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/leftypol/ - Leftist Politically Incorrect

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 No.485932[View All][Watch Thread]

Syrian rebels enter Aleppo three days into surprise offensive
Insurgents had recaptured territory around Syria’s second city with civilians including children killed in fighting

Islamist insurgents have entered Syria’s second city of Aleppo in a shock assault, eight years after forces loyal to Damascus seized control of the city.

Fighters from Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) began a major offensive earlier this week from their base in the Idlib countryside, a slim strip of land in Syria’s north-west. It took only three days for the fighting to reach Aleppo, with insurgents capturing territory around the city’s outskirts for the first time in four years as Syrian government forces pummelled rebel-held areas.

Turkey’s Anadolu state news agency reported on Friday afternoon that the insurgents had entered Aleppo, while unverified images and video circulating online showed armoured vehicles and armed uniformed militants on its streets. The Associated Press said residents reported hearing missiles striking its outskirts.

The fighting over the last three days had killed 27 civilians, including eight children, David Carden, the UN deputy regional humanitarian coordinator for the Syria crisis, told Reuters.

The rebels have rapidly recaptured dozens of towns and villages in the Aleppo countryside, seizing a military base, weaponry and tanks from Syrian government forces, while some Turkish-backed Syrian rebel groups based elsewhere in north-west Syria joined the fighting.

The UN said Syrian government forces based in Damascus carried out at least 125 airstrikes and shelled areas across Idlib and western Aleppo controlled by the rebels in response to the offensive, killing at least 12 civilians and wounding 46 others, and displacing 14,000 people.

Syria has been promised extra Russian military aid to help the army thwart the assault, two Syrian military sources told Reuters on Saturday. Damascus expects new Russian military hardware to start arriving at Russia’s Hmeimim airbase near Syria’s coastal city of Latakia in the next 72 hours, the sources added.

HTS said on Friday that it had captured four more towns including Mansoura, five miles from the centre of Aleppo. Syria’s state news agency said four civilians were killed inside student accommodation in the city when it was struck by projectiles from insurgent forces.

“The regime’s lines of defence have crumbled, I think they were taken aback. No one anticipated how fast the rebels would reach towards the edge of Aleppo,” said Dareen Khalifa, of the nonprofit International Crisis Group.

She added that it remained unclear whether the rebel forces would be able to hold the swath of captured territory, or how Russian forces backing the regime of Bashar al-Assad in Damascus may respond.

Turkey’s foreign ministry called for calm in the region around Idlib, demanding an end to the strikes on the area. “It is of utmost importance for Turkey that yet another and greater instability is avoided and civilians are not harmed,” it said.



A delicate balance of power in Syria has been increasingly tested over the past year, however, amid increasing regional fallout from Israel’s battle with the Iranian proxy group Hamas in Gaza.

Israel has dramatically escalated airstrikes against Iranian forces stationed on the ground in Syria, carrying out more than 116 strikes on Syrian territory, according to the UN, and killing more than 100 people, while recent fighting in Lebanon has forced 500,000 people to flee into neighbouring Syria.

The increasing Israeli strikes have put Iranian forces in Syria on the defensive, allowing rebels to exploit a moment where various proxy forces backing Assad are more engaged elsewhere.

Khalifa said Moscow remained focused primarily on the fighting in Ukraine. “The Russians are distracted in Ukraine. They are less invested politically if not military in Syria,” she said. “It’s difficult to tell what the result of this offensive is going to be. The rebels think the other side is vulnerable, and they have leverage.”

The Kremlin spokesperson, Dmitry Peskov, said on Friday that Moscow regarded the rebel attack as a violation of Syria’s sovereignty and wanted the authorities to act fast to regain control.

Turkey, which backs rebel groups along Syria’s northern border but has sought recently to normalise relations with Assad, is yet to publicly intervene in the latest round of fighting.

HTS said it would target Iranian forces fighting alongside Syrian government troops as part of the latest offensive. Iran’s Tasnim news agency said a commander from the Revolutionary Guards was killed in western Aleppo late this week.

The fighting and airstrikes appeared to paralyse much of the fragile network of services across rebel-held territory in Idlib, forcing the closure of health services and other infrastructure that sustain millions seeking shelter there.

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/nov/29/syrian-rebels-launch-surprise-attack-on-aleppo
80 posts and 11 image replies omitted. Click to expand.
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 No.486321>>486426

>>486286
you get credit for pointing out the similarities with the Mars Attacks movie.

Also I found that pretending Netanyahu says "Ack Ack, Ack!" during his speeches has surprising mental health benefits.
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 No.486426>>486439

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 No.486439

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 No.486465

https://x.com/HowardMortman/status/1870064513762075115
"We have been briefing you regularly there are approximately 900 US troops deployed to Syria. In light of situation in Syria and significant interest we recently learned those numbers were higher…I learned today in fact there are approximately 2,000 US troops in Syria"
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 No.486595>>486597>>486610>>486632

File (hide): 1735437961828-0.png ( 56.77 KB , 438x495 , ClipboardImage.png )

File (hide): 1735437961828-1.png ( 57.03 KB , 438x495 , ClipboardImage.png )

Damn this site is so fucking slow and dead
Syrian turkish jihadist sanduyghurs had their own stunning coat of arms, yet still picked the shitty template version to reskin
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 No.486597>>486632

File (hide): 1735438027930.png ( 129.82 KB , 555x577 , Sandnuyghuyrs_cant_make_OC.png )

>>486595
Actual subhumans defending this choice of inferior aesthetic
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 No.486610>>486626

>>486595
this is about the bird picture ? One has the wingtips pointed down and one has them pointing up.

Can you explain why coat of arms do ?
There are sooo many of these and they're hard to tell apart.
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 No.486626>>486632

File (hide): 1735497141669-0.mp4 ( 4.74 MB , 954x560 , MUTED_COLORS.mp4 ) [play once] [loop]

File (hide): 1735497141669-1.png ( 324.75 KB , 485x769 , ClipboardImage.png )

>>486610
The one with the wings up is original. The rest is a shitty lazily reskinned template, because the turkish jihadists got their brains fried from huffing sand.
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 No.486632

>>486595
>>486597
Wait, but if you preferred the 'wings up' version and that's the previous on, why does the guy in the picture have a CIA patch? That seems like it would be more of a patch HTS guys would have.

>>486626
No idea how you or anyone finds the time to be racist about something this insignificant.
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 No.486637>>486650

According to Red,
The Kurdish-led, US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) have regained control of eastern neighborhoods in Manbij, a strategic northern Syrian city. This comes after the SDF launched a counteroffensive against the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA).
https://twitter.com/redstreamnet/status/1873708894499057728
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 No.486644

[Embed]
Geopolitical Economy Report with Ben Norton - Secret CIA report on Syria reveals US plan to overthrow Assad government… in 1986!
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 No.486650>>486651

>>486637
>US-backed … Forces … launched a counteroffensive against the Turkish-backed … Army
So the Assad government was among other things also acting as a buffer that prevented new antagonisms between the US an Turkey.
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 No.486651>>486654

>>486650
From my POV this is basically US against US. Until Erdogan does something substantial, militarily, against Israel that matches the rhetoric, I'll see him as entirely on board with the US agenda.
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 No.486652>>486659

The new Syrian government is appointing Chechens, uyghurs, Egyptians, Jordanians, Turks, and Albanians to military positions.

"The sources said that out of a total of almost 50 military roles announced by the Defence Ministry on Sunday, at least six had gone to foreigners."

https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/syria-appoints-some-foreign-islamist-fighters-its-military-sources-say-2024-12-30/

According to Craig Murray, all 50 military appointments have gone to Sunnis.

https://x.com/CraigMurrayOrg/status/1874073178701479968
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 No.486654

>>486651
I think, Israel has over-extended it self big time, and it's hollowing out its foundations to fuel the expansion. Erdogan could be waiting for an opportunity to exploit that. Low budget imperialism
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 No.486659>>486662>>486663

>>486652
Even US-backed forces have to fulfill diversity quotas..
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 No.486662>>486663

>>486659
They don't call it DEISIS for nothing.
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 No.486663

>>486662
lol
>>486659
What does D and E stand for ?
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 No.486689

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 No.486898>>486979

File (hide): 1736902490246.webm ( 215 KB , 640x266 , catching ak47.webm ) [play once] [loop]

Since overthrowing the Syrian government has thrown Syria into chaos, the Syrian arsenal is now being sold off on the black market.

That means that Hezbollah is now able to buy weapons at a steep discount.
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 No.486979>>486982

>>486898
Initially surprised there was anything left tbh not that I should have been, obviously there'd still be, like, AKs and bullets like you attached at the very least and probably other stuff
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 No.486982

>>486979
After the Syrian government folded. Israel launched a frantic bombing campaign to destroy the big ticket items like tanks, helicopters, AA-radars/launchers and so on. I guess they destroyed 50% to 75% of that stuff. But they probably only got 10% of the smaller items.

Like you said, it's probably more than automatic rifles. Likely are mortars, rocket-pods, light cannons (for point defense or mounted on pickup trucks) , grenades and perhaps drones.
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 No.486987>>486988>>486991

Israel bodied Iran and its entire axis. Now with Syria fallen there's an open corridor for IAF sorties to take out Iran's nuke sites a la Osirak 1981
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 No.486988

>>486987
>Israel bodied Iran and its entire axis.
Yemen's still hitting Israel even as the US and UK continue to bomb Yemen on Israel's behalf.

>Now with Syria fallen there's an open corridor for IAF sorties to take out Iran's nuke sites a la Osirak 1981

The last time Israel (or possibly the US, see Daniel Alwan's possibly opsec-breaking post) attacked Iran directly, they struggled to get close enough to hit much, and that seems to have been down to Iran's own air defenses - Assad didn't do much of anything to impede them, an approach which, in retrospect, some would say was a mistake.
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 No.486991

>>486987
>Israel bodied Iran and its entire axis.
Isreal has mainly bodied bloodied children in Gaza.

>Now with Syria fallen there's an open corridor

Those linchpin theories usually don't pan out.

>for IAF sorties to take out Iran's

Iran seem to have a potent air defense system these days. The last time Israel attempted an air-raid, was a few months ago. They fired fighter based long range stand-off weapons into Iran. By all appearances those ran into a veritable air-defense buzz-saw and very few targets were actually hit. After that Israel called off the followup strikes they had previously announced.
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 No.487598>>487600>>487601

# Iran's Axis of Resistance After Assad: Strategic Decline and Adaptation in a Shifting Middle East

The ousting of Bashar al-Assad in December 2024 has precipitated a fundamental realignment of Middle Eastern geopolitics, dealing a severe blow to Iran’s decades-old strategy of regional dominance through its "Axis of Resistance." This network of state and non-state allies—including Syria, Hezbollah, Hamas, Iraqi militias, and Yemen’s Houthis—has served as the cornerstone of Tehran’s foreign policy since the 1980s, enabling it to project power across the Levant and counter U.S.-Israeli influence. However, Assad’s fall has shattered the logistical backbone of this axis, severing Iran’s land corridor to Hezbollah in Lebanon and exposing the fragility of its proxy-first strategy. With Syria now in disarray, regional adversaries like Turkey and Israel are capitalizing on Tehran’s weakened position, while internal debates within Iran’s leadership reveal diverging paths forward: doubling down on asymmetric warfare or pivoting to conventional deterrence. The Islamic Republic’s ability to adapt to this new reality will shape not only its regional standing but also the future stability of the Middle East.



## The Strategic Importance of Syria to Iran’s Axis of Resistance

### Syria as Iran’s Geopolitical Linchpin
Syria’s centrality to Iran’s regional strategy cannot be overstated. For over four decades, the Iranian-Syrian alliance provided Tehran with a critical conduit for projecting influence westward to the Mediterranean, enabling the steady flow of weapons, funds, and personnel to Hezbollah in Lebanon[1][3][6]. This "Shiite Crescent"—stretching from Iran through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon—allowed Tehran to maintain a credible deterrent against Israel while counterbalancing Sunni Arab rivals like Saudi Arabia. The Assad regime’s survival during the Syrian Civil War (2011–2024) depended heavily on Iran’s military and financial support, which included deploying Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) advisors and mobilizing Shia militias from Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan[1][6].

The collapse of this corridor following Assad’s ouster has left Iran scrambling to maintain supply lines to Hezbollah, its most capable proxy. Analysts note that without reliable overland routes through Syria, Tehran must now rely on riskier air and sea shipments, which are more vulnerable to Israeli interdiction[3][6]. This logistical disruption coincides with Hezbollah’s military degradation after months of intense conflict with Israel, further eroding Iran’s ability to threaten Israeli territory from Lebanon[1][2].



## The Erosion of Iran’s Proxy Network

### Hezbollah: A Weakened Pillar of the Axis
Hezbollah’s diminished capacity represents one of the most immediate consequences of Assad’s fall. Prior to 2023, the group possessed an estimated 150,000 rockets and missiles, many of which were supplied via the Syrian corridor[6]. However, sustained Israeli airstrikes targeting weapon depots and transit routes have degraded this arsenal, while Hezbollah’s political capital in Lebanon has waned due to economic collapse and public backlash against Iranian influence[2][4]. Iranian officials privately acknowledge that rebuilding Hezbollah’s capabilities could take years—a timeline complicated by Syria’s instability and Lebanon’s fragmented governance[3][6].

### Hamas and the Gaza Debacle
Hamas, though geographically isolated from the Syrian corridor, has also suffered strategic setbacks that ripple across the Axis. Israel’s military campaign in Gaza since October 2023 has dismantled much of Hamas’ governance infrastructure and reduced its rocket-launching capacity by an estimated 70%[2][4]. While Iran continues to fund Hamas, the group’s inability to pose a credible threat from Gaza undermines Tehran’s narrative of a united "resistance front." Moreover, the lack of a Syrian staging ground limits Iran’s ability to coordinate arms transfers to Hamas via Sinai or maritime routes[4].

### The Houthis: Iran’s Last Standing Proxy?
Yemen’s Houthi rebels now represent Tehran’s most active proxy force, having launched numerous missile and drone attacks against Red Sea shipping and Israeli targets. However, their utility is constrained by geographic distance from Iran’s core interests and reliance on limited weapon stocks. Israeli precision strikes on Sana’a in early 2025 demonstrated the vulnerability of Houthi assets, while Saudi-led coalition pressures further strain their operational freedom[1][4]. Analysts warn that without Syrian or Iraqi transit routes, resupplying the Houthis will become increasingly difficult for Iran[6].



## Regional Power Shifts and Iran’s Strategic Isolation

### Turkey’s Ascendance in Northern Syria
Turkey has emerged as a primary beneficiary of Syria’s destabilization, leveraging its support for Sunni opposition groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) to expand influence in northern Syria[1]. By positioning itself as a stabilizing force, Ankara has curtailed Iranian-backed militias’ ability to operate near the Turkish border, while its economic investments in rebel-held territories undermine Tehran’s efforts to rally Alawite and Shia minorities[1][6]. Notably, Turkey’s alignment with the Trump administration’s anti-Iran agenda has provided diplomatic cover for its Syrian interventions, further isolating Tehran[1].

### Israel’s Unshackled Military Posture
Israel has exploited the post-Assad power vacuum to intensify strikes against Iranian assets across the region. With Syrian air defenses in disarray, the Israeli Air Force (IAF) has conducted unprecedented raids targeting IRGC bases in eastern Syria and weapon convoys bound for Hezbollah[2][4]. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government views Assad’s ouster as an opportunity to dismantle the Axis of Resistance permanently, lobbying the U.S. to greenlight potential strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities[2][6].

### Russia’s Retreat and the Limits of Patronage
Moscow’s declining military footprint in Syria has compounded Iran’s challenges. While Russia once provided diplomatic cover for Assad at the UN Security Council, its focus on the Ukraine conflict has reduced its appetite for Syrian entanglements. This withdrawal has left Iranian-backed militias exposed to Turkish and Israeli offensives, undermining Tehran’s ability to hold territorial gains[1][4].



## Iran’s Strategic Crossroads: Adaptation or Escalation?

### Path 1: Doubling Down on Asymmetric Warfare
Some Iranian hardliners advocate reinforcing the remnants of the Axis by mobilizing Iraqi militias and the Houthis against U.S. and Israeli targets. This approach mirrors Tehran’s playbook during the Iraq War, when proxy attacks on coalition forces extracted concessions from Washington. However, the decimation of Hamas and Hezbollah raises doubts about the viability of this strategy[2][6]. Escalating attacks on shipping in the Red Sea or Persian Gulf could provoke direct U.S. military retaliation, a risk Iran’s leadership has historically sought to avoid[4][6].

### Path 2: Pivoting to Conventional Deterrence
An alternative path involves diverting resources from proxy warfare to bolster Iran’s domestic military capabilities, particularly its missile and drone arsenals. The IRGC’s Aerospace Force recently unveiled the Kheibar Shekan-3 ballistic missile, with a reported range of 2,000 km—capable of striking Israel without Syrian launchpads[5]. Concurrently, Tehran has accelerated uranium enrichment to near-weapons-grade levels, signaling a potential shift toward nuclear deterrence[5]. While this strategy reduces reliance on unstable proxies, it risks triggering preemptive strikes by Israel or the U.S.[2][5].

### Path 3: Diplomatic Reengagement
A less likely but plausible scenario involves Iran seeking détente with regional rivals to stabilize its western flank. Preliminary talks with Syria’s post-Assad government suggest Tehran is exploring avenues to preserve limited influence in Damascus, possibly through economic investments or cultural outreach[4][5]. However, such efforts face stiff resistance from Turkey and Arab states determined to curtail Iranian meddling[1][6].



## Internal Fractures and the Nuclear Wildcard

### Leadership Divisions in Tehran
The post-Assad crisis has exacerbated tensions between pragmatic and hardline factions within Iran’s political establishment. President Massoud Pezeshkian, elected in 2024 on promises of economic reform, faces mounting pressure to prioritize domestic stability over costly foreign adventures[5]. Conversely, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and IRGC commanders remain committed to the Axis doctrine, framing it as an ideological imperative rather than a mere policy choice[2][4]. This fbi.gov complicates coherent strategy-making, with competing power centers pursuing divergent agendas[5].

### The Nuclear Calculus
Iran’s nuclear program looms larger in its post-Assad strategic calculus. With conventional proxies weakened, hardliners argue that nuclear latency—or even weaponization—could restore deterrence against Israel[2][5]. Satellite imagery from January 2025 revealed expanded centrifuge arrays at Fordow, suggesting Tehran is hedging its bets. However, overt pursuit of nuclear arms risks unified Western-Arab-Israeli retaliation, including potential military action[2][5].



## Conclusion: A Diminished Axis in a Contested Region

The fall of Bashar al-Assad has irrevocably altered the Middle Eastern strategic landscape, exposing the limitations of Iran’s proxy-centric approach. While the Axis of Resistance retains residual capabilities—particularly in Yemen and Iraq—its heyday as a coherent anti-Western alliance has passed. Iran now faces a dilemma: continue pouring resources into rebuilding fractured proxies or reorient toward conventional/nuclear deterrence. Either path carries significant risks, from regional escalation to internal unrest.

Regional adversaries, sensing Tehran’s vulnerability, are likely to intensify pressure on its remaining allies. Israel’s campaign against Hezbollah and the Houthis shows no signs of abating, while Turkey’s entrenchment in northern Syria complicates Iranian efforts to regain influence. Meanwhile, the U.S. and its Arab partners have an opportunity to leverage Iran’s weakened position for diplomatic gains, potentially offering sanctions relief in exchange for curbs on proxy activities.

Ultimately, the Axis’s prospects hinge on Tehran’s ability to reconcile ideological imperatives with geopolitical realities. A pragmatic recalibration—reducing reliance on unstable proxies while engaging in guarded diplomacy—may offer the only viable path to preserving Iran’s regional relevance. However, with hardliners dominating key institutions, such a shift remains unlikely in the near term. The Middle East thus enters 2025 poised between the fading echoes of Iran’s resistance doctrine and the uncertain contours of a new order.

Citations:
[1] https://gulfif.org/iran-grapples-with-a-new-strategic-reality-after-assads-ouster/
[2] https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/12/19/irans-3-possible-post-assad-paths/
[3] https://www.nytimes.com/2024/12/08/world/middleeast/irans-syria-axis-of-resistance.html
[4] https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/breaking-the-chain-why-assads-fall-leaves-iran-scrambling/
[5] https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/country-to-watch-2025-iran-195462
[6] https://www.rferl.org/a/iran-syria-assad-lebanon-hezbollah/33232587.html
[7] https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/iransource/gaza-iran-resistance-axis-hamas-hezbollah-israel/
[8] https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/analysis-how-does-assads-ouster-in-syria-affect-irans-influence-over-the-region
[9] https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/12/31/how-syria-fell-and-whats-next-for-irans-axis-of-resistance/
[10] https://www.cnas.org/publications/commentary/sharper-iran-and-the-axis-of-upheaval
[11] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/12/21/the-iran-led-axis-of-resistance-in-the-aftermath-of-syrias-upheaval
[12] https://www.stimson.org/2025/what-roles-will-russia-and-iran-play-in-post-assad-syria/
[13] https://san.com/cc/assad-ouster-in-syria-will-have-ripple-effects-in-iran-russia/
[14] https://www.stimson.org/2025/irans-axis-of-resistance-weakened-but-still-dangerous/
[15] https://www.iranintl.com/en/202501010857
[16] https://www.chathamhouse.org/2024/12/fall-assad-has-exposed-extent-damage-irans-axis-resistance
[17] https://www.cfr.org/expert-brief/will-iran-become-more-dangerous-after-assads-ouster-syria
[18] https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2024/12/10/iran-syria-nuclear-weapons-israel-assad/
[19] https://economictimes.com/news/international/world-news/is-iran-next-fall-of-assad-jolts-a-vulnerable-leadership/articleshow/116197202.cms
[20] https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2025/01/07/the-future-of-irans-foreign-policy-in-the-complex-geopolitics-of-the-post-assad-middle-east/
[21] https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/12/21/the-iran-led-axis-of-resistance-in-the-aftermath-of-syrias-upheaval
[22] https://www.rand.org/pubs/commentary/2025/01/the-fall-of-assad-could-be-a-turning-point-for-the.html
[23] https://www.barrons.com/articles/ouster-of-assad-breaks-link-in-iran-s-axis-of-resistance-e87e0dd2
[24] https://www.timesofisrael.com/assads-collapse-fractures-iranian-axis-but-ensuing-chaos-could-batter-rest-of-region/
[25] https://mecouncil.org/blog_posts/with-the-axis-of-resistance-in-retreat-how-will-the-iranian-people-respond/
[26] https://tribune.com.pk/story/2516637/iran-rejects-claims-of-collapsed-resistance-axis-after-syrias-assad-ouster-says-supreme-leader
[27] https://www.oxan.com/insights/prospects-for-middle-east-security-in-2025/
[28] https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/12/31/how-syria-fell-and-whats-next-for-irans-axis-of-resistance/
[29] https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/reshaping-iran%E2%80%99s-axis-resistance
[30] https://www.argusmedia.com/en/news-and-insights/latest-market-news/2636966-assad-s-ouster-removes-key-outlet-for-iran-s-crude
[31] https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c05pmmzp63zo
[32] https://www.barrons.com/articles/iran-s-khamenei-says-resistance-not-over-after-assad-ouster-4f979658(USER WAS WARNED FOR THIS POST: Do not repost AI-generated content verbatim)
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 No.487600

>>487598
Nice war propaganda, PNAC.

>it risks triggering preemptive strikes by Israel or the U.S.

For all the very obvious bullshit in this piece, this item especially sticks out. Israel has already launched multiple "preemptive" strikes on Iran in the past year. The US's conduct in Iraq showed that no actual threat of any sort of "WMD" is necessary - they'll just start a war of aggression and claim it's "preemptive." The idea that Iran is racing to produce nuclear weapons and the US is making any calculations based on "preventing" that is a total fantasy. It's not how the US operates.

Time and time again, the US (and its proxies) have made shit up as a pretext to invade other countries.
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 No.487601>>487602

>>487598
This does not present a solid argument why Iran won't be able to have influence in Post-Assad Syria. If Iran build up a network of proxies allies all throughout west Asia since the 1980s. They prolly just continue doing that in Syria. Given Israel's escalating atrocities, they probably motivated a lot of people to oppose Israel.

Your LLM just declares the situation has "irrevocably changed" but it hasn't. It also declares Hezbollah is out of the game, when in reality they fought Israel to standstill again. By the way Hezbollah formed independently from Iran, as a response to an Israeli invasion of Lebanon.

The only true change is that Iran has tech-ed up and Israel no longer has better military hardware. That last exchange of hostilities (the back and forth airstrikes) had Iran at an advantage. The Iranian missiles punched through Israel's air defense systems, while the Israeli strike with fighter-jet based stand-off weapons, was mostly repelled, and follow up strikes had to be called off.

The "nuclear calculus" is that the Russians have convinced Iran that it can generate sufficient deterrence without nukes. And that probably is true, Israel is very small and a sufficiently powerful conventional arsenal will do the trick.
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 No.487602

>>487601
>The only true change is that Iran has tech-ed up and Israel no longer has better military hardware. That last exchange of hostilities (the back and forth airstrikes) had Iran at an advantage. The Iranian missiles punched through Israel's air defense systems, while the Israeli strike with fighter-jet based stand-off weapons, was mostly repelled, and follow up strikes had to be called off.
Ha ha ha, foolish anon
You believed your lying eyes!
I have it on good word passed down from the Biden state department, renowned for its honesty, that akshually the last Israeli attack on Iran destroyed Iran's air defenses! They were located in the sky far above Iran, which is why almost all of the Israeli missiles exploded up there! That's also where Iran stores its drone motherships!
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 No.487785>>487786>>487787>>487814

https://x.com/MintPressNews/status/1894816189370495063
A Druze militia has declared their intention to defect from Syria and form their own autonomous region

This development came only a day after Israeli PM Benjamin Netanyahu declared that Syrian army forces aligned with the transitional HTS-led government must withdraw from all areas south of Damascus and that Israel will protect the Druze population. The Israelis are currently attempting to co-opt Druze forces to work under their proxy regime in southern Syria, essentially ending the country once known as the Syrian Arab Republic.
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 No.487786

>>487785
No one could have predicted this
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 No.487787

>>487785
Wonder if we'll see an Alawite and a Christian autonomous region as well. Or maybe those demographics are too disperse in Syria.
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 No.487814

>>487785
Forming a autonomous region might be a good idea, but throwing in with the Israeli … that won't end well. Israeli society is build around hating some group and displacing/dispossessing it, what they're doing to the Palestinians, that might happen to the Druze.
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 No.487850

Ocalan now asking the PKK/YPG to disarm.
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 No.487855>>487857

A compelling case can be made that the fall of Baathist Iraq in 2003 was a major precursor to the eventual collapse of Baathist Syria in 2024. The two regimes were structurally similar, sharing ideological foundations, geopolitical positioning, and common enemies. The destruction of one set into motion a chain of events that made the fall of the other almost inevitable.

### 1. The Loss of Iraq as a Strategic Counterbalance
Before 2003, Iraq and Syria—despite their differences—served as mutual counterbalances in the region. The fall of Saddam Hussein removed a major Arab nationalist stronghold, allowing regional and global powers (especially the U.S. and Iran) to reshape the Middle East’s political landscape. With Iraq gone as a buffer state, Syria was left more exposed to external pressures, particularly from the West, Turkey, and Islamist militant groups.

### 2. The Rise of Sectarianism and the Weakening of Baathism
The U.S. invasion of Iraq led to a power vacuum that was filled by sectarian conflict, weakening pan-Arab Baathist ideology in favor of identity-based politics. The Iraqi insurgency, dominated by Sunni jihadists and Shia militias, marked the beginning of the end for secular Arab nationalist regimes. This same sectarian dynamic played out in Syria’s civil war, where Assad's Baathist government increasingly relied on sectarian militias (e.g., Hezbollah, Iranian-backed forces) rather than its traditional nationalist base.

### 3. The Strengthening of U.S. and Western Interventionism
The precedent of regime change in Iraq emboldened Western powers to pursue similar policies elsewhere, either through direct military intervention (Libya) or through support for insurgencies (Syria). The 2011 uprising in Syria was met with U.S., European, and Gulf-state backing for rebel factions, mirroring the way the U.S. dismantled Iraq’s Baathist regime. The lessons learned in Iraq—such as the use of proxies, economic sanctions, and no-fly zones—were later applied to Syria, accelerating its destabilization.

### 4. The Spillover of Jihadist Insurgencies
The fall of Baathist Iraq created a breeding ground for jihadist groups like Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which later evolved into ISIS. These groups found new battlegrounds in Syria’s post-2011 conflict, directly contributing to the weakening of Assad’s control. Without the Iraq War, it’s unlikely that ISIS would have emerged as the powerful force it became, severely undermining the Syrian state and making its eventual fall more likely.

### 5. The Iran Factor: Overextension and Strategic Overreach
Iran stepped in to fill the power vacuum left by Saddam's fall, turning Iraq into a client state. This gave Iran a direct land corridor to Syria, allowing it to prop up Assad with fighters, weapons, and economic aid. However, this overextension drained Iran’s resources and put Syria in a precarious position. By the 2020s, with Iran facing its own internal crises and economic decline, its ability to sustain Assad became weaker—leading to the Syrian regime’s ultimate downfall in 2024.

### 6. The Normalization of Arab Regime Change
The fall of Saddam Hussein helped normalize the idea that strongman regimes in the Arab world were not invincible. While it took longer for Syria to collapse, the precedent set by Iraq was clear: once an authoritarian leader loses legitimacy and external support, their days are numbered. The 2011 Arab Spring, which fueled Syria’s civil war, was partially inspired by the realization that long-standing regimes could be toppled—something first demonstrated in Iraq.

### 7. The Erosion of Russian Influence
Syria, like Iraq before it, was a key Russian ally in the Middle East. The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 showed that Moscow was either unwilling or unable to prevent the downfall of its regional partners. This pattern repeated in Syria, where Russian intervention prolonged Assad’s rule but ultimately could not save him. The strategic retreat of Russian power in the 2020s (due to economic and military strain from the Ukraine war) sealed Syria’s fate—just as Russia’s post-Cold War weakness made Iraq’s fall possible in 2003.

### Conclusion
The fall of Baathist Iraq was not just an isolated event but a critical first domino that set the stage for Syria’s eventual collapse two decades later. It removed a key regional player, weakened Baathist ideology, fueled jihadist insurgencies, emboldened Western intervention, and overextended Iran and Russia. Without the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Syria’s fall in 2024 might not have happened—or at least, it might have played out very differently.(USER WAS WARNED FOR THIS POST: Do not repost AI-generated content verbatim)
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 No.487857>>487858

>>487855
Sorry but if the AI you got this from, believes in Domino theory, it's not very intelligent.

It's also wrong on the geo-pol big-picture, both Russia and Iran have expanded their influence in the region at the expense of Israel and US influence. The last 2 decades of neocon forever-wars were a giant waste of blood and treasure. Even before factoring in that China brokered a peace between Yemen, Saudi Arabia and Iran. The side effect of this was the US losing leverage over Saudi Oil production volume / oil-price.

Considering that the neocons originally thought that it would take them at most a year to topple Assad, while in reality it took them over 20 years, proves how bad they really are at imperialising.

Isreal lost it's military exchanges with Hamas, Hezbollah, Yemen and Iran. And considering how wrecked their economy, destroyed their international reputation and beat up the IDF now is, we're looking at a situation where Israel is likely going to wither away. The fall of Assad is just copium. If Netanyahu manages to instigate that war against Iran, he's been plotting and scheming for so long, we'll see a hard wipe-out of Israel alongside most of the US's bases.

Give up, you can't polish this foreign policy turd into triumphalism.
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 No.487858>>487878

>>487857
The stupid AI poster who, for some reason, posts shitty generated neocon "articles" in these threads, is obviously not providing anything of value, but I also disagree with some of your assessment to an extent.

It took 20 (or at least 13) years for the US to topple Assad, but, in retrospect, it really seems like they've been doing a lot of this stuff on behalf of Israel, and when you frame the toppling of Assad that way and all the humiliating, wasteful wars in the middle east by the US as a product of Israeli interests, then they seem like remarkable wish fulfillments. As pursuits of US interests, outside of selling arms (which the US pays itself for), they are catastrophic failures, but Israel has gotten to see a much larger country do most of the legwork and finance and fighting to kill people Israel doesn't like.

I think Israel's exchange with Hezbollah is also questionable as a loss. Strictly looking at it in terms of tactical accomplishments and a support front for Gaza, it's possible to say Hezbollah won; at the 'end' of the war in Lebanon, Hezbollah was hitting Tel Aviv, and they do seem to have succeeded in making Israel shift resources away from Gaza to an extent. However, Israel's terroristic attacks on the capital of Lebanon and on civilians did successfully lead to an internal political pressure on Hezbollah which resulted in Hezbollah de-linking from Gaza. The ceasefire did not come with Israel's unrealistic aim of completely destroying Hezbollah, but it also did not come with an immediate ceasefire in Gaza. The new president and prime minister of Lebanon are essentially US/Israeli puppets, installed under a great deal of US pressure, and they still have the stated aim of disarming Hezbollah, even as Israel has continued to consistently violate the ceasefire for months. Hezbollah has offered no retaliation, and there are now many bodies being discovered in the south of the country as Israel has partially withdrawn. Hezbollah itself seems to have much weaker leadership now than before, and it suffered a lot of terrible losses, so if their contribution to the support of Gaza can be considered a victory, it has to be considered an extremely pyrrhic one.

I always take issue when people on the left predict things will "wither away," too - there's a very prominent history of those words not coming to be realized. It will take a lot more to make it happen. You wrote about Assad earlier, and it took 13-20 years of continuous economic and proxy and (in some cases) direct attacks from the most powerful country in the world to topple Assad. Israel may be losing money, but it has the opposite relation with US, and it still has trade relations with the EU, Russia, etc. as well. The US's relationship with Israel seems outright suicidal; US leaders will completely destroy their own country to prop up this once-proxy. If that continues, and the opposition in the US don't get their shit together, who knows how long this could last?

The fall of Assad isn't insignificant at all, either, Syria has been plunged into chaos and largely disarmed, Israel has taken massive swathes of additional land in the country, and it looks like the plan to continue carving it up by turning ethnic and religious factions against eachother is largely working.
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 No.487878

>>487858
>wasteful wars in the middle east by the US as a product of Israeli interests
Israel is a partial reason for the middle eastern / west Asia wars. But there also was the military industrial complex making money on weapons. And then there are other geopolitical goals like preventing Arabs from forming a powerful block. These wars also were supposed to create chaos to slow down the belt and road project from China. And things like exploiting resources. Maybe other things like the CIA could have been using Afghani farmers to farm drug-plants for "covert budgets".

>seem like remarkable wish fulfillments

Both the US and Israel are in a worse geopolitical position then they were 25 years ago before all of this. So those must have been stupid wishes.

I think you are looking too much at the map and ignore too many other factors. Israel has depleted a lot of it's fighting-capacity in it's population, they're almost tapped out, and have to wait for another generation until they can try again. By that time Iran will be so strong that they can check anybody who tries to tear up the region. Netanyahu also wrecked Israel's economy, it's very doubtful that this can be repaired because Israel's reputation is ruined. If you're a Israeli tech-bro , you can go the US, EU or Russia, and get better conditions, so most of their tech ventures are lost. Keep in mind that "Israel based company" is now a bad marker. It means more risk, and a hole bunch of moral aversion.

You are right that the US installed a puppet government in Lebanon, but it's a sideshow. Lebanon is increasingly ruled by Hezbollah. Even the neocons agree with this. They started talking about "the post-Hezbollah period" in Lebanon. They never do this word-salad-game when they're winning at regime change, when things go their way they stay silent. The fact that they started talking this way means they also think they're loosing in Lebanon.

>it took 13-20 years of continuous economic and proxy and (in some cases) direct attacks from the most powerful country in the world to topple Assad.

Yes a small, relatively poor country, and the big super-power chewed 2 decades on it. That's not a big demonstration of power. Keep in mind that Syria wasn't an end in it self, it was a means to get to Iran. That ship has sailed a long time ago.

>The US's relationship with Israel seems outright suicidal; US leaders will completely destroy their own country to prop up this once-proxy.

They want to create the appearance that the US would back Israel unconditionally, but in reality i highly doubt that is the case otherwise Netanyahu would have already gone to war with Iran a long time ago.

>If that continues, and the opposition in the US don't get their shit together, who knows how long this could last?

Not long, a section of imperial capital wants to pick a fight with the Chinese, who are hiding their power-level. Once that shit starts a lot fewer imperial resources will be available for fucking with the middle east / west Asia.
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 No.487982

https://twitter.com/redstreamnet/status/1897744562967200043
https://twitter.com/HadiNasrallah/status/1897836967003365790

Dozens killed in clashes between Syrian forces and Assad loyalists

Forces linked to Syria's new rulers have engaged in heavy fighting with fighters loyal to deposed President Bashar al-Assad in a coastal area of the country.

It is the worst violence in Syria since rebels toppled Assad in December and installed an Islamist transitional government.

A war monitoring group, the British-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights, said more than 70 people have been killed.

A curfew has been imposed in the port cities of Latakia and Tartous, where the fighting has broken out.

The clashes started when government forces were ambushed during a security operation in Latakia.

Reinforcements have been sent, and videos posted online show heavy gunfire in some places.

The coastal region is the heartland of the Alawite minority, and a stronghold of the Assad family, which belong to the Alawite sect.

Estimations of the number of people killed in the violence vary, and the BBC has been unable to independently verify them.

Late on Thursday, Syrian-based Step news agency was reporting that government-aligned forces had killed "about 70" former regime fighters, while more than 25 others were captured in Jableh and surrounds.

There have also been reports of clashes in the cities of Homs and Aleppo.

The crackle of heavy gunfire on residential streets in Homs could be heard on unverified videos on social media.

A spokesman for Syria's defence ministry, Colonel Hassan Abdul Ghani, issued a warning to Assad loyalists fighting in Latakia via state media.

"Thousands have chosen to surrender their weapons and return to their families, while some insist on fleeing and dying in defence of murderers and criminals. The choice is clear: lay down your weapons or face your inevitable fate," he said.

The region has become a major security challenge for interim president Ahmed al-Sharaa.

Alawite activists said their community had been subjected to violence and attacks since Assad fell, particularly in rural Homs and Latakia.

He is also facing resistance in the south, where there have been clashes with Druze forces in recent days.

https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/cdrxkm2evnlo
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 No.488001>>488003

[Embed]
KernowDamo on the emergence of the Military Council for the Liberation of Syria.
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 No.488003

>>488001
In retrospect this development seems kinda obvious. I'm slightly annoyed with my self that i didn't predict it. Especially since i knew HTS was going to do sectarian killings.

Iran probably will be able to funnel loads of weapons to MCLS.
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 No.488010

>>

 No.488016

[Embed]
BadEmpanada on the latest developments with US-backed Al Qaeda.
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 No.488017>>488018

It's really amazing how a bunch of foreign invaders from Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and China can be considered the "legitimate government" of Syria.
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 No.488018

>>488017
And they were recognized by western gov'ts immediately after overthrowing Assad, what luck! Weird that Ansar Allah has been governing Yemen for much longer and the west just skipped right over recognizing them to endorse ISIS.
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 No.488019

[Embed]
Laith Marouf sez HTS convoys are heading towards Iraq.
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 No.488041>>488085

[Embed]
Galloway on Syria (starts around 3 mins I think, initially he's talking about the Romanian election)
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 No.488057>>488085

[Embed]
HTS is apparently making friends with the Kurds now.
Seems sort of odd.
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 No.488085>>488086

>>488041
He thinks the Romanian population will not accept the abolishing of their democratic rights and enforce their democratic choice of leadership, and says they have done so before. I don't know anything about Romania, so is that's how it's gonna be ?

Yeah the Syria shit sucks. Consider the average Syrian had to endure extreme material hardship because the Syrian economy got sanctioned to shit, and now they have to dodge the sectarian head-choppers.

>>488057
>Seems sort of odd.
Indeed, the Kurds are at odds with Turkey who is HTS's principle backer.

HTS might just be desperate.
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 No.488086

>>488085
>I don't know anything about Romania, so is that's how it's gonna be ?
Idk anything about Romania either lol

>HTS might just be desperate.

I'd guess the Kurds are too.

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