>>929>This does not detract from their utility as fictions or effects as objects; if it did, then Stirner would not have bothered communicating his critiques in such possessive terms nor concern himself with possession at all.Possession has no root in ideas or social contract, rather in my ability. Of course I could use my communicative ability to come to an understanding with others that we do not touch each others possessions, but what's stopping me from still taking your apples? If my ability is strong enough you wont even know I broke the contract, for you it'll still be forfull and a force in the world even though it's rules have long been broken. That's because in the end the contract stays an idea, while my ability is real. This is egoism 101 my mane.
>Recognising the fictivity of spooks, and thus restoring them to their unreality (in thought and action), dispels their possession So why aren't you recognising the unreality of the social contract? It's no different from any othe spook. Your consensus absent a state is still just in your head. What idea could be so universal that it would be agreed on by everyone to the point of constituting a contract (that is a rule or set of rules which is expected to be followed by everyone partaking, meaning everyone since the contract is social)?
> If your mother is murdered in front of your eyes, will you be upset? Does the suffering of others not perturb you? Might the closure of bunkerchan be at least an annoyance? If so, then how spooked you are according to your logic!Are you fucking high? My mother dying affecting me emotionally is the fucking opposite of a spook, since her dying is literally a material reality! Where did you get this from? A social contract has no physical reality (as already explained above, i might break it without your knowing and it's still unbroken for you, if you break something material it's broken no matter the perspective). My mother has, at least the last time I checked. Now you might say that my mothers identity as mother definetly has spooky connotations, and I would agree, but my emotional relation towards her is still based on my actual history of percieved existence and growth of my psychè, so the emotional distress would be a subjective reality.
>what matters here is not the idea or its presence, but whether it is possessed or whether it possesses: that is what makes an idea a spook, and this difference is what distinguishes them.A social contract definetly possesses the partaking individuals. Its boundaries are the boundaries of their actions. If they were the possessors they could step over the lines of the social contract at any time.
>Stirner himself proposed a theory of social contract, too? It is called a "union of egoists", or more appropriately a union of uniques.Ok. Here it is. What is this shit?
The union of egoists has no rules - no contracts. I can use, abuse and drop the union to my liking. If not I could not partake as myself as a full person, as an egoist at all Of cousre the union can drop me at anytime too, there is nothing guaranteering me memership.
>By social contract, I refer to the shared values, standards, and repercussions held in common by such a communion.The communion you talk about sounds like it's indeed well placed in a church, but the union of egoists is everywhere we want it to be. Sometimes it's in the bar when we drink with people we otherwise despise, it's in the callcenter when we look out for the asses of colleagues we don't like against our bosses. Shared values, standarts and repercussions make a good party, what constitutes a union of egoists is nothing but our will to constitute it. And if I don't want to anymore, I don't. If there are repercussions for leaving or misbehaving in the union it wasn't one to begin with, at least not if these meassures are justified through the union, which is again abstract so how can it meaningfully constitute reality?
>What makes this arrangement dispossessed is precisely the fact that the possessors are the unique onesSo if I am a unique one, I am able to completly live myself out as I desire, since I am a complete person? In that case there can be no contract, no rules of behaviour, because that's directly contrary.
>Hogshire and Black freely associated and their union was determined by their mutual aid and consent. Hogshire violated that union, that social contract, when he literally threatened Black's life and attempted to murder him, largely over ideas which appeared to have possessed Hogshire.If they were associating according to contracts, the contracts were the ones acting free, not them. Of course Hogshire had the right (in an egoist perspective) to attack Black since he had the ability, or power, to do it, just as black had the right do defend himself to his power. That's the unspooked truth, but could go as far as their ability because that's how far they could go. Saying one of them had to right to go this or that far constraints his ability so self-express just as much as any other spook.
>This was not an act of free dissociation, but violence against that freedomWhat about Hogshires freedom to violence?
>Black did what anyone prudent enough to protect their freedom ought to do and eliminated Hogshire as a threat to himself and others in the least violent way available.First off, doesn't really seem like Hogshire was a direct threat to anyone really at the time that Black ratted him out. I mean he gave them the information via letter, so he definetly wasn't in the vicinty of Hogshire anymore. Am I supposed to believe that Hogshire is a constant threat because he does drugs and pointed a gun at an asshole one time? Aside from that I'm, as I said before, more disagreeing with Blacks behaviour being justified through some spooked social contract bs than him actually calling the cops (which still is a dick move imo). I mean he calls himself an anarchist?
Considering Proudhon, he is interesting for historical reasons, but most of his views are either useless due to utopianism or spookyness.
>Proudhon doesn’t want the propriétaire but the possesseur or usufruitier. What does that mean? He doesn’t want the land to belong to anyone; but the benefit of it—and even if one is entitled to only the hundredth part of this benefit, this fruit—is nonetheless his property which he can deal with as he sees fit. One who only has the benefit of an acre is assuredly not its property owner; still less the one who, as Proudhon wants it, must give up as much of the benefit as is not required for his needs; but he is the property owner of the share that is left to him. So Proudhon denies only this or that property, not property as such.
>Proudhon (also Weitling) believes he is saying the worst about property when he calls it theft (vol). Completely leaving aside the embarrassing question of what well-founded objection one could make against theft, we only ask: Is the concept of “theft” at all possible unless one lets the concept of “property” count? How can one steal if property doesn’t yet exist? What belongs to no one cannot be stolen; you don’t steal the water that you draw from the sea. Consequently, property is not theft, but a theft becomes possible only through property. Weitling also has to come to this, since he indeed regards everything as the property of all: if something is “the property of all,” then indeed the individual who appropriates it to himself steals. I mean, have you even read Der Einzige?
>I guarantee you that I am more radically Stirnerian and post-left than you have ever been in your life.Yeah mister "you-can't-threaten-me-or-im-morally-justified-in-calling-the-cops-since-you-broke-the-inmaterial-social-contract", very impressive misreadings you gor there.