we possess may be wrong. There is a reason why in both cases, scientific paradigms progress one death at a time, and institutions stubbornly hold on to wrong ideas because political and social stakes depend on maintaining the lie. Sometimes these wrong ideas are mistakes by men who are fallible, and other times - I dare say often - the lie is deliberate, either because someone is a charlatan or because a very large thought-form of deliberate lying has perpetuated itself in communication, and substituted the lie for the native understanding our own sense and reason would tell us. The difficulties in science are well known but will be expounded upon later. Not all of our knowledge is scientific, and there is a great deal of political knowledge that is wholly in the realm of ideas communicated between people. This political knowledge is real, in the sense that people do communicate it to each other and act on it, but very often political knowledge is intended to occult, to obscure, to project strength and violence against another, and towards purposes that we would not consider a pursuit of scientific truth. The political knowledge has real consequences because people will act on that knowledge, and many times the political truth is more important than being right about a scientific truth for the actual task we use our conscious mind to accomplish.

The "thing-in-motion" is a system with traits we can understand, rather than a whole "thing" to be taken as a whole. There are no "true forms" of material things at all, and there are not even simples as such. There is just matter, which grants substance to anything real and a measurable quantity, and the motion, which grants that substance qualities we can say something about. "Motion" is too limiting a concept, since cause and effect does not concern simply the passage of time as an inexorable trend. To borrow a trend in spiritual philosophy, I will refer to this concept as "spirit", though it should not be granted religious connotations. This is simply a short-hand that can make sense, and it has been used in the past to describe such a thing, though not in the way I have.

A system, as I will understand it here, is a set of relationships. Formally, the relationships are between things, but here we have reduced those things to loci of causes and effects. It is the relationships themselves that describe to us the overall form of a thing. If we seek to describe this thing, we describe those relationships as what the thing does, to attribute to it characteristics. We then summarize this concept with a word that symbolizes the concept, and grant to that word a range of "true meanings". We have a word for dogs, but there are many varieties of dogs, and we have particular characteristics of the species generally, and a whole science pertaining to canines to classify their breeds, and a whole science to raise them and train them, and a history of dogs. There is no way to understand "dog" as a singular meaning, rigid in form. Even if we were to accept an axiomatic definition of "dog", the context of it in any world that is real, and the context we place it in for our mind's knowledge base, is dependent on a history, for us to connect this word token "dog" to its appropriate meaning.

When we seek to understand something, rather than simply digest a word and translate it to meaning, we are necessarily examining this system we have isolated. When we look at all relationships to understand it better, we encounter a difficulty in that the system is connected to many things. In fact, it is in an indirect way connected to everything else, in order for us to place the thing in its proper context. Yet, it is indeed a distinct thing, because we did isolate it. If we were to untangle all of these things analytically, we would be caught in an infinite loop to truly "know" what something is. At some point, we cease doing this and our satisfied with our understanding of the things we see, believing that our understanding, knowledge, and actions are appropriate for interfacing with a real world. Our hypothetical observer does not face this problem and sees everything, and it does not face a problem of conflating everything with everything else. It is also well known that in language, and in our true understanding, we have to compare anything we detect to other things in order to build useful definitions. We have a number of understandings that are basic enough that we do not need to recall a dictionary definition to know them when we see them, and act as we would expect. Thorough, formal knowledge requires reference to other things to adequately understand the thing we see, and this creates a difficulty when there are no forms as such; we have to assume a vocabulary to build a basis for formal knowledge, and if this vocabulary is fixed, it limits how much we can investigate. A small vocabulary of base words could be used to construct a very complex rational understanding. Computation theory has shown that from a small instruction set, very complex problems can be solved algorithmically, and we also have a sense of problems which are unsolvable like the Halting Problem. We can prove that they are unsolvable, and could teach a computer to rationally determine the solvability of problems if it were adequately able to process meanings in any way we would consider suitable. The computer, it must be understood, does not actually "think" or possess consciousness. It is a machine we built to perform a rote task we would have done manually, and this is the original "Turing machine" - a human with pencil and paper performing the instructions and writing down the results, for the purposes of demonstrating the theoretical machine's operation. We still need a base vocabulary, and without forms as such, we have none. The computer, though, is doing these instructions if it is a real machine. An electronic computer is designed with certain parameters so that it does the thing Turing's machine does, and this was not as simple as it seems. To perform the instructions without fail required careful regulation to ensure that fail rates were low enough to be reliable. Even with this, failures are known to happen for computers, and because a computer is not conscious, one byte in error will turn the entire program into garbage. Humans tend to correct this, or do not fatally fault if they do not correct processing errors.

The way we can sort through these relationships to define an thing most efficiently is to know the proximity of relationships, so that the closest and most relevant relationships are emphasized in our definition and casual understanding of things. We may know on some level that there is more to the thing and that each thing has its own history and existence, but if we define a simple machine, we know the parts and the intended function of the machine, and we have some mechanical knowledge to know what happens when one part moves and impacts another part. It is not necessary to read into its whole history to know the practical meaning of the thing, and that there may be other machines with the same function. For any system, no matter how large and complex, we can sense which causes and effects are more distant or a weaker determinant. We may not know the full characteristics of the thing we are observing, but we have an ability to look into the nature of a thing and ask deeper meanings. It is because of that ability to think of something deeper that modern chemistry could be known. These arguments in modern chemistry were not bold assertions from on high that matter must philosophically be comprised of particles, but that there was evidence for the formation of what were called "atoms", before there was further knowledge that these "atoms" were not philosophical atoms at all and protons, electrons, and neutrons were postulated and demonstrated in experiment. These concepts of particles are themselves not fixed things or dogmas, but understanding of a thing that was postulated and refined over the years in physics and chemistry. Whole societies or knowledge systems are no different from simple machines in this regard. We may develop mechanisms to streamline our understanding and study some aspect of a system, but in principle, this systems analysis is scalable and can break down to smallest descriptive units. For a society, the unit of importance is the individual social agent, or a person in our socialization. There may be baseline units to speak of a large construct. There cannot be society without properly constituted agents that engage in social behavior, and the social behavior of humans is distinct from that of ants or geckos. There are a few laws of social behavior that apply to any social agent generally, and we would be wise to distinguish human societies from animal societies, without making a leap by our bias towards humanity. There are fine details which mark good systems analysis from the bad, and there are bad writers who make sweeping generalizations about things which are not supported in the small details. We would also be wise to remember that no system we see is a world apart from other systems in full. Systems may have no direct link that allows for easy comparison, but all these systems must fit into an overall understanding of the world, which will be expounded on in the next chapter. A system that is discordant with our knowledge of the rest of the world has to be questioned, and a thorough understanding of the world can relate many systems of knowledge and classify which are relevant to which spheres, and what can be learned about one from another that may seem unrelated.

If anyone is telling you that "motion is contradictory" or that there is a grand narrative of "contradictions in nature", that is hogwash and should be ignored. Motion is, for us, something we observe in material systems all over. There is no hobgoblin moving a particle, and insisting that it continue to move until the hobgoblin tells it to stop. Moving is something material systems do on their own accord. Without any identifiable cause, there is no reason to believe that an object in motion would not tend to stay in motion. The changes in motion we observe do not arise from contradictions or philosophical tricks, but from causes we can analyze if we set ourselves to the task. It is an imagined stillness of things in the world that is the supposition we can't support. This is not because of a mystical belief that the universe is always changing, but because we see the procession of motion even when an object appears to stay in place. The cause and effect that occurs when someone touches an object and feels its presence is itself premised on a mobile force interacting between the hand and the object. The touched object would have to possess substance and some force pressing against the hand, for the hand to not pass through it as if there were nothing at all. We could imagine a world where this did indeed happen, and we don't have to make it a thought experiment. We pass through air and an atmosphere as we don't notice the minor perturbations of gas. We know that the air in reality is a vortex of many moving particles, or at least we learn that knowledge and build our understand of gases in physics and chemistry on that basis, but we usually simplify the composition of the atmosphere to measured quantities of some elements, the density of the overall atmosphere. We do this because we know the tendency of gases to dissipate into the air, such that the atmosphere is mostly uniform in its distribution of gases; or we know that certain substances rise while others fall, knowing what we know about physics and chemistry. We know there is air, and we might guess at certain qualities of it, but we did not always possess a theory or understanding of why gases behave as they do, and such an understanding is not immediately obvious from simple principles a child could see. The existence of a solid object, like an apple, is quite obvious from simple principles, because if it weren't, it would be difficult to imagine a child learning to identify any solid object or any fixed image and associating it with a word.

This is not to say that this concept of contradiction is meaningless. A common example is the problem of Zeno's Paradox. Numerous versions of this exist in the original telling, but the paradox concerns the concept of an infinitesimal. This is a problem not for describing the real world, but a problem for our models which must resolve a problem intellectually. A modern day computer programming equivalent can be structured as follows: Suppose we are playing a game in a two-dimensional field, and a single pong ball moves and reflects off of any surface it touches. On each frame, the ball moves at its velocity, and checks if it has collided with any wall. Because movement occurs only once a frame, the position of the ball changes "instantaneously". However, we want to maintain that movement is continuous. If there is an impact, it would logically occur in the middle of this seemingly instantaneous movement. Upon collision, the point where the ball would impact the wall is determined. Its remaining velocity is calculated, and the ball's course is altered by reflecting off the wall. The ball then repeats this process, checking for any other wall it impacts. The problem that is there may be an infinitesimal distance between two walls. If this happens, the computer program will lock up in an infinite loop. There are two ways to resolve this. The first, naive approach, is to sacrifice the integrity of the simulation by not preserving continuous motion, or including a mechanic which reduces velocity by so much with each collision, or limiting the number of collisions in a round with some caveats to resolve the loop while sacrificing integrity. This is what is done in many computer games, and exploits due to this imperfection in mechanics are known to any speedrunner or bug tester. The second is to resolve this scenario with calculus or a suitable solution that relies on walls being either horizontal or vertical and checking for the case of infinitesimal distance, which is possible for any competent programmer without too much difficulty. The former is often done for expedience, especially on older machines and consoles, where there are constraints on resources that value efficient processing over meticulous accuracy. This is a problem for the computer program, because the computer program is algorithmic. No motion in a simulation on these computers can be continuous. We always preserve the illusion of motion, because the real world is not algorithmic and doesn't update every frame. In Zeno's time, the argument of motion being continuous or discrete was a thing for philosophers, and so Zeno makes the argument through such paradoxes that movement is in fact impossible. There were solutions to this paradox in ancient times, but the most obvious answer to the paradox came right after Zeno's presentation. Another man in attendance stood up and walked out, disgusted at the entire argument, and in doing so, made clear the absurdity of the entire setup. How these thought experiments are constructed is very relevant to answering the questions posed. In Zeno's original paradox of Achilles and the turtle - there were multiple versions of this - Achilles and the turtle are understood to be in theory just like their real object counterparts, and there is no argument that Achilles or the turtle did not possess free range of motion by virtue of being living things and physical objects.

Crucial to this problem is defining what reality is, what motion is, what time is, what an "instant" is, and how we conceive of the material world and the ideas we hold about it. In any language or expression humans can understand, we only can present ideas, or gestures that are interpreted as ideas. The only way we have to understand anything is to express them as ideas. We have no language that can purport to speak to the material world directly and answer questions with final truth. In science, in simulation, and in our own understanding of the world, we only possess models based on ideas. Our human faculties are then used to process those ideas and expressions to derive meaning. We do not do this uncritically, but rather we do this in a way that suits our own aims. The nature of human thought, or rather, the thought of anything in the real world, is considered in the next chapter. In any discussion of the truth, we first have to grapple with this inherent limitation in our ability to express the real world, which itself can be a challenge if we are unwary. We then have to be able to discern for ourselves when someone else is lying, and whether we can trust any information that is conveyed to us by words or ideas alone. We have to be aware of any doubts we have of our own senses and abilities to assemble knowledge, and these doubts are always possible. We have to be aware of anything that is imposing forcibly an interruption of this process where we assemble meaning and truth from ideas.

These "things" we identify, from the simplest to most complex, are all systems, and we understand them by viewing the relationship of parts to see what this thing does. This is more than the sum of its parts, but a description of mechanical causes and effects which create something that is not indicated by its parts alone. New things arise out of causes and effects that did not originally exist, and could not have existed without some prior conditions that allowed them to exist. If we ascribe a new quality to a thing, that is something we understand. The real changes involve a change in quantitative, substantive things, rather than merely a change in interpretation. For us to judge new qualities coming into being, we can only judge based on the quantitative change in things; that is, nothing real happens without a material cause. Once an act is real, it is understood through this spirit or motion, and the words we use are intended to point to that rather than a definition that is formally pleasing to us. We may use ideal forms in thought exercises, and we tend to do this because it is far easier for us to do this to communicate what we intend. All of these ideas we communicate must relate to something substantial if they are to be appreciated and acted upon; even if the ideas were fantasy, the fantasies are pointing to things that we encounter in reality, or that we could encounter, or that speculate about a possibility that might be real or tell us something interesting about the real. Fantasy which remains purely fantasy would be an idle exercise that amuses us, but is set aside when substantive matters are at hand. This applies to our question about what the world is, rather than what we would value in our time and action, which is not interested in the question of truth necessarily. Never are the systems truly arrested in time. This is not because the things are inconsistent, but a failure of us who only have our ideas of the world to tell us what this is, and the faculties of sense that are available to us. We do not have a direct connection to the material world, where the names of things are stamped on them. Forms are assembled by us in our minds, which either resemble the things, or the forms are marred by our errors in reckoning with a material world which must be accepted as the true reality. There are some general characteristics of systems as I have described them, based on the propositions laid out, as they would be seen by the hypothetical observer:

-Material reality can be subdivided arbitrarily into divisions containing matter, void, and "spirit" or the motive of the matter. The matter is the substance of a division, while the spirit grants to the substance qualities. Void affects the motion of matter, but void by itself lacks substance and quality of its own. It can only be accounted for in the description of substantive action in a system as affecting what does happen.

-The observer can ascribe to each division any qualities it can conceive of the division possessing. The qualities are not "true" things; they are descriptions that the observer can assign meaning to. The underlying motion or spirit is at a base level real, but its true meaning is at first indescribable.

-It can further divide a division arbitrarily, as if it were affected by these principles.

-Two divisions can be conjoined, and all aspects of them disassembled and rearranged to form a new division, in any way imagined.

-Divisions need not be exclusive to each other; a division may contain part or all of another division, and there is no problem of overlap in any definitional quality. The division is merely a convenient device for isolating some aspect or portion of a whole. The division, then, is defined arbitrarily by the observer in any instant.

-The demarcation of divisions is not a spatial segregation, but a segregation of connections and behaviors observed. It is that which is most relevant, rather than any fixed notion of what the division is. It is decided arbitrarily what, exactly, the thing "is", but the underlying substance and spirit cannot be changed. Spatial proximity is a sensical relation of events and so it is often easy to expect a thing to exist in some contiguous space, but this is not necessarily a rule and not all things are defined as having a clear spatial dimension, and many things will move a focal point imagined as a "center".

-Qualities and quantities identified in any subdivision are fixed once defined. All aspects of the subdivision are definite qualities and quantities. It is from this that any consistent meaning of a particular subdivision can be understood. If a subdivision's qualities are described differently, then it is a different thing. Different interpretations of the same thing are all, together, encapsulated in any thing as we may understand it.

-Interpretations of a thing which are discordant with any real spirit or substance of the thing are ultimately errors of a subjective observer, which may or may not be corrected, and have no inherent bearing on the substance or spirit of a thing.

-There is no quality without a quantity of substance implied. The quantity has no inherent quality other than being a quantity, which can be understood by a set theory of numbers and some unit whose definition is understood by observation. For example, a meter is not based on any philosophical principle, but is a unit we understand as the baseline for measuring length. The hypothetical observer does have this limitation as well, as there is no philosophically determined unit of quanta.

-Quanta, then, are repetitions of a proposition of some quality's existence, or a proposition of one quality's mixture with another in the same "thing". Quantities of inches are measured separately for the length of a thing to be measured, for an example; we do not measure an inch twice because that would defeat the purpose of a proposition of a thing's total length as a dimension of a solid object or some measure of space. The mixture of two qualities in a fluid would be difficult to segregate into two fluids of the different qualities without knowledge of how this segregation can be affected through a process, and in practice we would look at the fluid as a mixture of the two qualities, and understand how those qualities interact in accord with mechanics of fluids we understand. For example, oil rises above water, rather than dissolving into water; particles of some solid dissolved in a water may be said to be a water fluid containing a mixture of "orange" and "grape" flavoring. The meaning of this mixture is implied by those qualities in combination with each other, rather than just the existence of the two qualities. There would be a distinct taste of the mixture compared to the taste of each quality separately, for this example. Where there are quantities of two or more qualities in the same thing, we require some knowledge of how those qualities interact within the thing to adequately describe the whole thing, and this implies an ability to segregate those qualities in a model and imagine them independent of the original thing, even if these things are not possible materially or in a real world.

-Quanta of real things are always considered to exist in some division. We ask how many grapes are in a pile without counting grapes in other piles, or we ask how many grapes are in a whole city or whole planet. It is impossible to speak of quantity without specifying some location or division where they would be counted. There is no quanta that exists absent a context to know what is counted and where it is counted. For example, "7" absent a context is not a quantity but a concept. "7 apples" is a proposition of a number of apples, but without a division. "7 apples in the store" refers to a proposition of a real quantity that can be verified. We may understand by our context what a concept of a number is pointing to, or why we are working with that concept of a number towards some real problem.

-No division "outside of the universe" may exist, without itself being in the universe. If a division is imagined in some other plane, it implies that there is some relationship between the two planes that can be understood.

-The division's causes and effects meet at loci which are the "things" or "parts" of a system, and description of what all those parts do operate in concert to describe the whole system. All of the describable parts must possess some substance to be "real" things, even as figments of an imagination. Imagined systems are only possible because there is a corresponding real thought that is understood to whomever is thinking of that system. There is no real thought without a substantive thinker that can think. This is the only way in which there can be thought that can ask the question. Without any corresponding substance to thought, there could be no sense and no processing and no consciousness. The parts of a system may be arrested, broken down, or elaborated upon to explain longer-term causes and effects that are not immediately apparent.

-All causes and effects are subject to investigation to determine the truth or falsity of the event, and these taken together are compiled into our knowledge of a system. Assumptions or self-evident realities form the basis for understanding formal systems and logic, and would be necessary in order for logic to proceed. Systems with internal contradictions or discordant truths cannot be real, but are rather products of failed understanding.

The most basic understandings arise because thought is not something apart from the world, but something that emerged from the world; and so, ideas we possess about the material world, no matter how elaborate, are only possible because of some material condition which made the idea possible. It is not possible to hold ideas that are not possible to actually think for any thinker. The hypothetical observer is not limited by this, but any language it would use to describe an idea to another thinker has to consider this limitation.

The limitations of a materially-based thinker are extensible, but not infinitely so and not without a process of development. For example, it is not easy to imagine four-dimensional space, but it is possible to conceive the consequences of four-dimensional space and suggest what a tesseract would seem like in a model. We can simulate three-dimensional space on a two dimensional surface, but this has limitations in what it can express to a viewer.

The question of existence implies that a material thinker and some cause-and-effect chain is, to our reckoning, a necessary condition to speak of anything existing, even if no such thinker actually exists. The past and future can be approached as if the world that thinker senses exists without it. Of course, "past" and "future" are relational understandings for us. To the hypothetical observer, time and causality are not a thing that is seen as motion, but all that happened and will happen is known to it. How it knows this or sees it is something we would not be able to fully understand; however, if we are to speak of a moment, we are implying that there were past conditions to make this moment, and future conditions that follow this moment. It is impossible to speak of a moment without reference to this, as if moments were isolated from time. This is true regardless of our perception of time or question of what time "really" is; or rather, our perception of cause and effect, which is in the end a construction we made to understand the world as events. The conclusion is that our thought itself is such an event, and that is why we observe things in the world as a collection of events that happen, or happened, or will happened. There is no "being" that is divorced in our symbolic language from "doing". This does not say something about the true nature of the universe or what things "really are", but it says something about us and what we are, and what we would have to be for thought to occur in the first place. The truth is that material thinkers are not inherently committed to the truth, but their thought serves another purpose altogether, and the truth is something that is useful to know for that purpose. This is a fatal weakness that can be exploited.

If the only way the world can be known is by inhabitants of the world, how does consciousness exist in a world that appears to be one apart from the material world? Should there not be a signal in the brain corresponding to the thought? This is a misunderstanding of what the mind and the body of any material actor does. The mind does not correspond strictly to a body, but to a confluence of activity which creates a body interfacing with the rest of the world. Among the traits of a body are its muscles, nerves, its brain, limbs, and any tools it uses. The body interfaces with a world that is almost entirely outside of its control, which this body must navigate. This is a trait of only certain types of life, and certain types of machines that are configured in such a way that they can do this. Conscious experience is tied in to instincts of a body, which we become acquainted with throughout life. There is a problem with this; how does the conscious experiment manifest in a way that allows it to make decisions? This does not happen at any material, physical locale where we can say "this is where we can find consciousness". The tools a body uses, and the events the body interfaces with, have an effect on the body of an animal, and the animal exists in the first place because actions outside of it created the animal, raised it, and allowed the environment where that animal could grow and stabilize into something that could function independently and retain its core functions. For this event we call an animal to persist independently, it would have to respond to events in the world which are real, and its thought itself is a real event in order for it to do this. The subjective experience is constructed and occurs in a virtual area, and the basis for this subjective experience is that there is an animal with nerves and impulses that are constantly at work. Even while asleep, the animal is "conscious" in this sense, and can be roused to alertness when under attack. True "unconsciousness" is only death, and when this happens, the functions that allow thought rapidly decay. This makes sense if we acknowledge what a body and brain actually do in order to produce the phenomenon of thought, and this is possible with simple self-exploration. We can create a distinction between abstract consciousness, which is where we form ideas and imagine things while awake, and where we can act with the deliberation expected of consciousness, and concrete consciousness which is an awareness of the material world and events that the body actually interfaces with, and the events its tool use has on the world. Since the tools include the body of the animal itself and its language, it is difficult to truly part the body of a person from tools and the events around it. The same is true of animals. The distinction with humans is a degree of advancement and development of symbolic language, which allows for communication and social forms that rely on deliberation, and allow humans to hone their body and thought in ways that were not immediately evident to instinct. How humans do this to build abstract consciousness is a complicated process, which in full is beyond the scope of this book. It is important here to note that this "mind" is not real because of abstract ideas, but because the impulses and nerves of a body coalesce in a way that creates this consciousness.

Once the consciousness does rise, it exists in a world apart, and must connect to the world only in indirect ways to build its understanding of the world. These indirect ways are the senses and tools available to an animal. This consciousness would exist in any life-form with the brain and nervous system that allows it to respond to its environment, in pursuit of its objectives. If this were something that manifested in a mechanical construct, we must be careful to know what this mechanical construct is, and not construe the appearance of ideas for "thought" of the sort animal life formed. It is not that animal life or biological or natural systems are somehow privileged by some law of the universe, but that animals developed their consciousness not out of a deliberate plan but as a response to events around it. No one asked to be born or possess this thought, and no one can truly turn off their thought by will alone and continue to live. Animals that train and hone their thinking can only do so in the ways that are accessible to their existing faculties, and do so while maintaining the requirements of their bodies. If there were a machine that thought in the way animals do, it would not be a computer or rational "mind", but artificial constructs abiding the same conditions a natural construct would in order to "think" in the way animal life does. The computers and robots we build are designed specifically not to "think", but to perform tasks they are engineered to do. The free range of thinking in animal life is not something we build a computer to do, and the material necessities of the computer are designed to avert the characteristics of conscious thought we know. Attempts to impose this type of thinking on animal life and humans have not been terribly successful, because humans cannot be turned off or "wired" in the way we would construct an electronic computer. If we wanted to build humans that behave like automata, we would understand that human architecture is much different from the architecture of any working electronic computer or robot. We would program humans not with an algorithmic program in machine language, but by seeding in the human its core assumptions with the structure of the brain and mechanisms of the body in mind. This is one task cybernetics seeks, and in doing so, the conscious experience of humans is recognized not as a barrier to be abolished, but as an asset to be utilized and controlled. To beat programs into a human as someone would type a machine program into an electronic computer is a very lousy paradigm for building humans, and it is a questionable paradigm for artificial life. This is because algorithmic computing was designed for a very different task than living. Electronic computers are very effective for the tasks we would have to perform algorithmically, but are lousy at pattern recognition which is easy for our architecture. When humans recognize patterns, it is not because some software or firmware was immaculately designed to do this, but because the architecture of the brain is adept are responding to sensations, and those sensations include the animal's feelings. Humans did not have "rational man" as a seed in them that was some essence. Humans have, over their development, hacked in rational faculties, and these faculties are acquired by experience and deliberate learning, rather than a given that is inborn in humans. An infant does not possess the rational essence or "theory of mind" before it gathers information. Infants possess a faculty to learn and do so rapidly, and can only do so if they are in environments where this learning is encouraged, and they are sheltered from dangers of the world. The infant encounters patterns, and because the humans around it speak in language and these patterns are the product of rationality, the infant picks up this rational pattern, first as mimicry of the rational humans and patterns, and then acquires key concepts that allow the infant to begin its own inquiry and construction of its own understanding. This is when an infant learns "who", "why", and so on, and asks this question both of any event it encounters, and asks older humans who might be able to provide an answer. There is no way for an infant to acquire its knowledge base and mature unless it can, for itself, inquire and build its own knowledge base. The knowledge base is always local, and is maintained because there is a conscious experience, and that experience requires maintenance of the body to continue. Only after considerable experience does memory and abstract consciousness rise in an infant, and the infant learns to assert its own existence. Whether other humans regard this assertion is irrelevant to the true consciousness of the infant, by now a toddler. There is a connection to that earlier infant existence that might be vaguely recalled, as an impression that affects the later life, but most humans will upon fuller development of abstract consciousness not recall things that happened in the first two or three years of their life. The malleability of this consciousness is something a young child is acutely aware of, so much that he or she would not need to be told to be afraid. Fear has been present for a long time, and it is fear that is among the impulses that form the building blocks of conscious experience.

A greater investigation of this process is helpful, but must be held off for now. It is important here to note that conscious experience is not mystical or philosophically ordained, and does not possess any moral quality that grants it legitimacy just by being conscious. It is, however, not a thing that is ubiquitous to the universe. It is a very particular arrangement of matter and spirit, doing a particular thing to be conscious. The particular distinct states of mind, or frames or reference, humans slip into every day is not consequential to the question of an objective, material reality that almost entirely exists outside of a single mind's conscious awareness. This consciousness is particular to a living animal, or some material entity that is similarly constituted, and only certain animals "think"; nor does every animal think in the same way, or possess the same sense. Sense alone cannot verify anything to be true, but the senses of any animal and their rational faculties are a fact of existence that must be accepted. Sense, and rational thought is itself a sense, is the first thing allowing humans to verify real, material things. Not all truths are material truths; political truths do not have any scientific basis that is easily identified, and political truths are often designed to be conspiracies that defy any inquiry we would use regarding the natural world. They are still truths, because people believe them, know them, act on them, and perpetuate them in society, whether they conform to material reality or are wholly constructions for political purposes of the thinking actors. Politicians must lie to conduct politics in any way we realistically conceive of politics, but the lies have real consequences, and political lies can create an impression on reality on their own, by pure assertion of will from the political animal. That will can only proceed in certain ways, since political animals must interface with the world through their body and tools, but a political will is often defiant of the material world they find themselves in, and seeks to change the world, whether that would be a good idea or not. To do otherwise is for the political animal to surrender itself and become material flotsam, as we will see throughout this book. To say "mind" is everywhere, or that it is an essence defined by ideas, is to say it cannot be real, and this is a deliberate choice. Consciousness, or the experience allowing us to think, has to be real, and it is a specific function of animals because they have centralized nervous systems and interface in a world to meet the demands of life. That consciousness manifests as a sensation that we consider subjective experience, but it is always connected to a material world in some way. The subjective experience doesn't exist in the physical world, but it an extension of the world. What this means is that what we see can always be explained, whether we are capable of understanding that explanation or not. It also means that we can ask questions of ourselves and speculate about the world. That is where the thinking animal can posit the existence of a hypothetical omniscient observer. It can be demonstrated that such an observer cannot actually exist, but it is a necessary speculation if we are to ask the question of what the universe is. There is no way to ask a question of everything unless a thinking animal believes that all that exists and can exist is knowable. Whether it is knowable to the faculties of the animal is not relevant; the thinking animal can conceive that it will not be what it is in the future, and that it wasn't what it is in the past. The central consciousness is a real event that persists throughout the life of the animal, starting from the period where nervous activity begins in the life form.

We should be wary of that which is "self-evident", and make as few assumptions as we must to begin compiling useful ideas. This can be taken too far, where we doubt our basic concepts of reality, or it can be taken to claim things are self-evident that are not, or the self-evidence can be doubted in a different environment. Few political truths can be said to be truly self-evident, but the evidence for them may be so common that they would be necessary for a political settlement. For example, the self-evidence of any rights of human beings to life and liberty may be doubted, but if those rights are not presumed to exist by the virtue of life, a republican form of government or any sort of free society is impossible, and all efforts to maintain a constitution dependent on that belief will be undermined. The consequences of this will be that assumptions of a republican society are no longer operative, yet republican institutions will remain as zombies, turned into the exact opposite of what would be intended if a republic actually concerned the public. Such a deliberate and flagrant contradiction illustrates exactly the problem where self-evident truths are played with, and language violates the most basic sense of reality we would possess natively. Even if we were to explain the right to life or liberty by natural principles, the political logic of a republic demands that no free man would be deprived of these things in principle. The argument for eugenics, the organization of society for the project of "race betterment", violated entirely the natural rights, and did so on the basis of "freedom" and "life", then prohibited meaningful understanding of the switch in meaning that was insinuated. These reversals of the original intent were inherent in the construction of the American project and the deeds of the American government from the outset, and would be the basis justifying slavery. Slaves did not possess mind, and therefore were not men and did not have any right to life or freedom or anything else. This is rather preposterous if someone considers what mind is, for there were slaves desiring freedom and a practice of manumission which suggested redemption was possible. Eugenics took the claim that slaves lacked mind and made it absolute, self-evident, and in doing so, reversed entirely the rights of mind. As eugenics insinuated itself, the natural rights of liberal society were turned into solely the natural rights of the eugenic interest against the public. The republic itself would be re-defined as the property of the eugenic interest, and eugenics decides whether someone is in the republic and their position within it, and this eugenic interest would be controlled by an institution of a small minority. It is still in every sense a republic. It is maintained by the same principles that any republic would be, and despite the preeminence of eugenic institutions, the subjects of the eugenic republic are just as "free" as they were before. Eugenic slavery is not portrayed as legal slavery or even imprisonment in all cases. Slavery and imprisonment are rephrased as "rehabilitation" or "medical interventions" which are imposed at gunpoint, and the extraction of wealth becomes an obligation of the eugenic against the dysgenic. Even as your wealth and health are destroyed right in front of your face, you will be told you are free, and in a legal sense, you are free. It's "your fault" that you ran afoul of eugenics, and this is in line with the republican idea of government. That the entire society was engineered and rigged to ensure that a few people were selected to live, most were selected to suffer, and a growing sector was selected to die, is not a violation of life or liberty in the sense that was inherent to liberal republics. The death and oppression of eugenics would be rephrased as "freedom", while freedom as the lower class understood the concept was no longer meaningful "freedom". Indeed, the freedom of the lower class and mere existence of the dysgenic would be claimed to be an oppression of the valid, as if the invalid initiated this conflict by their own will. At no point was a dictatorship formally declared, and the legal trickery does not imply any particular organ possessing dictatorial power. If the eugenic institutions that are known were no longer operative, the eugenic interest would re-assert itself from the faith that was placed in the eugenic idea, so that eugenic institutions would be re-created with no significant change in purpose or structure. A truly despotic or dictatorial government would not be able to do this, and this is why the eugenic republic is so insidious. Why this is so is a question I wish to answer in writing this book. We can find in life many difficulties with truths that are held as self-evident. This is only resolved at the level of society if it is possible to speak plainly about what these truths are and what they mean. This means we would be asking truly what we do in a free society, or a republic, or a despotic government. It is not merely a question of political truths or narratives. This eugenic society is not possible unless self-evident truths we knew for ourselves were entirely overridden by eugenic institutions; and so, our native sense of measurement, down to the basic concept of measuring length or weight, are mystified. Our native attachment to reality and scientific practice is replaced with ideology and "The Science" and a wholly constructed world-view which we are told is consensual, but is really constructed by a few well-paid liars for us, without a single iota of input from the lower orders. Those of the lower orders seeking to affect either the real world or this constructed reality on their own power are negated, and those who persist in trying will be forcibly suppressed. The eugenic society relies on fear, and when the nature of state society is understood, this makes a lot of sense and operates on some natural principle that can be known. The great game of the false narrative is to disallow admission that this reality control happens.

Where does this interruption of reality happen, that forbids us to hold any reality as self-evident and thus constructs reality? It is not merely the strength of an idea that insinuates itself by some spooky force of the world, eternal and unchanging. It happens because our ideas of the world and our models of material reality are only possible because there is a source of knowledge that is neither ideal nor material, nor is it directly the spirit or anything we know directly. All of our knowledge, whether it is sense from the material world or ideas we conjure in the mind, begins as a revelation, before it can be processed and converted. It first converts to sense data, and the material thinker can only process so much of this data at any time. It is then processed into meaning, and can be expressed as ideas to communicate that meaning to another person. We have no way to judge this revelation, and it bypasses the normal filters a human would use to control information. We only receive from the revelation that data which we are capable of processing, and converting into meanings in the limited way we can, and then to ideas which are even more limited in expressing meaning to another human. By controlling revelation, both in a spiritual sense and in controlling what events someone may see with their material faculties, it is possible to inject into a subject this reality control. This is an old trick, and it is something long practiced by humans to control other humans. It is this interruption of reality that has been able to insinuate itself more and more, and this interruption seeks to become an inexorable trend until there is nothing but the interruption. Once done, our sense of the world can be over-written and anything to suggest it could be any other way is removed from conscious experience. Revelation becomes to us a spiritual authority that precedes all others, but we can say nothing about it other than its occurrence. It must be accepted, because we did not choose to exist or for the whole of the world to exist, and we cannot help but exist in some way or another. Even if we killed ourselves, the body would remain, and the consequences of our existence up to death and including the suicide would affect the world. That is something no one can deny, regardless of what they would want the world to be. The instinct to not kill oneself, the conditions under which someone would do that, and the sense that doing so is wrong if done improperly, are not something we can choose easily. We have no choice in living. We do, however, have some choice in what we do. The final key to controlling revelation is to ensure that all choices lead to pre-planned outcomes that are in the hands not of the material world or an actual truth, but pre-planned outcomes of a human manager with their own conceits. This has been a thought-germ that has been present in human society for a long time. Modern technology has only made possible something that had been latent in human society and communication for millennia, in a way that suggests to us that escape is truly impossible. Whether escape is possible or not is not relevant to the truth I ask here. There is no way to make someone love this ignorance and fear, and the reasons why have been known for a long time.

The first revelation of existence led consciousness to posit the idea that it is knowable, and that consciousness comes only in living animals that exist first of all to live, rather than think. Regardless of consciousness, the know-ability of the world is implied, because it is not difficult for material creatures to conclude that there was a time they did not exist. The same would be true if we were ideal, abstract "thought", because ideas themselves would be reducible in the end to some basic substance that is akin to matter, out of which ideas of the world are constructed. There is no way to conceive of "God" without the implication that it entails essentially the same construction as "the world" for the purpose of answering this question. Idealist and materialist approaches to the world are instead different methods of acquiring knowledge. Truth, however it may be understood, is not reducible in the end to anything but itself. There can only be one world, one reality, in which this existence happens. We may have models to suggest the nature of that reality, in which different planes of reality exist. There are conclusions jumped to about a singular reality that are always in the end conceits of small-minded, venal people rather than useful conclusions for our problem of discovering truth; for example, a belief that if there is a God, or if the world is all that exists, it follows that a Satanic, venal ethos is the only permissible way to live. Such cowardly people should be ignored, but unfortunately, such people find it easy to insinuate themselves, as their ethos is a path of little resistance. There are then those who indulge in themselves and insist that they will create their own reality, and this is even stupider still and doomed to meet an end we are by now familiar with. Many of the answers to truth are things we can understand intuitively, but our intuitive knowledge gathering is disrupted in society, and we are made to attach moral values to ideals, materials, thought-forms, revelations, and whole theories, which are all intended to arrest a process that we were capable of without an overbearing pedagogue to tell us what to think. Unfortunately, humans are cursed with limited capacities and thrown into a world where many generations have built knowledge before us, and where vast institutions and libraries gather a preponderance of both knowledge and material energy and power to impose on us as they will. What we would do with such a world gives us little to work with, if we desire truth for ourselves or truth towards some objective that is discordant with the ruling ideas of today.

The philosophical tract of this chapter is by no means a complete investigation. The author must make it known that he does not like the practice of guru-seeking that has plagued intellectual development for centuries, and he is very much not a guru. I invite all readers to investigate philosophy for themselves if they are interested in this question, and to keep in mind their own sense and history, rather than to fall into the trap of gurus that is inherent the most pernicious pedagogy. I write it here not becase I feel I've found something new, but because it is a necessary exposition to explain why this reality control works, and the limitations of humans or any thinking animal in acquiring knowledge should be understood. It is not as if an abundance of knowledge will liberate you, and this is another false idea taught by gurus. Ideally, the reader will not have to repeat this philosophical inquiry, and can adjust their understanding as needed while retaining themselves. A fuller philosophical approach is beyond the scope of this book, and I cannot suggest to the reader what would be best for living life. That is not why I am writing this. I write it here so that confusion can be averted about what follows in this discussion. The central thought-germ to allow for reality control, and also for education as we have known it, is revelation and the control of it. Revelation, which is morally neutral, is granted a moral value which becomes greater as the control of reality intensifies, until basic assertions of material truth become the moral questions of the day, and morality in a genuine sense is abolished. As this is done, the ideas and history humanity developed become "bunk", and the trend towards slavery is declared to be a spooky and inexorable force plaguing the world. This state of affairs today was a seed in the religions humanity has known up to now, and it is the overriding goal of ruling institution philosophy to ensure that no new idea challenging this is possible, and will be snuffed out of existence as soon as it is born. How this is done is one of the questions I asked myself before writing this book, and before I could set out on this mission. We have been, in most of our lives, able to ignore revelation in our thoughts, because usually the world conforms to our expectations, and logical and rational understandings of the world are sufficient for formal knowledge. Emotional and personal understandings grant to us a body of knowledge that we might call common sense, since they are reproduced among many people and form a reliable basis for our learning, whether the learning is conducted on our own or through whatever learning formal education permits. As with and self-evident truth, "common sense" is increasingly uncommon, as manipulation of human beings and the segregation of humanity into clusters has produced for different castes a different "common sense" that is constructed for them by thought-leaders, rather than the common sense that was organic to humanity at an earlier time. This has been a gradual process, which was only partially controlled in the past. Modern science and an ability to control lives of subjects that was previously impossible requires us to develop a new sense and connection to the truth, if we would like our lives to be anything other than what a pedagogue or influencer tells us we are and can only be forevermore. I am doubtful any such program will work for much or reach far, but the author has spent his life pissing in the wind in hopes that this madness will change. I have no choice but to keep doing this, because compliance is not an option. If it were, I would cease writing, for what I write will be considered a forbidden revelation, which cannot be repeated in the institutions today. To speak of these things is social death and rejection, and it is even more so coming from me who has been rejected and tainted. I hope the reader can approach the following not with an incredulous, open mind, but with a critical approach that allows the reader to take from the book what is useful, and construct an understanding suitable to the problems posed.